A SOCIO-RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN THE MUSLIM COUNTRIES
The Issue of Modernization

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PREFACE

The history of Islam in the Muslim world is actually a dynamic process which covers a continuity and change. Some local elements have still been practiced while some others have changed. The first is especially concerned with the aspects of local traditions which are permitted by Islamic teachings. The second is concerned with the issues of special rituals which have become traditions of the people for a long time. These traditions have not been practiced anymore because of the awareness of the people. This because the new wave of Islamic mission has reached them or the people themselves who have increased their Islamic knowledge.

As it is elaborated in the Chapter one, Islam was able to enrich itself with the other traditions to form its new traditions. This section will focus on the issue of the "relation between religion and sovereignty" in the early Abbasid government, more specifically in the period of Al-Mansur. In the case of Islamization in Indonesia, there is transition of pre-Islamic tradition to Islam. In order to explain the scope of the section, it raises the questions: what were the traditional beliefs and how did they make contact with Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam when these religions entered Indonesia; How profoundly Hinduism and Buddhism penetrated the religious life of the people; and how Islam conquered areas which had previously been Hinduized. The answer is, of course, not on the argument that one religion or belief replaces the other, but rather on the view of the process of change in Islam which is still on going.

The process of change indicates the beginning of modernization in the Muslim world. There is pro-contra on the issue. Some Muslims oppose modernization is simply because it is from the Western countries and, therefore, is same with westernization. Everyone who wears the products of western modern industries is claimed as modern. Some others accept that modernoization has its root in Islamic teaching. Therefore, it does not contradict with Islam. Among the reason those who accept this idea is that in Islam there is a theological basis of modernization. It denotes the universality of Islamic teachings, the finality of the Prophetic function of Muhammad and, the legitimacy of the text in the Qur'an and Hadith.

The application of tajdid in the history of Islam covers aspects of thoughts and movements; religious, social, political, and cultural ideas. It reveals many mujaddidun from the class of ulama and umara. Their function is to preserve and apply Islamic teachings to fulfil the demand of developments. Its themes are to respond the decline of Muslim community as well as to respond the progress

attained by the Muslims. The first is concerned with the religious matters and the second with the historical experiences of the Muslims. All these are discussed in chapter two.

Chapter three focuses on the discussion of the transmission of the modernist ideas. The session is actually tracing the transformation of the tajdid ideas in Indonesia. Many works claim that the modernist movements in Indonesia are influenced by the modern ideas from the Middle East. Claiming that Egypt, especially the thought of Muhammad Abduh, has dominant one. This works reveals that Mekka and Madina have an important role in shaping the ideas of many elites and founders of Islamic movements in twentieth century Indonesia. Although, Muhammad Abduh of Egypt becomes a reference of some Muslim activists in Indonesia through his publications, the religious ideas of all founders of Islamic movements in Indonesia in the early twentieth century are from Mekka. All of the leaders of Islamic movements are alumni of Mekka and Madina. They perform hajj and stay (*muqim*) for certain years to enrich the religious knowledge that become an important tool in performing the purification of religious life of Indonesian Muslims.

The last chapter closes with the issues that have been discussed in many regions and in certain time, responding the problems occur. Such issues are the dispute on inheritance among the Muslims in Indonesia, initiated by Munawir Sadzali. The Jadidist movement in late nineteenth and early twetieth century Russia: the role of Ismail Gasprinskii and the reformation of Muslim education: Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah. The last tries to compare between the modern Muslim education in India and Indonesia. Both Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah promote the modern ideas concerning the management ideal of Muslim education.

I. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

1. Persian Tradition and Islam: The Relation Between Religion and Sovereignty

The history of the early development of Islam is not only the history of territorial expansion, but also the history of a diffusion process which has occurred at a wider level of Islamic tradition. In this process, Islam enriched itself with the traditions of newly conquered lands or some other traditions to form its new traditions. Such a process results in theses which state that certain pre-Islamic traditions, such as pre-Islamic Arabian tradition, Sasanian tradition, Christianity and Judaism became important sources of influence in the formation of Islamic tradition. The contact with some other traditions caused the first seeds of Islamic tradition to develop. Among the influences with a foreign national element which Islam came into direct contact with in its early days were the traditions of kingship and government. This work tries to trace the influence of Persian traditions in Islamic literature with reference to the idea of Ibn Muqaffa' on the ethics of statecraft.[1] It will focus on the issue of the "relation between religion and sovereignty" in the early Abbasid government, more specifically in the period of Al-Mansur.

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[1]The works on the ethics of statecraft which are known by the Western term "Mirrors for Princes", in the Islamic world, were written by some prominent 'Ulama'. Among them is *Nasehat al-Mulk* by al-Ghazali, written in Persian some time between 498/1105 and 505/1111. It is still unclear whether it was written for Muhammad ibn Malikshah or for Sanjar b. Malikshah. It seems that it was probably written between 502/1108-9 and 503/1109-10 for Sanjar. See Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 117; *Mau'izah-i Jahangiri* by Muhammad Baqir Najm-i Sani, provides valuable insights into political and ethical thought in India during the reign of the Mughal emperor Jahangir (1605-1627). For further information on available Indo-Islamic Mirror literature, see Sajida S. Alvi, "Introduction" in *Advice on the Art of Governance* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 1-34. For valuable information on Turco-Islamic Mirrors for Princes, see Yusuf Khass Hajib. *Wisdom of Royal Glory,* 1069. trans. with an introduction and notes by Robert Dankoff.

The section assumes that the process of diffusion occurred under certain conducive factor which are believed to have facilitated the smoothness of the process. First, the transition of the caliphate from the Umayyads to the Abbasids, as Goitein says, marked a change in the structure of the Muslim state: an essentially secular "kingdom" was replaced by the "imamat," which emphasized the religious character of the highest office of the state.[2] The change itself was based on the Abbasid claims of bringing about a return to Islamic government on the model of the golden age of Madinan caliphate (*rashidun*),and of being the *ahl al-bayt,* the legimate heirs of the Prophet and the warriors for God and his law *par excellence.[3]* Such claims were very necessary to legitimate the religio-political power of the Abbasids**,** and to convince those who were involved in the revolutionary movement to overthrow the Umayyads. Many Muslims in Iraq and some groups of Shi'is who became strong supporters of the Abbasid revolution felt that truly Islamic leadership was necessary to establish Islamic rule. By the end of the Umayyad period it had become an article of faith among such people that only the Family of the Prophet could supply this authority. In such an atmosphere, as Shaban says, one can understand the reason why the Abbasid emissaries preached on behalf of "an acceptable member of the family of the Prophet".[4]

Considering the importance of the issue, after the Abbasid victora specifically Abbasid claim to the caliphate was put forward in statements attributed to al-Saffa (132-136/750-754) and Al-Masur (136-158/754-775), the second Abbasid caliph. In a speech attributed to the former on the occasion of his receiving the oath of allegiance in the mosque in Kufa in 132/749, the claim was made that the Abbasids received their authority by divinemandate. The Abbasids, in contrast to the

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[2] S.D. Goitein, "A Turning Point in the History of the Muslim State," *Islamic Culture,* XXIII (1949), p. 120.

[3] Lambton, *State and Government,* 45-48.

[4] M.A. Shaban, *The Abbasid Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970),149.

Umayyads, would rule according to the Qur'an and the example of Muhammad.[5] The Abbasids' concern for preserving the religious atmosphere in their government invited the contribution of thoughts from the Muslims. These contributive ideas were hoped to become a guide to the religious and moral considerations for the ruler in solving the governmental affairs. And like the administrative institutions which were brought together by the Iranians to the circle of the Abbasid government, certain religious ideas also came through this channel.

Secondly, with a fairly extended process of borrowing and adaptation, the flow of ideas from pre-Islamic Persian into Islamic tradition had taken place for a long time. Goldziher says that this can be traced back to pre-Islamic times, and even Muhammad himself was not absolutely free from the influence of religious ideas of the Persians, whom he classes in the Qur'an with Jews and Christians, and contrasts with the heathen as confessors of more favoured religions.[6] The high possibility of this process is obserable in the intercourse between the Muslims and the Persians. This continued with particular vigor during the first two or three centuries of Islam. During this period some converts to Islam were themselves direct descendants of men who had been bearers of the ancient tradition of Iran. And Ibn Muqaffa', who will be discussed later, was one of these bearers.

Some scholars assert that the influence of pre-Islamic traditions in Islam has occurred through direct contact with the region in which the pre-Islamic tradition developed. At this point, Goldziher cites the theory of Roman influence in Islamic law. He is confident that the transmission of Roman elements took place in Syria, when the Umayyads conquered that area and centered their government in that region.[7] He enumerates certain resemblances between Roman and Islamic law and

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[5] Lambton, *State and Government,* 48.

[6] Ignaz Goldziher, "The Principles of Law in Islam" in Henry Smith Williams, ed. *The Historians' History of the World,* vol. VIII (London and New York: Hooper & Jackson Ltd., 1908), 298.

[7] Similar to this thesis, Crone proposes her thesis of Roman provincial influence in Islamic law. She states that they came into contact when the Arabs were in Syria. Patricia Crone, *Roman Provincial and Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

concludes that these resemblances must be due to direct borrowing. He argues that the application of principles and rules borrowed from the methodology of Roman jurisprudence first made it possible to extend the limited legal material supplied by the Qur'an.[8]

Though it is difficult to identify the historical channels through which some influences of pre-Islamic Persian tradition may have penetrated Islam, it is undeniable that on some issues both traditions have similarities. The prayer and fasting which were imposed by Manicheanism can be related to the Islamic ones.[9] As for times of private prayer, it was ordained that the Zoroastrian should pray five times in twenty-four hours, at the beginning of each *gah* (period). Unless he was already wholly clean, he should first make ablution, washing face, hands and feet.[10] The Zoroastrianism tradition of prayer is indeed similar to Islamic prayer. The essential prayers for each watch take only five minutes in both Zoroastrianism and Islam. The usual custom is to clean the body before praying, which in Islam is called *wudu'*. Both Zoroastrianism and Islamic traditions emphasized the importance of prayer, and it is the prayer that is taught to a child. For these similarities, Mary Boyce in her other book concludes that prayer is an invaluable religious exercise which Muhammad adopted from Zoroastrianism.[11] The dualistic and angelical metaphysics, the chivalrous and fatalistic ethics of Mazdaism strongly resemble some features of the Muslim theological system.[12] It is very probable that Persian theologians carried their inherited views into the new religion which they had adopted, or that the conquering Muslims enriched their own religious property with

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[8] Goldziher, "The Principles of Law", pp. 294-304.

[9] R. Ghirshman, *Iran: From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 316. To some extent, the tradition of fasting in Islam can also *t*be compared to Christian and Judaic traditions.

[10] See Mary Boyce, *Textual Sources for the Study of Zoroastrianism* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books, 1984), pp. 3,51,58,144.

[11] Mary Boyce, *A Persian Stronghold of Zoroastrianism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 29-30.

[12] Alessandro Bausani, "Pre-Islamic Iranian Thought" in M.M. Sharif, ed. *A History of Muslim Philosophy,* vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), pp. 56-74.

elements supplied by the experience of a profound religious life when they came into contact with the conquered Persians.

Thirdly, the important position of those of Iranian descent in the Abbasid government, to some degree, supports the continuation of the borrowing process. Although Arabs still held high position and Arabic remained the language of administration, it is true, as Kennedy concludes, that the Abbasid government was sometimes said to be Persian in character and personnel in contrast to the Arab rule of the Umayyads.[13] People of Iranian descent became more important in both army and administration. The influence they achieved in administration points to their growing importance as two elements in the Abbasid elite, the *kuttab* (secretaries) and the maw*ali* (freedmen) of the caliphs. Relating to the administration, the Barmakids[14] provided political leadership for the *kuttab* and it was largely through this that the bureaucrats became an important force in Abbasid government. The other group which emerged at this time was the palace servants. A large number of servants were recruited at the time of Al-Mansur to run the establishments and prepare their increasingly complex ceremonial.

Such a position enabled them to be close to the palace affairs and to the caliph. This, at least, is proven by the ex-slave al-Rabi' b. Yunus, a leader of palace servants, who had been a *hajib* (chamberlain) and a close confidant of Al-Mansur. He was reported to have been an advisor to the caliph's son. With such a position, it was very probable that to some extent the palace servants influenced certain important decisions of the caliph. Kennedy says that compared to their role of little importance in the Umayyad period, palace servants became powerful and influential in the period of the Abbasids.[15]

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[13] Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates* (London: Longman, 1989), 135.

[14] For further information, see W. Barthold and D. Sourdel, "al-Bara>mika", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* vol. 1, 1033-1036; Syed Sulayman Nadwi, "The Origin of Barmakids", *Islamic Culture,* 6 (1932), 19-28.

[15]Kennedy, *The Prophet,* 138-139.

In such circumstances, Ibn Muqaffa' was among those of Iranian descent who devoted their lives to the Abbasid government. Though it is not clear whether he was among the *kutta>b* or not, the draft letter of *aman[16]* that he made indicated that he was quite familiar with such a secretarial job. The term *aman,* however, seems to have been used in another meaning. It was intended to solve the problem of the Khurasani troops, which would specify their duties and serve as proof of their position.[17] Under Al-Mansur and by his orders, Ibn Muqaffa' translated Persian books. The best known of his works, was the translation of the *Kalila wa-Dimna* (Fables of Bidpai) from the old Persian which was itself a translation from the Sankrit.[18]

With such a position, it is reasonable to place him as the fourth conducive factor of the Persian-Islamic transmission process. Certain additional reasons for such a claim state that he was born at Jur in Fars, a place in which, according to Ghirshman, Zoroastrianism had been preserved in its original form.[19] Abu Zaid al-Balkhi, as Boyce writes, recorded that the province of Fars in the ninth century still had a strong influence of Zoroastrianism; it retained ancient usages and conformed to them in religion. There is no country, he said, where the Zoroastrians are more numerous than in Fars, because that country is the center of their power, rites and religious books.[20] This indicates that Fars, at least up to the conquest of Islam, remained a region that was strongly influenced by the pre-Islamic Iranian

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[16] The letter was presented to the caliph Al-Mansur for his official guarantee of safety for 'Abdullah b. 'Ali, the caliph's uncle, after he attempted a revolt against the caliph from Syria. The letter is said to have enraged Al-Mansur and caused the death of Ibn Muqaffa', who drafted it. De Lacy O'Leary, *Arabic Thought and Its Place in History* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1968), 106.

[17] E.I.J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 72; Goitein renders the term as "catechism" which means "safeguard" (protect its bearerfrom false creeds). Goitein, "A Turning Point", 124; Shaked considers the term *ama>n*as the Sasanian origin of *zenhar,* which means "treaty or promise". Shaked, "From Iran", 34-35.

[18] O'Leary, *Arabic Thought,* 107.

[19] Ghirshman, *Iran,* 314.

[20] Mary Boyce, *Zoroastrians,* 152-153.

traditions. Ibn Muqaffa' grew up in such an environment, which made him one of the bearers of Persian tradition in Islam.

Moreover, he converted to Islam at a mature age, but it is still unclear whether he was Zoroastrian or Manichaean. Many writers say that Ibn Muqaffa' was a Manichaean,[21] but some others argue that Ibn Muqaffa''s religious adherence before his conversion to Islam was to Zoroastrianism.[22] It is also important to note that he was accused of being a *zindiq* after comforming to Islam.[23] As it is understood, *zindiq* is a term properly signifying a Manichaean but is used loosely by the Arabic writers to denote a member of one of the Persian religions who professed outward conformity to Islam, but secretly adhered to his own (old) creed. If Ibn Muqaffa' was a true *zindiq,* then it is quite probable that he was a Manichaean. But whatever belief he followed before, he had an avowed interest in transferring to Islam what he deemed to be of most interest in his native tradition. As Shaked says, he was one of the most prominent and generally recognized bearers of Iranian literary tradition in Islam.[24] Based on the above factors, this paper is aimed at an understanding of the derivation of Ibn Muqaffa''s idea of the proper relationship between religion and government.

The idea is explained in his two principal *adab* (literature) works, *al-Adab al-Kabir* and *al-Adab al-Saghir*[25] and his *Kitab al-Sahaba.* Through these works Bosworth regards Ibn Muqaffa' as the precursor of the Mirrors for Princes or

[21] See Lambton, *State and Government,* 50; Goitein, "A Turning Point in the History of the MusliState", *Islamic Culture,* XXIII (1949), 131 f.4; Gabrieli, "Ibn Mukaffa'", 883.
[22] O'Leary, *Arabic Thought,* 106; Shaked indicates that most of the writings from Ibn Muqaffa''spen derive from Sasanian court literature, which was impregnated with the Zoroastrian spirit. Shaked, "Appendix on Ibn Muqaffa''s alleged Manichaeism and Some Related Problems" Shaked, "From Iran To Islam: Notes On Some Themes In Transmission", *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam,* 4 (1984), 32.
[23] O'Leary, *Arabic Thought,* 107.
[24]Shaked, "From Iran", 32.
[25] There are several versions of this publication work. The version which is quoted in this paper is *al-Adab al-Saghir wa'l Adab al-Kabir* (Beirut: Dar Sadir, n.d.).

Furstenspiegel genre in Islamic literature.[26]Although his books are among the earliest specimens of Arabic literature, he himself was regarded in his own time as one of the late epigones; thus Ibn Muqaffa' declared in the introduction to his *al-Adab al-Kabir* that everything of importance had already been said in the works of the "previous generations" (*'aqwal al-muqaddimin*).[27] While for the contemporary author nothing was left but "some fine distinction and subtle notions, derived from the more substantial saying of the ancients". Ibn Muqaffa' used the word "previous generation" as the derivation of his idea here, according to Goitein, as none other than pre-Islamic Persian tradition.[28]

The contents of this genre are a guide to the ethical and moral considerations which were supposed to inspire a ruler in his policies. His *al-Adab al-Kabir* deals with the government and the conduct of the ruler, with the conduct of his associates and with friendship (*al-asdiqa*).[29] The ruler is portrayed as an absolute monarch, God-fearing and refined in his manners, a competent politician, and a good administrator.[30] In *al-Adab al-Saghir* Ibn Muqaffa' urges care upon the ruler in the appointment and supervision of officials. He believes that a failure to exercise care in these matters would result in instability of the whole structure of government. He points out the need to support officials once they had been appointed. He insists that those who did good should be rewarded and that those who did evil should be punished.[31] In general this type of literature provides the theoretical basis for the practical advice on the right of princes and their servants.

The scope and nature of the relation between religion and sovereignty is discussed by Ibn Muqaffa' at some length. He divided kingship into three kinds. The

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[26] C.E. Bosworth, "An Early Arabic Mirrors for Princes: Tahir Dhu l-Yaminain's Epistle to His Son 'Abdallah (206/821)," *JournaL of Near Eastern Studies,* 29 (1970), 25.
[27]*al-Adab saghir wa'l Adab al-Kabir,* 6.
[28]Goitein, "A Turning Point", 121.
[29]*Al-Adab al-Kabir,* 68-108.
[30]Ibid, 68-97.
[31]*al-Adab Saghir*, 26.

first was that founded on religion; the second was based on the will to power and the third on personal desire. He regards the first as the best and most secure, since it gives the subjects their due and they in turn fulfill their duties towards the state in obedience to the demands of religion.[32]

Ibn Muqaffa' says that the Sultan must fulfil four conditions if the state is to be well founded and secure. First, he must exercise great care and circumspection in the choice of his ministers and officials. He elaborates that the Sultan cannot rule effectively without the help of the ministers and associates. If his government is not based on the capable and trustworthy functionaries he is not able to govern his Empire effectively. Secondly, he must be firmly in command and control the affairs of state by strict supervision of his servants and their official actions. Thirdly, he should be well informed at all times by trusted persons everywhere about the activities of his governors; and fourthly, he must be just in punishing offenders and in rewarding those who serve the state loyally by good deeds. He says, "a reward will encourage goodness and demolish badness".[33]

Ibn Muqaffa''s idea of the basic expression for the interdependence of religion and government is contained in the Testament of Ardasir. It says that religion and government are twin brothers, neither of which can survive without the other.[34] Ideally religion and royalty or kingship are so intimately connected as to be inseparable: "Religion is Royalty, and Royalty is the Religion. Religion is the foundation of kingship, and kingship protects religion. For whatever lacks a foundation must perish, and whatever lacks a protector disappears".[35] The idea gives further information that kingship is built on religion, and religion on kingship. Thus the doctrine concerning the foundation of the Good Religion is that there is no separation between the two.

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[32] *Al-Adab al-Kabir* (Ibid.,) 73.
[33] *Al-Adab al-Saghir,* 25-26.
[34] Shaked, "From Iran", 37.
[35] R.C. Zaehner, *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1961), 284, 296.

The Good Religion, however, is not only synonymous with God's omniscience, it is also the expression of His will, and His will is that all men should be saved from hostilities. Religion, then, is his principal instrument for bringing about his will on earth. This, however, can only be done with the cooperation of the royal power, and since man is the symbol of God on earth, he cannot attain his true stature until royalty and religion are united in one person.[36] The Religion, however, is rarely conceived of in the abstract – it is seen as God's word operating on earth within a definite social structure; and this structure is the social hierarchy of the Sasanian Empire in which each man is alloted his due place. So close was the link between the Zoroastrian religion and the Sasanian Empire that the collapse of the one meant the downfall of the other.

To carry out God's will on earth, Ibn Muqaffa' says that men of knowledge and wisdom are entitled to rule, and the 'ulama' are the right people to advise (*ahaqquhum bi'l tadbir al-'ulama*').[37] He suggests that the selection of governors and functionaries should be godfearing men (*ahl al-din*).[38] The idea of the combination between religious interpretation of knowledge and wisdom, the highest qualification of the political leader, clearly shows the similarity with the Sasanian idea of the virtues of the kings. Here, a king is illustrated to be a faithful image of God on earth, he must first of all be wise -he must be guided by reason. His job is first of all to protect his subjects.[39] The ruler is advised to seek and accept the counsel of wise and expert men and listen carefully and patiently to their views, even if their advice and their criticisms were bitter *(mararat qawlihim wa 'adhlihim).[40]* Again, this idea is similar to the Sasanian ideal in which the king should not consult the popular will, which would be folly, in carrying out his job.[41]

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[36]Ibid,296.
[37]*Al-Adab al-saghir,* 33.
[38]*Al-Adab al-Kabir,* 70.
[39]Zaehner, *The Dawn and Twilight,* 299-300.
[40]Ibid,71.
[41]Zaehner, *The Dawn and Twilight,* 299.

Religion is the source from which the royal power springs, and royalty should consider its first duty to be the defence of the faith.[42] Parallel to this, one of the most interesting themes introduced by Ibn Muqaffa' in Kitab al-sahaba concerns the need for the caliph to assume responsibility over the religious life of his community.[43] Modern scholars pointed out that this position is unusual in the Islamic context; it has indeed been subsequently rejected in the development of Islamic ideas of government, except by Shi'a theoriticians.[44] In this case Rosenthal argued that Ibn Muqaffa''s theory was "real and valid, not only in the writings of jurists, but also in the formal pronouncements of Caliphs, emirs, and sultan.[45]

Ibn Muqaffa', however, convinced as he was that the fundamental need was stability, considers that this could best be achieved by a rigid control by the state. His concern was that the Caliph's rule should be effective and undisputed, that uniformity should be established throughout the empire and that unorthodoxy, because of its implication of political opposition, should be controlled. He was in effect proposing a control by the state over both religion and law.[46] In his view it was part of the duty of the government to teach the Qur'an, to be well versed in the *sunna,* to uphold standards of trustworthiness and integrity, and to avoid irresponsible persons. It was the duty of the Caliph to admit to his company righteous *fuqaha'* who might serve as models for the people, and it was the duty of the *fuqah*a' to be the educators of the people in every town and to prevent the spread of heresies.[47] He states that by certain knowledge the common people (*'amma*) cannot themselves find the conditions of their prosperity: these can only come from their *imam,* and this is because the majority of the common people are

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[42]Ibid, 297.

[43] See Goitein, " A Turning Point", 124.

[44] Shaked, "From Iran", p. 37; Goitein, for example, says that Ibn Muqaffa''s ideas of a rigid control by the state of the religion of its subjects never materialized. The result was that the state became weak while religion gained what the state had lost: it enjoyed a degree of freedom and a variety of possibilities of development, which under strict control of the state it would never have attained. Goitein, "A Turning Point", 130.

[45]Rosenthal, Political Thought, 254.

[46] Lambton, *State and Government,* 54.

[47] Joseph Schacht, *The Origin of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1950), 137.

weak and ignorant.[48] To achieve the prosperity, the rulers had to work well. Ibn Muqaffa' advises the *wali*, governor or ruler, to give satisfaction to his God; to his Sultan, if there is one above him; and to the good, decent men among his subjects (*salih man tali 'alaihi*).[49]

When Ibn Muqaffa' propounds the theory that the king should control everything which relates to religion so as to prevent schisms and in order to obtain uniformity of religious practice, he is actually perpetuating a typical Sasanian idea.[50] This does not necessarily mean that it was carried into practice by the Sasanian kings themselves with complete effectiveness. The numerous heresies and schisms of the Sasanian period, and the independent position which several *mobads* (the caste of priests) seem to have held, suggest that the advice given to rulers to hold religion in check was timely and necessary, but that it was not normally achieved.[51]

Once the royal power is firmly based on religion, and the religion is protected by the king, a just society will arise.[52] The rulers, then, are duty bound to protect the religion and their subjects and to bring prosperity to the empire. They should also extend their frontiers, since it is believed that the ultimate salvation of the world depended on the Good Religion being accepted and practiced by all mankind. For the latter, the Sasanian Empire was less successful than the Abbasids, and even they were defeated by the Abbasids. Though the Muslim conquest caused the cessation of Sasanid rule, the dynasty had become extinct but, ideologically, they still existed. Their traditions of kingship and government gave an important inspiration to and a set up as model rulers for the Abbasid caliphate. At this point, it is reasonable to say that the Abbasids were the successors of the Sasanian kings.

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[48] Lambton, *State and Government,* 53.

[49] *Al-Adab al-Kabir*, 69.

[50] See Mary Boyce, *Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices* (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 151-152; Goldziher, "The Principles", 299.

[51] Shaked, "From Iran", 40.

[52] Likewise, by the combination of kingship and Good Religion, just kingship is there, which subsequently creates a just society.

2. Transition from Pre-Islamic Tradition to Islam: The Indonesian Case

This chapter attempts to analyze some aspects of the early development of Islam in Indonesia in phenomenological concept.[1] It would like to take issue with the popular view best described in the words of Geertz, that "Islam came late to Indonesia, in the sense that it came into an already well-established non-Islamic civilization."[2] By "non-Islamic civilization", Geertz is concerned primarily with old beliefs and traditions of Indonesian people which were influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism. These traditional beliefs, in fact, still exist and were only partly replaced by Islam. Thus, there is no possibility of defining Islam in Indonesia as a one-sided religion. What is clear then, is that, as Kahane expresses, Islam in Indonesia is a special "copy" from the "original" Islam which has to be analyzed in idiosyncratic terms.[3] In order to explicate the scope of the section, I would like to focus on the questions: what were the traditional beliefs and how did they make contact with Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam when these religions entered Indonesia; How profoundly Hinduism and Buddhism penetrated the religious life of the people; and how Islam conquered areas which had previously been Hinduized. The answer is, of course, not on the argument that one religion or belief replaces the other, but rather on the view of the process of change in Islam which is still on going.

When Islam came to Indonesia, the people there already had strong beliefs and practised old religions, characterized by a form of mysticism that had been

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[1] The phenomenological approach attempts to investigate the essence and meaning of religious phenomena and to group phenomena in a typological manner independent of space and time. It is then primarily understood as a systematic and comparative classification of all religious phenomena whatever they are. See Frank Whaling,*Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion,*vol. 2 (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1983), 38-39.

[2] Clifford Geertz, "Modernization in a Muslim Society: The Indonesian Case" in Robert N. Bellah, ed., *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 95.

[3] Reuven Kahane, "Religious Diffusion and Modernization: A Preliminary Reflection on the Spread of Islam in Indonesia and its Impact on Social Change" *European Journal of Sociology,* XXI, 1 (1980), 117.

influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism. In the early development of Islam, aspects of these older beliefs remained dominant and even colored the religious life. Although many embraced Islam the old traditional beliefs still exist in their inner soul and blur the original teachings. The Javanese, for example, believe that everything in this world, principally, is one unity. Therefore, religion for them encompasses more aspects than formal religion.[4] It does not differentiate between worldly affairs and religious life, and nearly all aspects of life are synonymous with religious fields.[5]

1.*Spirits: The Basic Element of Folk Religion*

The central theme of Indonesian religious life is the importance of maintaining harmony in one's relations with supernatural and natural forces and with one's fellowmen. This is based on the ancient Indonesian belief in a divine, cosmic order of nature in which all aspects of life, including after-life are woven into a harmonious pattern.[6] The notion of spirits has dominated the Indonesian world view.[7] The Indonesians believe that spirits dwell in the objects of the physical world as well as in persons, both living and dead. Some spirits are benevolent and some are malevolent. Since many of the important spirits are believed to be the souls of the dead, a reverence for ancestors remains an important facet of religion.[8] Here, the

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[4] Niels Mulder, *Kepribadian Jawa dan Pembangunan Nasional* (Yogyakarta: Gajahmada University Press, 1977), 36.

[5] A.G. Honig Jr., *Ilmu Agama I* (Djakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1966), 66.

[6] Jeanne S. Mintz, *Indonesia: A Profile* (Princeton, N.J.: D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961), 126-127.

[7] Some authors give their contributions to this subject. Eric Crystal and Shinji Yamashita write "Ma'bugi Ritual of the Sa'dan Toraja"; Joshep A. Weinstock deals with "Kaharingan Religion of Southern Kalimantan"; and Janet Hoskins analyses "Spirit Worship and Conversion in West Sumba". See Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rodgers, eds. *Indonesian Religions in Transition* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1987), 48-97,136-160.

[8] Jeanne Mintz argues that this is not ancestor worship as such, but that a good deal of thought and energy is expended in some regions in placating the ghosts of the departed, keeping them happy and favorably inclined toward the living. Ibid.

concept of God has a wide meaning which covers all supernatural powers, such as, believing in mysterious and animistic powers.

Some of these spirits are recognized and revered throughout the country; others are local, including the guardian spirits who watch over the welfare of each community, its land and its people. The Javanese refer to spirits as *yang.* There are many classes: the *danyang* or *sing momong*, which protect the village; the *ratu demit*, which are protective spirits; the *cikal bakal* or *sing mbau rekso,* which are the spirits of the founders of villages; the *buto,* which are the giants which devour the heavenly bodies during the eclipse;[9] and *Dewi Sri,* the goddess of the rice.[10] The numerous spirit ceremonies when planting and harvesting rice[11] indicates the peoples' belief that the plants themselves have spirits. The Javanese hold the spirits responsible for all rice-crop failures. A rice disease called *mentek* is believed to be the evil spirit who behaves like an irresponsible child and ruins the crop. Even mice in the field are blamed on spirits.[12]

Among other spirit-beings in Java there is *Nyai Roro Kidul,* goddess of the Indonesian ocean. She commands legions of spirits and lives on the rocky south coast of Java, where high waves pound. The people at Surakarta believe that the *Susuhunan,* the prince, unites carnally with her. The prince and the Sultan of Yogyakarta[13] are said to send their cloaks to her annually.

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[9] K.P. Landon, *Southeast Asia: Crossroad of Religions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 15.

[10] Mintz, *Indonesia,* 127.

[11] When the rice season is approaching, the peasant seeks out an older more knowledgeable man who applies a *petungan,* numerological system, to select the correct day on which to begin plowing the land. When this day arrives, a small *slametan* called *wiwit sawah* (beginning the rice field) is held at midmorning in the field, and anyone who happens to be passing by must be invited to participate. During the harvest time, they also perform a *slametan,* called *metik,* before the paddy is cut. See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 80-81.

[12] Landon*, Southeast Asia*, 17.

[13] The other occasion on which Nyai Roro Kidul apperas in the babad is to marry Sultan Agung, who has a second *kraton* under the sea with her. See A. Kumar, "Kingship and Religion: Looking from Java to Japan" in V.J.H. Houben, H.M.J. Maier and W. van der Molen, eds.,*Looking in Odd Mirrors: The Java Sea* (Leiden: Vakgroep

The belief in spirits leads the people to the concept of reincarnation. The Indonesians believe that the spirits of the dead seek to reincarnate themselves in living bodies and that there are persons actually possessed by spirits. This belief has led many to claim that they are the reincarnation of some famous person in history. Some individual may set himself up as a mystic.[14] The notion of the reincarnation of spirits explains why the Indonesians believe that spirits exist in innumerable objects such as tigers, snakes, certain areas of grounds, mountain, rivers, stones, lakes, statues, trees, road crossings, jewels, all of which must be propitiated.

Tied in with the idea of spirits is that of auspicious times and lucky days.[15] Many Indonesians place enormous importance on good and bad, lucky and unlucky days. Suppose a thief wants to steal something and wishes to select a good time to do it. If he wishes to steal on Tuesday, he must first know if it is a lucky day, for him and then at what instant on that day will be his luckiest moment. All these determinations of lucky and unlucky days and acts and associations have an enormous practical importance because these are the things by which the people actually live, work, marry, and bury.

According to the day of one's birth, one can determine all sorts of things, such as illness which will befall, offerings which should be made, and amulets which should be carried for protection. Amulets are an important element in the spirit cult. Certain objects are supposed to have a spirit and possess supernatural power and thus, are able to ward off evil. These charms are generally preventive in function.

Talen en Culturen van Zuidoost-Azie en Ocanie, 1972), 263; the history of the kings of Java and their relation with Nyai Roro Kidul is much discussed in *Babad Tanah Djawi.* In recent edition of this babad, see W.L. Olthof, ed., *Poenika Serat Babad Tanah Djawi Wiwit Saking Nabi Adam Doemoegi Ing Taoen 1647.* vol. 2 ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1941), 25-27, 30-31, 103-104, and 300.

[14] Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 18

[15] Among the Sundanese there is a variation in the calculation of good luck, depending not on the calendar but on the alphabet. Each none of the consonants of the Sundanese alphabet is given a numerical value, and, by adding up the values of the consonants, one discovers the numerical value of one's name. If two persons are to marry, the "old men" work over the values of their names to discover whether they can be happy together. Ibid, 20.

Amulets may be made of small pieces of wood, small stones (*batu akik*), or of odd-shaped roots (*gelang akar*).[16] Since Islam came to Indonesia, many amulets are written in Arabic on bits of paper, called *rajah,* and carried in a tube hung from the neck; often, they are put above the entrance gate of houses.

It is very important to understand the spirits in order to know how to treat them. The first thing is how to communicate with them. Anyone who knows how to communicate with the spirits, will do it; but if one does not know, he may go to someone who does the communication. Because of this reason, some social phenomena emerge in the Indonesian community and many persons claim themselves as intermediaries in the form of various practices of *dukuns.[17]* They are certain people who have or are considered to have special spiritual powers. Some are able to foretell the future, others to heal the sick, others to select the propitious day for a new undertaking, such as a marriage or the planting of the new rice crop. Many people are considered to be endowed with all of these qualities.[18] With their help one can win a wife,[19] recall an erring spouse from distant place, make one's self seem handsome and attractive, appear to be powerful and fearsome, find money or jewels that have been lost, or take revenge on the enemy,[20] cause an illness, or even cause sickness in some hated person.

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[16]Ibid.

[17] The *dukuns* who function as medics, may be male or female. Usually, females predominate because they officiate at birth, called *dukun bayi.* They have arts and knowledge passed down from generation to generation within families. They have the obligation of offering their services whenever they think they are needed, and may not charge a fee.

[18] In fact, the *dukuns* fulfill the demands of the people which cover nearly all aspects of their life. Because they are believed to be closer to the truth than others, they are often asked to predict lottery numbers.

[19] Or, suppose one wants to get rid of a competitor for a girl's love, one hires the sorcerer to do it for him by his control of the spirits. Or, he can do by himself which in the Muslim youth circles, is known as a *mahabba.*

[20] For example, to cause an enemy a woundon the leg, the witch sticks a toadstool with a needle and thensecretly mixes a potion into the victim's food. A potion may alsobe concocted to engender passion for a lover, hatred against a spouse,madness, or even death. It depends on how far one wants to go.See Landon, *Southeast Asia*, 14.

Such beliefs create ritual forms which express respect or fear of the influences of the evil spirits. People believe that everything will run well if the whole spirit community is contented. The rituals usually manifest in the forms of certain offerings and sacrifices. Among these ceremonies, *slametan*[21] is perhaps the most important and popular, it is usually performed individually or collectively. Many Javanese believe that when someone performs *slametan,* it will protect him against evil spirits. These will not upset, bother, cause illness, unhappiness or confusion. The most important purpose of *slametan* is to render things *slamet,* which is defined by the phrase "*gak ono opo-opo*" (there is not anything), or more appropriately, "nothing is going to happen" (to anyone)".[22] It can be given to celebrate or commemorate almost any occurrence one wishes to celebrate, mitigate, or sanctify, such as: birth, marriage, sorcery, death, house moving or before laying the foundation for a new house, bed dreams, harvest, name changing, opening factory, illness, supplication of the village guardian spirit, to mark the beginning and the end of a journey, and even at the start of a political meeting.[23] Thus, *slametan* is considered an obligation for human beings to safeguard the general welfare and to protect oneself from calamity.

2. *Basic Concept of* "*local genius*"

These traditional beliefs and ceremonies still exist in the Indonesian religious life. The Javanese character, which endeavors to develop the indigenous identities in terms of mentality, thought, and religion, will always exist whenever facing the strange and odd phenomena. Introducing the term "local genius," Bosch argues that

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[21] Mintz argues that *slametan* is neither Islamic nor Hindu in origin; it is purely Indonesian, an ancient tradition going back thousands of years. See Mintz, *Indonesia*, 129.

[22] Besides the above reason, Geertz also concludes that it will not make anybody feel any different from anyone else and so they do not want to split up. This tendency to state the implication of social behavior in psychological terms, according to its ultimate effect on the individual's emotional equilibrium, and to state those implications negatively, is characteristic. See Geertz, *The Religion of Java,* 14.

[23] Ibid, 11; Mintz, *Indonesia,* 129.

this character is not only belong to Javanese but to the Indonesian as general.[24] They might follow a certain religion but in their inner soul their old beliefs have not changed. In their converted new religion, these old elements such as delicate spirit belief, ancestral spirit worship, fear of the *angker* (imbued with evil influences, of places), *kuwalat* (a bad effect from unfavorable deed to the elders, especially to the parents), persist.[25] This shows that the Indonesians have a certain capacity to select and adopt the elements of foreign cultures. Once these elements are taken and included as a part of Indonesian culture, they will be recognized at their own value and it will be very difficult to see them as foreign elements. As is reflected in the history of the spread of Islam in Indonesia, such character becomes an important factor in the aspect of continuity of traditional beliefs.

The Indonesian capacity for reconciling differing views is demonstrated not only by the extent to which indigenous beliefs and traditions have been fused with the imported religions; it can also be seen in the way that the new religions have been merged and blended with each other.[26] Therefore, it shows no sharp lines delineating one religion from another but rather delicate shadings at various points along a continuum.

3. *The Spread of Hinduism*

It is said that Hinduism came from India and its expansion occurred during the first centuries,[27] and it was probably commercial in nature. In the course of

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[24]"Local genius" is a term which denotes the capability of people to adopt strange or foreign elements and process them to be suited to the emotions and conditions of the concerned people. See Haryati Soebadio, "Introduction" in F.D.K. Bosch, Masalah Penyebaran Kebudayaan Hindu di Kepulauan Indonesia (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1976), 8.

[25] Rahmat Subagiya, *Kepercayaan dan Agama* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1976), 22.
[26] See Mintz, *Indonesia,* 130; Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 78-79. The indication of this merger, at least, appears in the predicate which has been often used, such as "Hindu-Buddha" instead of Hinduism and Buddhism, "Siva-Buddha" instead of Siva and Buddhism.

[27]Ibid, 62. See also Bosch, *Masalah Penyebaran Agama Hindu di Kepulauan Indonesia,*1976.

expanding their trade, the Hindus carried their way of life with them.[28] The new comers did business with the chiefs of the countries and made themselves acceptable by their rich presents, by their ability to heal disease, and by their gifts of amulets to ward off the evil. The stranger in every century who has penetrated the East successfully has passed as wealthy, as a healer, and as a magician.[29] They needed interpreters in order to live successfully among the indigenous peoples. Marriage with the daughters of the chiefs was the natural step, and it was only then that the culture and religion of the strangers could have influence. The local girls became familiar with Hindu ways and unconsciously acted as missionaries. Being high born locally, they were seldom contradicted, when they asserted that Hindu ways were superior to their own. The indigenous people had no language for the new religions and ritual concepts, and so they naturally adopted the Sankrit terms.[30] If this theory is acceptable, it is understood from the above passages that Hinduism spread only among limited class of the Indonesian people who had advantages due to the business deal. Or perhaps, local chiefs who were enriched by the Hindus adopted Hindu ways for themselves and their state. Therefore, it was reasonable to retain and deepen their new religion, as Landon also says, there was considerable travel of Indonesians to India.[31] It could not be unnatural for the established Hindu communities, local converters or Hindus who lived in a community and married the daughters of the local chiefs, to send some members of their community to India. These travellers picked up Hindu attitudes and practice and returned home to Hinduize their own societies.[32]

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[28] India had a great reputation for it wealth in gold, and both Greek and Latin geographers have mentioned this fact. The search for gold played a large part in Hindu expansion in the Indochina Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago. It was gold above all that attracted the Indians to the East. Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 62.

[29] Ibid, 66.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid, 68.

[32] In Modern times there is a parallel seen in the students returning from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Europe, America or Canada who have more effect in introducing Middle Eastern and Western manner and customs to Indonesians than the foreigners themselves living in Indonesia. In other words, the most effective

The limit of Hinduization which only reached the elite class of the people made the Hindu cult an aristocratic religion. It is believed that one reason for the sudden disappearance of the Hinduized Kingdoms was the weakening of the position of the elite, leaving the mass of the people still strangers to Hindu culture. This also explains the ease and rapidity with which Indonesians accepted Islam when this religion was introduced to the archipelago.

Nevertheless, Hindu influence was not negligible, since, culturally, it contributed to the Indonesian people. Landon describes that Hinduization was an extension of organized Hindu culture. It included an acceptance of the Hindu conception of royalty, the divine King. Tied in with this was the Hindu idea of administration according to which the administration was as completely swallowed up by the king as the footprints of all other creatures were swallowed up by the footprints of an elephant. It included the acceptance of the Hindu or Buddhist religious cult; an acceptance of the mythology of the *puranas*[33] which dealt with cosmogonic, theological, astronomical, and physical knowledge. The second *puranas* included two of the most popular works in Southeast Asia, the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana.* It also included the observances of the *dharmashastras,* which contained the canonized common law. Finally, it included the use of the Sankrit language.[34]

The Hindu civilization in Indonesia reached a high level under the Sailendra Empire and during the succeeding Javanese dynasties of Kediri, Singasari, and Majapahit, which continued, with dominant Hindu influence, until the fifteenth

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missionaries are indigenous persons who have gone abroad and have been thoroughly indoctrinated and who then return home to affect their home community.

[33] The Sankrit word of *purana,* in its earliest use, means "old narrative and ancient lore". Gradually, *purana* came to designate a body of works, encyclopedic in scope, incorporating legends, myths, and customary observances. See Caterina Conio, "Puranas" in Mircea Eliade, *The Encyclopedia of Religion,* vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 86-90.

[34] Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 61-62.

century.[35] The emergence of these Hindu kingdoms was an indication of the acceptance or, in certain aspects, of the realization of the Hindu conception of royalty, or divine king. The administration was that of a highly organized bureaucracy with a divine and absolute monarch overriding the whole system. Under the king, there were three ministers, or *mantri,* who were represented by three executive officers who actually carried the burdens of government in military, civilian, and financial affairs. Two other classes of officers were responsible for the courts of justice and the religious institutions, both Sivaistic and Buddhist.[36]

In other parts of Indonesia, it was seen that the Sriwijaya king was surrounded by his kinsmen and his close associates. Surrounding the royal family and at the heart of the central administration were the various royal officials. Highest in status among this group were the royal judges, *dandanayaka,* who exercised the king's powers of adjudication. Next were two classes of administrators: *Nayaka* were revenue collectors, and *Prataya* appearently managed the property of the royal family. Other officials of the center were "minister not of the royal blood" (*kumaramatya*), "clerks" (*kayastha*), and the "priests" (*sthapaka*) or technical supervisors of the erection of divine images and the construction of buildings.[37] It is interesting to note further that the *stha>paka's* duties also covered building construction. Relating to this case, Hall said that they only directed rather than actually worked on these projects. It should therefore be expected that these were Brahman advisors, religious specialists who advised the king in the Indian method of construction and in the proper routine for performing religious ceremony.[38] Brahman religious specialists, whose educational background allowed them to assume useful roles in a developing state as clerks or technical advisors to the indigenous ruler, legitimized the rule of such a superior "chief" who was able to

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[35]Ibid, 75

[36]Ibid.

[37]Kenneth R. Hall, "State and Statecraft in Early Srivijaya" in K. R. Hall and J. K. Whitemore eds., *Explorations in Early Southeast Asian History: The Origins of Southeast Asian Statecraft* (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, the University of Michigan, 1976), 69-71.

[38]Ibid, 71-72.

distinguish himself from among other local chiefs.[39] The Indianized kingdoms were the first state-level polities in Indonesia, drawing their legitimacy from an imported, theocratic ideology. The kings were gods incarnate, and a "graded spiritually" according to closeness to the king determined succession to the throne and to many political offices.[40] The idea of an ideal king was also found in the period of Islamic kingdom. Referring to the order of the Mataram state Moertono says that the king's power was understood as unlimited. He could not be regulated by worldly means but within himself there was a force reflecting or higher still, identical with the divine soul (*Hyang Suksma Kawekas*), which checked his individual will. The Javanese thought of the ideal king as one constantly seeking for this internal divine guidance.[41]

Within the bureaucratic system of the government there were upper castes, the Brahman and the Kshatriya. There was constant intermarriage between the two upper castes which formed the aristocracy and patronized Hindu culture. The real social distinction lay between the aristocratic Hinduized society and the mass of people who continued as usual in their folkways. The aristocracy was easy to identify because laws reserved for them certain rights and privileges of clothing, of jewelry, of materials for their houses, and of access to the king. The rules for building were strictly enforced. Durable materials were reserved for religious edifices, for royalty, and for high ranking officials; but the dwellings of the common people were of bamboo and leaves, as was customary in all the Hinduized kingdoms of Southeast Asia. The people amused themselves with gambling, chess, and cockfighting, and music and dancing were popular.[42] The contrast picture between the aristocratic class and common people in many ways suggest that there was a conspicuous distinction concerning the application of religion in daily life. It would

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[39] F.D.K. Bosch, "The Problem of Hindu Colonisation of Indonesia" in *Selected Studies in Indonesian Archeology* (The Hague, 1961), 3-22.
[40] Hall, "State and Statecraft", 69-79.
[41] See Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1981), 40.
[42] Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 72,76.

indicate that at certain points, religious rituals were practiced more intensively by the elite class than by the common people. The elite aristocracies had greater access to the religious edifices in the royal neighborhood. On the other hand, the mass people might not have such a chance because of their social status and caste system.

Perhaps the most influential factor in the process of Hinduization was the Hindu literature. A valuable account by Sarkar on Indian influences on the Literature of Java and Bali gives us an idea of the extensiveness of Hindu literary influence. During the Hindu period, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* were the principal if not the only sources of local literary inspiration. In Hinduized Java, this epic and legendary literature was the inspiration for the classic theater, the dance, the shadow play, and the marionettes.[43] The upper class was familiar with Sankrit literature and wrote in an alphabet derived from India. The kings considered themselves literary and religious patrons and were said to be familiar with the Vedas, Buddhist texts, and the traditional philosophies of India. The scholars were conversant with the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata,* the religious literature pertaining to Siva, Visnu, and Buddha.[44] This leads to Coedes' conclusion that Hindu-Buddhist culture and the Sankrit language were certainly "the civilization of the elite and not that of the whole population."[45] To some extent, what Coedes concludes is, perhaps, true in terms of the performance of religious rituals, the intention of using Sankrit letters which, at the time, were not very common to the people as general. But through the folkstories, some themes of *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* were transfered to the people.

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[43]See H. B. Sarkar, *Indian Influence on the Literature of Java and Bali* (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1934), 173; See also Laurie Jo Sears, "Epic Voyages: The Transmission of the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* from India to Java", in Stepahnie Morgan and Laurie Jo Sears,eds. *Aesthetic Tradition and Cultural Transition in Java and Bali*(Madison, W.I.: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, 1984), 12-24.

[44] Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 72.

[45] G. Coedes, *Indianized States of Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1968), 16

Thus, the Hindu influence seems to be the most successful in literature, compared to the other aspects of their civilization. It contributed to both upper class and common people, their script, a large part of their vocabulary, and their great epic themes of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata.* It was very fortunate that when the Buddhists entered Indonesia they also utilized the literature to spread their teachings. Even later these two religions merged into a single one, Hindu-Buddhism. This event preserved the continuity, at least, in the form of Sankrit language terms which are still used widely until nowdays.

It is noted that Hinduism came first to Indonesia, and was followed by Mahayana Buddhism.[46] By about 1000 A.D. they had been transmuted into Hindu-Buddhism. Although Hinduism was the major component of this synthesis, it also contained pervasive elements of Buddhism, Javanese mysticism and Indonesian animist beliefs. This was the religion which prevailed through the latter period of the Hindu-Javanese kingdoms, until the early sixteenth century.[47] During the period of 1000 and 1500 A.D. a high level in Hindu influence[48] was attained in the field of Indo-Javanese literature. Landon says that in no other part of Southeast Asia did Hindu culture produce such a wealth of literature, most of it religious. The writers were chiefly Sivaists or Buddhists. The literature of this period is known as old

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[46] Buddhism of the little vehicle using Sankrit was prevalent in the Archipelago by the seventh century. The only known Buddhist kingdom of that period which fitted the description of *Fo-Che* was Sriwijaya at Palembang. Through Yi-Tsing, the Chinese pilgrim, it was known that Sriwijaya was a central place for study all possible subjects exactly as in India. There were more than a thousand Buddhist monks who devoted themselves to study and good works. If a Chinese priest wished to go to the West (India) to study the original Buddhist texts, he could not do better than to stay at Sriwijaya (*Fo-Che*) before he proceeded to India. Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 76

[47] Mintz, *Indonesia,* 130; It is a strong supposition that the close association of Buddha with Siva, Brahmanical religion, was a characteristic of Javanese religion, and some of the literature such as Kuncarakarna and Sutasoma, identified them as one. See Landon, *Southeast Asia*, 79.

[48] It was identified by the rise of Brahmanical influence which coincided with the shift of political power to eastern Java under the kings of Kediri, Singasari, and Majapahit. Ibid, 79.

Javanese.[49] It used many Sankrit words and quoted Sankrit verses. One of the most famous books of the period was a version of the *Ramayana.* It was not a translation but a new rendering of the old story in Javanese setting. It was so well done that the Javanese people thought that the events were all local.[50]

Another production was a prose translation of the *Mahabharata.* Certain parts of the epic were played and produced as separate volumes. An example of this was the *Arjuna-Vivaha,* written by Mpu Kanwa under the patronage of king Airlangga about 1020 A.D. It dealt with an episode from the *Mahabharata* in which Arjuna helped the gods fight Niwatakawaca (Nivata Kavacha).[51] Another great work was the *Bharata-Yudha* which dealt with great war. It was written by Mpu Sedah in 1157 A.D. by order of the king and was so well done that its fame lasted through the centuries.[52] In the fourteenth century, the famed poem *Nagara-Kritagama* (Negara-Kertagama) was written by Prapancha. It took as its theme the life and times of a famous king of Majapahit named Hayam Wurukand gave detailed information about the court life and life in the empire.[53]

On the most important productions which reached bloom flower under Hindu influence was the *wayang* stories. *Wayang*means "shadow". It is derived from the root *yang,* meaning "spirit", to which the prefix *wa* was added. The shadow was associated with the spirit in the minds of the Javanese. The *wayang* play was a natural expression of Indonesian concepts of the spirit world and its relation to the living. The Javanese shadow-show stories relate to early Javanese history. These

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[49] The old Javanese literature is called *kawi,* in prose, or *kakawin,* in poetic. A famous *kakawin* work was the Nitisastra-kawin now known in Bali as Nitisara. It was full of wise moral precepts and religious doctrines. Ibid, 79-80.

[50] See "local genius", note 24, p. 8.

[51] Zoetmulder, P.J. *Kadangwan: A Survey of Old Javanese Literature* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 236-243.

[52] Ibid, 256-263.

[53] Pigeaud translates this work into English in five volumes. The first chapter deals with Javanese texts in transcription; the second chapter with notes on the texts and translations; the third with translation of the texts; the fourth with commentaries and recapitulations; the fifth with glossary and general index. See Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud, *Java in 14th Century: A Study in Cultural History* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).

stories have been worked over with the Hindu stories, so that it is difficult to distinguish the one from the other. A large number of the stories were borrowed from the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata.*[54]

Muslim conquests brought the period to a close in Java and led the Hindu scholars to flee to Bali for refuge, where they continued their literary activities on a reduced scale. The unique synthesis of Hindu, Indonesia and Buddhist beliefs was enriched by the new local customs. Consequently, although the people of Bali today are nominally Hindus, their very active and creative religious life bears little resemblance to the Hinduism practiced in India. The case structure of Hinduism, which had been greatly modified during its stay in Java, left mild traces in Bali where it was further diluted by local attitudes. The forms of worship and the rituals followed are almost entirely Balinese. The many beautiful temples which dot the island, the intricately carved stone demons guarding its crossroads, the small, delicate shrines in every rice field are the symbols of a religion which has drawn upon many sources but has developed along its own lines into something distinct.[55]

4. *The Period of Islam*

Islam, which had entered Indonesia some time before the tenth century[56] began to spread rapidly across the archipelago some five hundred years later. Curently the religion of most Indonesians, Islam, like its predecessors, has been heavily influenced and modified by older, Indonesian beliefs and customs. Or, in an

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[54] Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 80-81.

[55]Mintz, *Indonesia,* 131.

[56]Ibid, 131-132; see also *Sedjarah Masuknja Islam di Indonesia* (Medan, 1963); from the archeological remains, it can be identified that Islam had spread in Java around eleventh century. The finding of the grave in the village of Leran, in the sub-district Manyar, about 12 kilometers to the north-west of the town of Gresik, East Java, supports the data. It is known that the grave is belong to Fatimah binti Maimun. Moquette reads the dates of the cemetary as 475 A.H. or 1102 A.D. or 1108 A.D. See Hasan Muarif Ambary, "Epigraphical Data From 17th-19th Century Muslim Graves in East Java" in C.D. Grijns and S.O. Robson, *Cultural Contact and Textual Interpretation* (Dordrecht, Holland: Foris Publications, 1986), 25-37.

extreme term, Islam was spread within the framework of traditional religious beliefs. As a result, Islam in Indonesia creates a unique picture when compared to the Middle Eastern heartland. And by making some compromises Islam so successfully penetrated and conquered areas which had previously been Hinduized.

This may have been partly due to the fact that Islam reached Indonesia not directly from its Middle Eastern heartland, but through India.[57] They were West-Indian Muslim whose religious life was much influenced by Hindu Indian culture,[58] and this Islam had filtered through the religious experience of India, and covered with mysticism which easily found the fertile ground in Hinduized Java.[59] Most of them belonged to sufi groups, and,it seemed, through their sufi teachings, the Indonesian people, and particularly the Javanese, were able to easily adopt their kind of Islam.[60] This was because some aspects of sufi teachings were similar to Javanese spiritual beliefs. For example, the Javanese believed that the most valuable aspect for the human character was the achievement of a quiet soul. This could be achieved by controlling the passions and by not paying too much attention to material existence. If someone could manage this feat, he would obtain the power to rule the world around him.[61] One can see how sufism would appeal to the Javanese

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[57] In this case the role of Gujarat merchants was very important. they came, in general, as others had come in previous centuries from India, seeking profit. Even those who arrived later from Hadramaut came in search of rich patrons. See Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 134; for further information, see van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955).

[58] A. Mu'ti 'Ali, "The Muhammadijah Movement: A Bibliographical Introduction" M.A. thesis (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1957), 28.

[59] See G.W.J. Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism" in G.E. von Grunebaum, ed., *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago, 1955), 287-288.

[60] Berg further explains that the integrating manner of spreading Islam in Indonesia is at least significant in the first that Islam did not lead to the creation of a separate community and to a lasting division between Hindus and Muslims, as had been the case in India. See C.C. Berg, "Indonesia" in H.A.R. Gibb, ed., *Whither Islam* (London, 1932), 254.

[61] Bisri Affandi, "Shaikh Ahmad al-Surkati>: His Role in Al-Irsha>d Movement in Java in the Early Twentieth Century" M.A. thesis (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1976), 31-32; Aboebakar Atjeh, *Pengantar Ilmu Tarekat* (Djakarta: Fa H.M. Tawi & Son, 1966), 4-5; Mulder, *Kepribadian Jawa,* 36.

under such circumstances. In this way, Islam had great success in Indonesia, especially in Java. This theory leads Benda to the conclusion: if Islam had come directly from Middle East, and applied pure monotheism and swept up all traditional beliefs, perhaps it would not have any place today in Indonesia, particularly Java.[62]

Such a description shows that the form of Islam which was introduced to Indonesia has similarities with the Java-Hindu's thoughts. The similarity is especially, concerned with the idea of the absolute power. Here, God is that intangible, mysterious, and divine energy which animates the universe. Thus the well-known mystical formula *Tuhan adalah aku* (God is I) expresses the concretness of the Javanese idea of power. The divine power is the essence of I, of the self.[63] So, Islam was acceptable in Indonesia in so far as it was able to accept the old religious patterns and associate itself with existing practices and beliefs. Thus, Indonesian people tend to practice Islamic mysticism, rather than *tawhi>d* and *shari>'ah* aspects.

Although Islam spread fairly rapidly in the greater part of Indonesia, the process of Islamization had no uniform pattern of degree of intensity. In Java, for example, the regions which had experienced intense Islamization from the start, and which were later continued by the *walis* (saints) and their followers, formed the nucleus of orthodox Muslim society. But the regions that were far from the center of Islamic activity and experienced a less intense Islamization, formed those groups of heterodox Muslim society, called Islam *abangan* (nominal Muslim).[64] The non-

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[62] Harry J. Benda, "Continuity and Change in Indonesian Islam" *Asian and African Studies,* vol. 1 (1965), 128.

[63] Benedict R. O'G Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culrute" in Claire Holt, *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 7.

[64] In this case Geertz proposes three types of Javanese Muslim religion, *abangan, santri,* and *priyayi.* See Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960). Geertz' idea of this polarization creates a controversial issue among the Indonesian sociologists and anthropologists. Some of them comment that *santri* and *abangan* are the fundamental category of the religious type of the Javanese people. On the other hand, *priyayi* is a social category and, therefore, cannot be contrasted neither to *abangan* nor *santri,* but to mass people, or *wong cilik.* See Harsja W. Bachtiar,"The Religion of Java: A Commentary" *Majalah Ilmu-ilmu Sastera Indonesia,*

uniform degree of intensity in the spreading of Islam was also caused by the Hindu-Buddhist influence. Benda notes that:

Only in those parts of Indonesia which had been least affected by Hindu civilization in past centuries -such as Aceh and the Minangkabau region in Sumatra and Banten in West Java- did Islam almost from the outset profoundly affect the religious, social and political consciousness of its adherents. Thus, it is in those regions that the new faith has manifested itself in a purer, less conciliatory and at times even agressive form. In the greater part of Java, on the other hand, Islam had been forced to adapt itself to centuries old traditions, partly indigenious, partly Hindu-Buddhist, and in the process, lost much of its doctrinal regidity.[65]

The continuity of Javanese traditional beliefs and the history of the spread of Islam in Indonesia, as mentioned above, brought about the result that Islam in Java for a long time remained more stagnant and less pure than Islam in other parts of Indonesia. It meant, that the real victor was Javanese religion, not Islam; Javanese custom–the, *adat,* not Islamic law.[66]

The old traditions and beliefs which influenced the Javanese people created disputes among the *walis* (saints) in determining the strategy of their *dakwah* (propagation) in Java. On the one group, Sunan Giri wished that Islam had to be spread and taught purely to the people as it was from its origin. On the other group, Sunan Kalijaga was very moderate with regard to old traditions. He did not want to eliminate the traditions at once, because it would create problem on the propagation of Islam. What he did was to give a new color to the old traditions, participation as well as persuasion. In this way, it was hoped that the pursuing of purer teachings could be striven continualy either by the guidance of the later *da'i*

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5 (1973), 85-118; Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 19; Achmad Jainuri, "Istilah Abangan" *Prisma,* 8 (September, 1978), 94-95.

[65] Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation* (The Hague/Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1959), 12.

[66]Ibid.

(preacher) or their own consciousness towards their religion.[67] The factors of continuity and the history of the spread of Islam in Indonesia led to the appearence of Islam that was not the same among all the regions in Indonesia. Taufik Abdullah said that in Aceh, Islam affected the culture to the extent that the pre-Islamic traditions were no longer influential. Such was also the case of Islam in Minangkabau region. Although prior to Islam, people strongly held the pre-Islamic culture, *adat*, but not like in Java, Islam in this region dominated and even replacedthe former.[68]

In later development, some of these old traditions disappeared but many of them undoubtedly still exist and even contribute to the national asset of culture, especially in the language aspect. Many terms and words of Indonesian are derived from the Sankrit language, although it is undeniable that most of them are also from the Islamic-Arabic language. Such an influence is well preserved in its original form. Much of the vocabulary has been modified because of the influence of Islam, which comes late, and of the modern development.

The process of the disappearance of certain traditional Javanese beliefs, in fact, have taken a long time. Some factors unquestionably have a great role in determining the ongoing process. These factors are related to the geographical and social condition of the people, and, of course, the foreign cultural elements which influence the people of the regions, which cannot be ruled out. From this view, one will be sure that in a certain place, a certain traditional belief had lived fertilely for a long time, but has now disappeared. Some old traditions, at the same time, may be practiced in certain places but not in the other places; they are perhaps practiced by some persons but not by others.

To count which the old traditional beliefs are still practiced by certain people is not an easy task. It can be said that some of the ceremonies that are usually held

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[67] Solichin Salam, *Sekitar Wali Sanga* (Kudus: Menara, 1974), 28-30; Umar Hasyim, *Sunan Kalijaga* (Kudus: Menara).

[68] Taufik Abdullah, "Dialog Agama Dengan Lingkungan" *Panji Masyarakat,* 260 (Desember, 1978), 16.

to honor certain spirits no longer exist. In the neighborhood of the place where the writer was grown up, some ceremonies to honor *danyang, sing mbau rekso,* and *Dewi Sri* are no longer practiced by the people. At least, up to 1960-s, *nyadran,* or *bersih desa*.[69] was held annually in the village. But some others are still practiced by the Indonesians, although with reduction and change of purpose. People may carry out some of these practices "just for good luck" or because it is a "family custom."

Such changes have also happened since the coming of Islam. Some magical practices are modified by using or adding Islamic elements. A Muslim *dukun* will read a kind of *do'a* (prayer) to treat his patient or to give a *mantera* (magic formula). The Amulet which is usually made of small pieces of wood, stones; many of these have changed to be written in Arabic on bits of paper. Thus, The Indonesian make magical use of mystical names and numbers derived from the four first Caliphs, the four Arabic letters that spelled the name of the Prophet and Allah, the twelve signs of zodiac, the twelve Imams of the Shi'ah and others.[70] Persons who want more power and must resort to magic to get it may practice *dhikr* or *suluk*.[71] Another and more hysterical type of ceremony which is associated with Islam in the earlier period is known as *dabus*.[72] Although the Indonesians regard themselves as

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[69]*Bersih desa* (cleansing of the village) is a *slametan* to cleanse the village of the dangerous spirits. This is accomplished by giving a *slametan* in which food is offered to the *danyang desa* (guardian spirit of the village) at the latter's place of burial. The *bersihdesa* is always held in *Sela* (Dzulqa'dah), the eleventh month of the lunar, but on different days in different villages according to local tradition. Sometimes a *wayang* (shadow play) or even *tayuban* (a combination dancing and drinking party) follows this event. See Geertz, *The Religion of Java,* 82.

[70] Landon, *Southeast Asia*, 139.

[71]*Suluk* is a sufi ritual which was typical of the earlier form of Islam in the archipelago. See Raymond L. Archer, "Muhammedan Mysticism in Sumatra" *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Malay Branch,* XV, 2 (1937), 1-126; It also means chanted interludes by the puppeteer at a *wayang* play to set a mood of the act. Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th century* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1981),166.

[72] It refers to any steel or iron instrument which may injure human flesh. This ceremony involves dangerous practices which must be learned from a *guru* or from the founder of spiritual order. The participants learn the mysteries in a yoga-like manner or *tapa* (ascetic practice) by constant practice in some quiet place until they

Muslims, they have a tendency towards the mystic and mysterious. These ideas and their practices cannot be regarded as anti-Islam. They are simply expressions of what they are as human beings. The domain of old beliefs has been brought under the garb of Islam or vice-versa.

As it has been mentioned, the Javanese performed certain rituals by providing various offerings and sacrifices to content the spirit powers. When Islam introduced a certain kind of ritual, which was quite different from their traditions, it was difficult to discard the former rituals. Because of the influence of their old beliefs, up to now, the Javanese Muslims call *sembahyang* (from *sembah*= to worship, and *yang*= spirit) for *salat* (prayer). The early and unorthodox conversion of the Javanese permitted them to feel that they were Muslims without paying much attention to the prayers (*salat*).[73] If *salat* was considered a way to being close to God, the Javanese believed that a man could become united with his creator by mental exercises and that the bodily forms of worship were mere preliminaries that could be dispensed with when one achieved the higher mystic level.

Islam conquered a large part of Indonesia by providing an attractive mould and accepting the native folkways under the cloak of Islam. As a result, Islam is practiced partially until now, and the majority of Indonesian Muslims, however, have been "less-Islamic" for a long time rather than "santri". They have a tradition in which *slametan* has dominated their religious rituals. Although the purpose has changed, it is practiced widely and connected with parts of life of the individual - birth, circumsion, marriage, and death; in addition to this cycle, the Muslims connect this ceremony with the yearly Muslim calendar -the birth of the Prophet, the beginning and the ending of the Fast, and the like.[74] *Slametans* play a vital part in the religious and social life of the "less-Islamic" Muslim community. Therefore, it was

have achieved real skill as magicians. When they are ready to demonstrate the immunity in Allah, they go some public square in the evening and beat a drum and praise Allah and Muhammad. The idea is to demonstrate Allah's grace. See Archer, "Muhammedan Mysticism", 108-109.Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 141.

[73] Does it mean that if Islam had been introduced from some orthodox sources such as directly from Middle East, the Indonesians would have taken greater care to observe the ritual prayer (*salat*)?

[74] See Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, 30-85.

misleading topersuade Indonesians to be converted to Christianity, by one of the common arguments, that they would not need to continue the *slametans* and could thus save money.[75] But, the issue of spending money for such *slametans* to an Indonesian is about as pointless as urging a Christian to give up Christianity in order to abolish Christmas. The great possibility of the reason why they did not convert Christianity is very simple. If they converted Christianity they would not be able to perform *slametans* and even not be *slameti* (being prayed by *slametans*) when they died. The same reason was given to the Muhammadiyah, as this movement was being far from this ceremonial.

The Muslimized *slametan* has taken place for a long time. Some Indonesian Muslims connect *slametan* with their own tradition and call it *Kenduri.*[76] Having adopted the Islamic pattern of time reckoning by lunar months and the holy days which are attached to it, many Indonesian Muslims have felt obliged to celebrate its sacred time periods by giving *slametans.* The *slametans* which are recognized during this time are: *Muludan,* held in *Mulud* or *Rabiul Awal,* the day on which the Prophet Muhammad was born; *Rejeban,* held in the month of *Rejeb* or *Rajab,* celebrates the *Mi'raj*, the one-night ascension of Muhammad to face God; *Megengan,* held in *Ruwah* or *Sha'ban,* one day before the beginning of the Fast, *Ramadan.* This *slametan* is invariably given by all those who have at least one parent dead. Just before the *slametan* one goes to the cemetery to pray for the deceased.[77] *Maleman,* held on one

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[75] Landon, *Southeast Asia,* 156; In the nineteenth century in particular, many Dutchmen had great hopes of eliminating the influence of Islam by rapid Christianization of the majority of Indonesians. These hopes were partly anchored in the erroneous assumption that the syncratic nature of Indonesian Islam at the village level would renderconversion to Christianity easier in Indonesia. But in fact, in spite of the governmental assistance, Christianity had been able to spread only very slowly, and even then only among Indonesians living in areas which had not previously been Islamized. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun,* 19; Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (The Hague/Bandung, 1956), 204-205.

[76] Howard M. Federspiel, *The Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Centur Indonesia(Ithaca, N.Y.:* Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program,1970), 71.

[77] In old tradition, one goes to the cemetery to scatter flowers on the graves of the parents involved, and the dead parents supposedly come to the *slametan* to eat the odor of the food.

of these 21, 23, 25, 27, or 29 of *Ramadan.* Generally people hold on the 21st of the month; *Bruwah,* held in *Sawal* or *Shawal,* on the last day of *Ramada>n.* Only people who actually fast are supposed to give *slametan,* but some non-fasters also do that; *Kupatan,* held on the fifth day after *Lebaran.* People who are supposed to give this are those who had small children who have died, and it is held early in the morning with *kupats* (little packets of glutinous) and somewhat similar packets called *lepets.*[78] As the time going on, the *kupatan* now has more cultural value rather than religious one. In some regions, it is held together with the celebration of the *Lebaran.*

Unlike the other cycle of *slametans,* the intermittent *slametans* held at irregular intervals and depending upon unusual occurences such as departing for and coming from a long trip, changing one's place of residence, recovering from illness, passing exam, and so forth seem to have much social value rather than a religious one for Muslims nowadays; who relate all these ceremonies with *syukuran* (expression of gratitude or thanks for God favors).

An important part of the Islamized version is found in the literature work which, primarily, concerned with the concept of cosmos. The key to understand a view of the world lies in Javanese Islamic mysticism. Here one knows that the doctrine of non-duality of pre-Islamic Java had been changed to the concept of the unity of servant and Lord, *'abd - rabb,* or, called *kawula - gusti,* in Javanese mystical words.[79] In Surakarta compendium of *suluks* dated A.J. 1763 (A.D. 1835) and Cod. Or. 1796, a companion manuscript, one finds description of the relationship between worshiper and God which concludes:

> We are one yet not one, certainly/two yet not two/it looks like
> (the relationship) of soul and body/they look like one yet appear
> like two/such is my being/with that of my Lord.
>
> or again:

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[78] As old tradition believed that some of these are hung outside the door so that the small children can return and eat out there without bothering anyone inside. See Geertz, *The Religion of Java,* 77-81.

[79] Karel A. Steenbrink, *Mencari Tuhan Dengan Kacamata Barat; Kajian Kritis Mengenai Agama di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 1988), 47.

If you wish to reach God/know your body/for this is His subtitute/
one yet not one is the true meaning of life/the truth of oneness/
is to be without duality/ It is like Wisnu and Kresna/like the echo
and the sound/one yet not one in truth/one yet not able to be one.[80]

Javanese sources provided a direct link between philosophical theories of unity-in-diversity and the realm of politics in the doctrine of *manunggal ing kawula gusti* (the unity of servant and Lord). This was a doctrine applied both to the temporal and to the supernatural orders. A temporal subject and his earthly lord were certainly readily distinguished, yet at a higher level of meaning they were one. And all of mankind, all servants of God, were ultimately one with their eternal Lord.[81] In one of the versions of *Dewaruci* or *Bhimasuci,* tells the idea of the unity of servant and Lord. The story appears in an Islamic guise, in a remarkable adaptation of the Yasadipura (the court poet of Muslim ruler, in the mid-Eighteenth century?) version under the title *Suluk Seh Malaja.* In this retelling of the story, the role of Druna is played by Sunan Bonang, one of the most important of the early preachers of Islam in Java. Bhima is replaced by Sunan Kalijaga, likewise well-known as a famous religious teacher and a convert of Sunan Bonang. The mysterious water is changed by *zamzam* water, and *Dewaruci* is replaced by the Muslim prophet *Khidr.* In this story Sunan Kalijaga is sent off to Mekka, to make pilgrimage. But on the way he enters the sea, in which he meets the prophet *Khidr.* Sunan Kalijaga is then ordered to enter prophet *Khidr's* ear, and once within, receives the same teaching in identical language as that given to Bhima.[82] In Javanese literature, the *Bhimasuci* is of particular interest and importance because it presents episode in Bhima's career which, according to Johns, up to the present at least, has not been discovered in any Indian sources. Further, it manifests an aspect of Bhima's character unknown in

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[80] Quoted from Ricklefs, "Unity and Diversity in Javanese Political and Religious Thought of the Eighteenth Century" in V.J.H. Houben, H.M.J. Maier and W. van der Molen. eds., *Looking in Odd Mirrors: The Java Sea.* (Leiden: Vakgroep Talen en Culturen van Zuidoost-Azie en Oceanie, 1992), 68.

[81] Ibid, 72.

[82] See A.H. Johns, "From Buddhism to Islam: An Interpretation of the Javanese Literature of the Transition" *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 9 (1966/1967), 42-43, 48-49; Steenbrink, *Mencari Tuhan,* 47.

India -Bhima as a master of esoteric wisdom.[83] The essential doctrine that has been communicated to Bhima, in the *Bhimasuci* story, is the identity of the microcosmos with the macrocosmos, and Bhima's own connection substantiality with the Absolute.

With some of the above notes, it comes to my conclusion that the transition from pre-Islamic tradition to Islam is the history of expanding Islamization and its impact upon the religious, social and political life of Indonesia. It reflects a continuing Islamization process which has lasted for a long time, and has even today not been entirely completed. With various compromises and combinations between the old and the new religious traditions, indeed, Islam in Indonesia is a unique picture. This uniqueness will always change in a process which increasingly directs the individual to work not for spreading Islam to non-Muslims but campaigning to make those who already Muslims firm believers. The target therefore is not people in general but the Muslims themselves; it stresses the quality of faith rather than the number of adherents.

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[83]Johns, "From Buddhism to Islam", 41.

II. THE IDEA OF MODERNIZATION

1.   The Basis of Modernization

The variety of modern Islamic movements that has taken place in some Muslim countries from the nineteenth century has its relation with the tradition of Islamic teaching. The idea of *tajdid,* whichis known in the contemporary world under different labels, ranging from Islamic modernism and reformism, to Islamic revivalism, resurgence, or even "Islamic fundamentalism",[84] has deep roots in the heritage of the Muslim historical experience. The most important aspect of this heritage is the theological basis of the movement. It provides a basis for the legitimacy of *tajdid* as means of implementing Islamic teachings after the death of the Prophet. The *tajdid* movement is one of long-standing theme in the history of the Islamic world and in the historical experience of Muslim societies. There has in fact been a continuity in the themes manifested in every *tajdid* movement. However, the historical reality of *tajdid* movements has also taken on a variety of forms. Each of them reflects a response of the Muslim community to problems particular to certain eras and regions. This chapter discusses first of all, these phenomena and argues that such phenomena provided the precedent for the modern Islamic movements in Indonesia. Second, it shows how they were transmitted to some Islamic movements in Indonesia in the early twentieth century. With regards to the Muʾammadiyah movement, this will involve tracing the influence on the movement of, in particular, the *Al-Manar* group of Egypt.

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[84]See Sajida S. Alvi. "The *Mujaddid* and *Tajdid* Traditions in the Indian Subcontinent: A Historical Overview" *Journal of Turkish Studies,* 18(1994), p. 1. All of these different labels have intellectually been analyzed under the growing ideological orientation of modern Islamic movements. For further references on the comparison among these orientations, see William Shepard. "Islam and Ideology: Towards A Typology" *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 19(1987), pp. 307-336; ____. "Fundamentalism Christian and Islamic" *Religion,*17(1987), pp. 355-378.

A Theological Basis of the Idea of *Tajdid*.

The idea of *tajdid* is actually a logical consequence of the fundamentals of Islamic teachings. These fundamental teachings hold that, first of all, Islam is a universal religion whis was sent as a mercy to all peoples[85]. Islam in this sense is understood as a religion which covers all aspects of life, governing the basic principles of the relationships between man and God, man and his fellow human beings, and his environment. Islam also transcends space and time, and is eternally valid for the whole human race, without regard for geographical or ethnic boundaries. Islam also emphasizes the equilibrium between worldly and non-worldly affairs, the spiritual and the material, ritual and social life. The basis of this notion is explained in the Qur'an which encourages everyone to seek the abode of the Hereafter in that which Allah has given, without neglecting the portion of worldly affairs[86]. The most significant aspect of this understanding, lies in the belief that Islam is a guidance for all mankind, a guidance whose goal is the acquisition of a happy life in this world as well as in the Hereafter.

This universal teaching, which is referred to by Voll as the uniqueness and authenticity of the Qur'anic message,[87] is defined in the Qur'an as completely and in some detail,[88] although sometimes in clear and at other times in allegorical

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[85]The Qur'an, *al-anbiya* (21): 107. Yusuf Ali comments this verse and says that the principle is universally applied to all peoples without questioning race or nation. Yusuf Ali. *The Holy Qur'an*, 2 (New Delhi: Kitab Publishing House, n.d.), p. 846.

[86]The Qur'an, *al-qassas* (28): 77.

[87]John O. Voll. "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: *Tajdid* and *Islah* " in John L. Esposito, ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 41; in another work, he elaborates this characteritic under the subject of "the existence and nature of the message". Voll. "Wahhabism and Mahdism: Alternative Style of Islamic Renewals" *Arab Studies Quarterly,* 4, 1-2(1982), pp. 111-114.

[88]The Qur'an, *al-an'am* (6): 114,115.

language.[89] For 'Abduh, the Qur'anic text consists of general principles, in accordance with the *maslaha* (utility) of human life in every time and place.[90] It is important to note that the claim of perfection should be understood in the sense of the Qur'an functioning as a paradigm of interpretation. Thus, behind legal ruling, the Qur'an only provides the main principles, values, and orientation and therefore, does not explain every single matter in detail. Interpretation is needed in order to understand their purpose or their meaning and implement them in accordance with the demands of particular age. They are generally categorized as interpretational matters (*ijtihadiyat*). They change in accordance with the benefits (*masalih*) demanded by certain situations or conditions.[91] Sociologically, they are able to adapt to diverse environments and times. It should not be expected, therefore, that the relation between the changeable aspects of religious doctrine and a specific temporal situation be either uniform or definite. Islam's strength therefore lies precisely in its ability to evolve, assimilate the capabilities of individuals and society, and guide these lives on the path of continuous development and renewal.

But it is also recognized that there are certain teachings which are expressed in explicit terms in the Qur'an and the *Sunna*. They are concerned with regulating the relations between God and man in the system of belief,[92] in certain rituals,[93] and in certain aspects of ethical behavior such as the benefits of honesty,

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[89]The Qur'an, *Ali 'Imran* (3): 7.

[90]Muhammad Rashid Rida. *Tarikh al-Ustadh al-Imam al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh* I (Egypt: Matba'at al-Manar, 1931), p. 614.

[91]Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziya. *Ighathat al-lahtan*, 1 (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1961), p. 347.

[92] "... but righteous is he who believeth in Allah and the Last Day and the angels and the Scripture and the Prophets;". The Qur'an, *al-baqarah* (2): 177.

[93]"Islam is built on five principles: to tesmony that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah, perform prayer, give almsgiving, pilgrim, and fast in the month of *Ramadan*". Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani. *Fath al-bari bi-sharh al-Bukhari,* 1 (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halibi, 1959), p. 55.

truthworthiness (*amana*), and patience (*sabr).* Various evil actions are also explicitly forbidden such as killing and stealing. These are God-given and fixed,[94] nor may they be changed by analogy or any other means. Nevertheless, although these rulings are meant to be unchanging, certain situations demand flexibility in their implementation. This legal exemption may be due to emerging situations,[95] caused by particular social conditions, time, and environment.

Second, it is believed that Islam is the final religion, and that it contains in the Qur'an and the *Sunna* all the essential religious and moral truth required by human beings, from now until the end of time. This claim to finality is made in the Qur'an where Muhammad is described as "the seal of the Prophets".[96] The universal interpretation of this verse means that Muhammad is the last of the Prophets, after whom there will no other. This belief is echoed in the Hadith literature. In a tradition, the Prophet compares his position with respect to the Prophets who preceded him to that of a man who almost completes the building of a beautiful house, leaving empty only the place for one brick at the corner. People start to walk around it, admire it, and ask why the missing brick has not been put in its place. The Prophet says: "I am the brick and I am the seal of the Prophets".[97] Thus the Prophet is described as completing, perfecting, and putting the final touch on the sumptuous structure of religion, which had gradually been erected by his predecessors in the prophetic mission. This interpretation accords with the last verse revealed to

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[94]Certain 'ulama' consider them as constant and therefore have to be eternity. See Yusuf Qardawi. *Al-Khasais al-ammah li-al-Islam*. Indonesian trans. *Karakteristik Islam* (Surabaya: Risalah Gusti, 1995), p. 242. The quoted texts used here is from Indonesian translation.

[95]The Qur'an, *Ali-'Imran* (3): 28; *an-nahl* (16): 106; *an-nisa'* (4): 148.

[96]The Qur'an, *al-ahzab* (33): 40.

[97]*Sahih al-Bukhari*, 2: Kitab al-Manaqib, p. 390; *Sahih} Muslim*, 4: Kitab al-Fada'il, p. 1791. For an extensive discussion on this issue, see Y. Friedmann. *Propecy Continues: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 53-82.

Muhammad: "This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed My favor unto you, and have chosen for you as religion Islam".[98]This means that all heavenly revelation ended with the Prophet Muhammad.

The claim of the finality of Muhammad's prophethood acquires an established place in Islamic doctrine. No prophet is acknowledged as true after Muhammad's death; nevertheless it should be understood that the cessation of prophecy does not mean the disappearance of divine guidance for the Muslim community.[99] The rationale behind the termination of prophethood is that people were now to receive knowledge directly from God, without the intercession of the angel Gabriel. Support for this interpretation may be found in a verse in the second *su>ra* which states that the Qur'an was sent down to be a guidance to the people.[100] In this sense, the Qur'an is a document that is directed to man.[101] In other words, the revelation in the Qur'an is a presentation of God's blueprint for the proper conduct of human life. The focus of the guidance is thus humanity, just as the vehicle its transmission was a human.[102] Since the Qur'an is the literal word of God, the people are able to have direct access to his commandments as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. By rigorously and intelligently pursuing reflective worship and imitating other practices of the Prophet, human beings sharpen their senses and develop their faculties, thereby becoming ready to appreciate and understand what

[98]The Qur'an, *al-ma'idah* (5): 3.

[99]Quoting some traditions of the Prophet, Friedmann argues that the channels through which divine guidance could reach the Muslim community after Muhammad's death are found in the "good dream of a Muslim" and the *muhaddathun* (people who are spoken to). Friedmann. *Prophecy*, pp. 83-92.

[100]The Qur'an, *al-baqarah* (2): 185.

[101]Fazlur Rahman. *Major Themes of the Qur'an* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), p. 1.

[102]Voll. "Wahhabism and Mahdism", p. 112.

God teaches through the Qur'an.[103] This is because the Qur'an describes itself as a clear sign in the hearts of those who have been granted knowledge.[104] This notion leads to the idea that after Muhammad's function as Prophet came to an end, the role of Muslims themselves in interpreting and understanding the basic sources thereupon became a necessity. Out of this situation there grew a body of learned men ('ulama') whose role became increasingly important in preserving the dynamics of Islam. This is no exaggeration, for one Hadith mentions that "the 'ulama' are the heirs of the Prophets".[105] It was from the rank of the 'ulama' that the *mujaddidun* emerged, and, therefore, it is logical to conclude that the continuity of revealed guidance extended from Adam to Muhammad through the prophets, and from Muh}ammad onwards through the *mujaddidun* 'ulama'.[106] This idea is institutionally expressed in the variety of thoughts and movements in Islam.

The concept of the universality of Islam and the finality of Muhammad's prophethood render the concept of *tajdid* an important one in the historical experience of Muslims. Thus, the mission of Muslims becomes the implementation of God's revelation within the actual conditions existing in human society. Islam's most important message therefore is not theoretical but practical. This practical aspect emerges as one of the more important characteristics of the *tajdid* movements. Where theory and practice meets there is the point at which human beings must exercise interpretation. During the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, this role was played by the Prophet himself, and his *Sunna* represents the record of his practical interpretation of the Qur'an. The two in fact go together, as Danner says, for the Qur'an without the *Sunna* of the Prophet would be ineffective as a

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[103]Mahmoud Muhammad Taha. *The Second Message of Islam* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p. 4.

[104]The Qur'an, *al-'ankabut* (29): 49.

[105]*Sahih Bukhari,* bab 'ilm, 10.

[106]See Ella Landau-Tasseron. "The 'Cyclical Reform': A Study of the Mujaddid Tradition" *Studia Islamica,* 70(1989), p. 83.

source for correct ritual practice, the *Sunna* without the Qur'an would be like a collection of actions without transcendent principles to back them up.[107]

Besides the necessity of interpreting in practical terms, and in accordance with the *Sunna,* what the Qur'an has to say about various issues, there is also a need for determining what must be done when a general directive in the Qur'an is not detailed by the *Sunna.* Over the centuries, the many *tajdid* movements that have existed have called therefore not only for a return to the Qur'ån and the *Sunna,* but also for recognition of their right to exercise *ijtihad.*

Further justification of the *mujaddid's* role may be found in the Hadith of the Prophet stating "Allah will send to this community at the turn of every century someone who will restore religion."[108] This is seen as a clear justification of *tajdid's* role in Islam. Other versions of this Hadith also appear in the *Musnad* of Ibn Hanbal, giving such varients as "who shall mend what has been impaired in religion" and "who shall teach the (right) *Sunan* and remove the falsehood from the Messenger of Allah."[109] Certain writers have different interpretations of the phrase *'ala ra'si kulli mi'ati sanatin* (at the turn of every century) in terms of the emergence of the *mujaddid.* Some connect this phrase with the birth of the *mujaddid*, and others relate it to his death. The latter is based on the tradition of biographical writing in Islam which usually refers to the death date of the person. But this interpretation is hardly compatible with the literal meaning of the Hadith because it could mean that shortly after the turn of the century the *mujaddidun* would already be dead and thus

[107]Victor Danner. "Religious Revivalism in Islam: Past and Present" in Cyriac K. Pullapilly. *Islam in the Contemporary World* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Cross Roads Books, 1980), p. 33.

[108]*Sunan Abi Da'ud 4* (Cairo: Matba'at Mustafa Mahmud, 1353/1950), "Kitab al-Malahin" p. 159; see also Muhammad Shams al-Haqq al-'Adhim Abadi**.** *Sharh Abi Da'ud*, 11 (al-Madina: al-Maktaba al-Salafiyya, 1969), pp. 385-396.

[109]Hava Lazarus-Yafeh. "Tajdid al-Din: A Reconstruction of Its Meaning, Roots, and Influence in Islam" in W.M. Brinner & Stephen D. Ricks. *Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions.* (Atlanta, GA.: Scholars Press, 1986), p. 100.

unable to restore religion.[110] This is why other writers interpret it loosely and insist that the restorer will still be alive and active after the turn of the century.

In his interpretation of the phrase *ala ra'si kulli mi'ati sanatin*, Maududi does not limit the number of *mujaddidun* who might appear in every century. He bases this view on the word *man* (who), which is used in the Hadith narrated by Abu> Da'ud, which quantitatively can be understood as either singular or plural. Therefore, in the context of *tajdid,* the *mujaddid* referred to the Hadith may be a single person or a group of persons, who carries (carry) out his (their) mission individually or as a group.[111] This interpretation would in fact explain how there could be a number of *mujaddidun* or a group of people who join in a movement or an organization.

Still another version of this Hadith refers to the role of *tajdid* in renewing the faith (*jaddidu Imanakum).* In this Hadith, *tajdid al-Iman* is identified with the constant repetition of the phrase "there is no God but Allah".[112] Although the meaning of *tajdid* in this Hadith is still general in that it is associated with *iman,* it may be interpreted as meaning that the issues raised by *tajdid* always relate to the fundamentals of Islam. It is understandable therefore why *tajdid* movements throughout the history of Islam have emphasized a return to the fundamental sources of Islamic teaching as well, shouting the slogan "back to the Qur'an and the *Sunna."* The supporters of *tajdid* saw themselves as being obliged to use these sources as a standard by which to judge contemporary events and practices. This approach made it possible for them not only to purify Islamic beliefs and rituals and to reject non-prophetic traditions, but also to try to introduce social reforms on the

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[110]Landau-Tasseron, "The Cyclical Reform", p. 84.

[111]Maududi, *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1981), p. 34.

[112]Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. *Musnad*, 2 (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-Islam, 1398/1978), p. 359.

basis of the established scriptures.[113] Thus, in its application, *tajdid* is always directed at the reform of religious beliefs and practices, and yet is often used to effect change in other areas of human life not directly affected by religion.

For certain scholars, it is difficult to imagine that Islam should recognize its own imperfection to such a degree that it should have formulated in a Hadith a justification for regular reform. Landau-Tasseron, for example, argues that while the prevailing idea in the Islamic self-image is the assumption that the Muslim community does not err, it is hard to accept a call for reform, because it leads to the assumption that Islam recognizes its own imperfection.[114] Sajida Alvi opposes this thesis and argues that *tajdid* tradition occurred in the history did not attempt to reform Islam but the practices of Muslims.[115] She sees this as tantamount to saying that religious life (not Islam) inevitably deteriorates .It is conceivable, however, that the original purpose of the Hadith was not only to correct that which had been distorted but also to praise whoever disseminates religious interpretation in accordance with the contemporary developments. In other words, as one rightly defines it, *tajdid* may be a response to the challenge of religious deterioration or to that of the success of the Muslim community.[116] Each has its own basis both in the principles and characteristics of Islam, and in the experience of Muslims in history.

These two functions can be analogised with the mission of the Prophet Muhammad, who, as we have seen, is believed to have been the last of the prophets sent by God to his peoples. According to this analogy, Muhammad was first of all sent to rebuild the deteriorated religious life of his community; to do so he had to deliver the religious message of the earlier prophets to an Arab community given

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[113]Voll. "Renewal and Reform", p. 36.

[114]Landau-Tasseron. "The 'Cyclical Reform", pp. 79-80.

[115]Sajida Alvi. "The *Mujaddid* and *Tajdid,* p. 15.

[116]John O. Voll. "Revivalism and Social Transformations in Islamic History" *The Muslim World,* 76 (1989), p. 172.

over to pagan and poletheistic beliefs. Second, as the last Prophet, it was his task to complete the teachings brought by the previous prophets.[117] The first reveals the similarity of his mission to those of others before him, while the second emphasizes the difference between the teachings brought by the Prophet Muhammad and the earlier prophets. The latter in particular may be seen as a logical consequence of the status and function of Muhammad as the seal of the Prophets who was sent to a more complex peoples than the earlier ones.

The other interpretation, which considers *tajdid* to be a response to the challenge of the success of the Muslim community, places less stress on an attempt at developing an understanding of religious practices directed at the purification of Islamic belief and ritual. Instead, it concentrates on the implementing those aspects of Islamic teaching which support the process of change in the socio-cultural and political life of the Muslims. In order to understand this, we must first look at those fields in which *tajdid* is supported to operate.

Tajdid is usually regarded as being valid in the area of changeable or worldly affairs (*dunyawiyat*),[118] but not in that of basic beliefs, rituals and other-worldly affairs (*ukhrawiyat*).[119] The general character of the Islamic conception of *tajdid* should therefore be understood primarily in terms of the Islamic concept of this world and its relation to the world to come. The so called "worldly affairs" referred

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[117]In a Qur'anic verse, it is mentioned that the Qur'an is a corroborator and measurement of the Books which were revealed earlier. The Qur'an, *al-ma'idah* (5): 48.

[118]'Abduh calls these aspects as human affairs (*mu'amalat*) which cover all social, cultural, political and public affairs. Rashid Rida. *Tarikh al-Ustadh*, I, p. 490; Rashid Rida. *Tafsir al-Manar*, IV (Cairo: Manar Press, 1346-1354), p. 25.

[119]Ibid, p. 49; see also 'Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf. *'Ilm al-usul al-fiqh* (Kuwayt: Dar al-Kuwaytiyah, 1968), p. 34.

to in a Hadith narrated by Muslim: "...you know better of your worldly affairs".[120] This may be taken as applying to any matters in which the Prophet has not provided guidance.[121] On the other hand, the Hadith may be taken as encouraging creativity or inventiveness in the affairs of this world. This leads to the fundamental principle of the dynamic character of *tajdid* which emerges in the norm "everything is allowed except that which is forbidden".[122]

This norm also gives us to understand that the scope of *tajdid* is closely related to the concept the of universality of Islam, which covers all of natural laws (*sunnatullah*) in this world. To understand the mechanism of these laws, Maududi, for example, relates them to the interference of God. He says that everything in this world, its own character, and its relation to others are determined by God.[123] What this means is that *sunnatullah* can be found everywhere. The mission of *tajdid* is therefore to find the latter for the benefit of human life. This principle also implies that, as long as something of the nature of a worldly affair is not contradictory with the principal teachings of Islam, is acceptable. This notion makes possible as well an attitude of openness to other ideas.

To understand and develop such principal values, a method is required which can interpret the applicable of religious teachings in the daily lives of Muslims. This method is not concerned with building a substantive knowledge of Islamic teaching, but rather consists of the procedures by which the teaching may be

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[120]*Al-Bayan wa-al-ta'rif fi al-sabab wurud al-hadith al-sharif*, 2 (Beirut: Maktabah al-Ilmiyah, 1980), pp. 172-173.

[121]*Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Central Leadership of Muhammadiyah, n.d.), 6; The meaning of the Hadith does not restrict on the case of the engineering of the date, but denotes everything which is not mentioned in the Qur'an and the *Sunna*. *Al-Bayan wa-al-ta'rif,* 172-173.

[122]Al-Suyuti. *Al-Ashbah wa-al-Nadair fi Qawa'id wa Furu' Fiqh al-Shafi'iyah* (Cairo: 'Isa al-Babi al-Halibi, n.d.), p. 66.

[123]Abul A'la Maududi.*Towards Understanding Islam* (Rampur, 1948), p. 3.

made to apply. To speak of the application of the Qur'an and the *Sunna*is necessarily to speak of their interpretation and application through some human agency.[124] If the Qur'an is believed to be a source or paradigm of Islamic interpretation, therefore, the metaphorical and allegorical phrases of the Qur'an must become the object of interpretation to find their real meaning. It is understood then that the universality of Islamic teaching not only refers to uniform insights into the normative aspects of certain Islamic rituals, but also to pluralistic interpretations of matters affecting the social, economic, political, and humanistic aspects of life. This means that arriving at different opinions on certain issues is a natural characteristic of the idea of *tajdid.*

To meet this need, *ijtihad* serves as one of the most important elements of the human interpretation, allowing one to deduce the application of Islamic teachings in the concrete realities of life. It is therefore imporatnt to apply *ijtihad* in the right instances. It is an effort, not a source nor a set method of determining the status of a certain issue in the context of Islamic teachings. It becomes necessary when one is faced with the task of determining the legal status of an issue in terms of the existing law, whether or not it is explicitly stated therein. This explains the statement of Mu'ad ibn Jabal, who promised the Prophet that he would perform *ijtihad* in those instances where he could not find an explicit law in the Qur'an and the *Sunna.*[125] To understand the important position of *ijtihad* in Islamic discourse, it is sufficient to point to the, albeit false, Hadith in which the Prophet guarantees a reward for those who practice *ijtihad.*[126] From the various narrations of Hadith however it may be safely concluded that *ijtihad* has a clear basis as an important element of source of Islamic law. *Tajdid* includes *ijtihad* as a part of its ongoing

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[124]An-Na'im. *Toward an Islamic Reformation* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p. 48.

[125]It was portrayed by the dialog between the Prophet and Mu'ad ibn Jabal, when the latter was appointed to be a governor of Yemen. See Ahmad Hasan. *Sunan Abi Da'ud*, 3 (Lahore, 1984), p. 109.

[126]*Sunan al-Nasa'i*, 8 (Cairo: al-Matba'ah al-Misriyyah bi-al-Azhar, n.d.), p. 224.

process of striving to understand religious, social, and historical phenomena. All efforts aimed at renewing religious values and beliefs will run smoothly if the institution of *ijtihad* is allowed to function.

A broader interpretation of *ijtihad* is possible however, wherein it becomes relevant to the understanding of the Qur'an and the *Sunna*. However clear and definite they may appear to be, they need *ijtihad* or their interpretation and concrete application. In asmuch as it represents an effort to understand the two sources, the exercise of *ijtihad* is the right of every Muslim.[127] Thus *ijtihad* should not be restricted to the obscure passages in the texts of the Qur'an and the *Sunna*, but should also deal with matters clearly defined by these two sources as long as the outcome of such *ijtihad* is consistent with the essential message of Islam.[128] Its use is especially needed in explaining otherwise clear texts of the Qur'an which are nevertheless apparently inconsistent with each other.[129] While this does not take away from the fact that the entire message of the Qur'an is eternal and fundamental, it is nevertheless true that some aspects of teaching from the Meccan period which were inappropriate for practical implementation within the historical context of the seventh century were suspended and replaced by the more practical principles revealed during the Medinan period. Nor does this mean that the suspended aspects of the Meccan message were henceforth invalid as source of law. Rather, they were postponed for implementation under appropriate circumstances in the future. Otherwise, the superiority and eternal aspect of Islam would have been

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[127]Rida. *Tafsir al-Manar,* 2, p. 399.

[128]An-Na'im. *Toward an Islamic*, p. 28-29.

[129]As an example of this, there are certain verses of the Qur'an of the Meccan period instruct the Prophet and his followers to practice peaceful persuasion and allow others freedom of choice in accepting or rejecting Islam (The Qur'an, *an-Nahl* (16): 125-127), the Qur'ån of the Medinan period, on the other hand, clearly sanctioned, and even required under certain conditions, the use of force to compel the unbelievers either to embrace Islam or to suffer one of the options which included death, or some other unpleasant consequence The Qur'an, *at-Taubah* (9): 5; see also Muhmmad Taha. *The Second Message*, p. 126.

lost.[130]*Ijtihad* was employed in such cases simply in order to identify which Qur'anic text was suitable for implementation in the seventh century, and which was at the time too advanced and therefore had to be postponed.

Having established the importance of *ijtihad* to the *tajdid* movements we come to the idea that *ijtihad* in terms of its application in explaining the Qur'an and the *Sunna,* necessarily involves human interpretation. The relation between the two concepts, *tajdid* and *ijtihad,* is attested by the claim that a *mujaddid* must be a *mujtahid.* Another indication of the connection between the two concepts leads to the idea that "the gates of *ijtihad*" are never closed, since its continuation is guaranteed by the appearance every hundred years of the *mujaddid.*

If these two interpretations of *tajdid* are accepted, *tajdid* can then be said to have two missions. First, it refers all aspects of present-day religious life to the example of the early period of the *al-salaf al-Salih.* This reflects the importance attached to the preservation of Islamic beliefs and rituals from corrupt influences. The movements which concentrate on this orientation are usually called "purificationist" movements. Second, based on the universality of Islamic teaching, *tajdid* is intended to implement Islamic teaching in accordance with the challenges of modern development. This implementation applies to non-specific ritual aspects, for which the sources give only general guidance. The movements which pursue this course are called "modernist" movements. In the field, these two missions may appear simultaneuously in a movement or in separate ones.

2. The Application of Tajdid in the History of Islam

Efforts at *tajdid* have been variously applied at different time in the history of Islam, depending on the evolution of Islamic thought and the changing circumstances of the Muslim community. Both of the responses outlained above, to the respective challenges of success and decline, seem to have been part of the

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[130]Ibid, p. 40; see also An-Na'im. *Toward an Islamic*, p. 52-53.

tajdid experience over the centuries. But there has been a continuous theme that has been present in every *tajdid* movement. This can especially be seen in the many Islamic movements that have called for a return to the basic principles of Islam as presented in the Qur'an and the *Sunna,* and that have proclaimed the right to exercise *ijtihad.* This theme has led to the application of *tajdid* in religious, social, and political life and thought, and has often resulted in important development in Islamic and world civilization.[131]

This thesis intends to argue that the application of *tajdid* occurs both in the religious and the social domains. This stance, when coupled with the notion that Islamic teaching faced new implications immediately after the death of the Prophet, may lead to the conclusion that *tajdid* ideas have existed since the earliest period of the *Khulafa' al-Rashidun* (the Rightly-Guided Caliphs).[132] This position is in conflict with the usual one adopted by some scholars who argue that *tajdid* movements are not possible until a basic tradition is formulated.[133] This means that *tajdid* could only have occurred after the codification of the *Sunna,* which took place during the period of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. It is for this reason that many writers date the first efforts at *tajdid* to this period and consider him as the first *mujaddid.*[134]

This latter idea is subtanstially weakened by the fact that the two basic sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the *Sunna*, have existed since the death of the

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[131]There are some version of Muslim reformers who deal with a mosaic of various fields of philosophy, art, literature, science, socio-politics, and religion. They represent figures of philosopher, artist, stateman, scientist, and 'ulama' from the period of the Companions until the twentieth century. See 'Abd al-Muta'al al-Saidi. *Al-Mujaddidun fi al-Islam min al-qarn al-awwal ila al-rab' 'ashr* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Adab, n.d); Ahmad Amin. *Zu'ama' al-islah fi al-asr al-hadith.* (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahdat al-Misriyah, 1948).

[132]al-Saidi. *Al-Mujaddidun fi al-Islam,* pp. 18-46.

[133]See Rahman. "Revival and Reform", p. 632; Voll. "Renewal and Reform", p. 36.

[134]Maududi. *A Short History*, pp. 45-50; Landau-Tasseron. "The Cyclical Reform", p. 84, especially note 22; Friedmann. *Prophecy Continues*, p. 99.

Prophet. It is true that the Qur'an was not codified until the period of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr (11-13/632-634), and was only perfected during the period of the third Caliph, 'Uthman ibn 'Affan (23-35/644-656), it was not until the reign of the eighth Caliph of the Umayyads, 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (99-101/717-720), that the Hadith was compiled. But the fact that these two were not set down in their final form did not affect the application of Islam in the earlier period since the Muslims still had a fresh memory of the revelation given to the Prophet. This situation was supported by the strong oral tradition of Arab society which enabled them to preserve the Islamic teachings without necessarily writing them down.[135] Another factor was the size of the early community, which was still small and closely-knit, enabling the Muslims to practice their religion in relative security. It is clear however that when the situation changed[136] the need for preserving those fundamental sources through another means was absolute. Those who worked at codifying the Qur'an and the *Sunna* actually engaged in a new precedent one which had not occurred during the period of the Prophet. As *maslaha* (public utility), such efforts may be categorized as fulfilling the idea of *tajdid*, in the sense that the preservation of those two basic sources was of paramount importance for the guidance of the religious life of the increasingly extensive Muslim community.

If the reasons given above are accepted, the formulation of a basic tradition might not be used to determine the beginning of the idea of *tajdid*, and 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz might not have been the first *mujaddid* in Islam. As a response to religious decline, however, *tajdid* may not have been introduced until two and a half centuries later. This was the period, as Rahman points out, in which formative developments took place in Islam, and in which Muslim orthodoxy crystallized and

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[135]Issa J. Boullata, ed. "Guest Editor''s Column" in *Arabic Oral Tradition* (Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers, 1989), p. 1. For more detail accounts of the Arab oral tradition, see also another article in the same book. R.M. Speight. "Oral Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad: A Formulatic Approach", pp. 27-37.

[136]Many *huffad,* sing. *hafid,* (those who know the Qur'an by heart were dead in the battle of Uhud and the growing influence of Islam outside Arabian-peninsula.

emerged. Since it was a formative period, there was no reason to "halt the process" of religious deterioration during this time.[137] It was also logical to say that since 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz lived in this period, his qualification as a *mujaddid* in the end of the first/eighth century cannot be based on any effort at arresting religious deterioration. In some ways, at least, the challenge of the *umma* at that time was that it had been successful in winning control over regions ouside the Arabian-peninsula. The period was indeed one of crisis for a particular ruling group but not for the Muslim community in general.[138] Moreover, 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz felt responsible for the moral life of the Umayyad families as well as the older political institutions which were no longer compatible with the recent development of the Muslim community. On the day of his allegiance he issued a mechanism of the appointment of a Caliph. Maududi illustrates this issue with an example:

> Though he succeeded to the throne by inheritance, before enlisting the allegiance of the people he declared in clear terms that they were not bound but free to elect anybody they pleased as their Caliph. The people on their part, however, were willing and disposed to elect only him as their Leader and, therefore, he had to assume the responsibilities of Caliphate.[139]

This interpretation leads to the notion that a *mujaddid* must be a figure who is dissatisfied with the conditions of the society in which he lives; he would not be a man who trying to preserve things as they are. The *mujaddid* is usually an agent for significant changes in socio-religious life. In this sense, a *mujaddid* is always a

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[137]Rahman. "Revival and Reform," p. 632; the dynamic religious life in this period has contributed the intellectual debates on theological and legal thoughts as well as the study of the Qur'an and Tradition. See Montgomery Watt. *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), pp. 9-249.

[138]Voll. "Revivalism and Social," p. 173.

[139]Maududi. *A Short History,*p. 47.

product of a response to a perceived challenge.[140] As a consequence, this exceptional man is generally a stranger (*gharib*) to the world around him.[141] Because of his ideas, people often react hostilely sometimes even putting his life in danger. The experience of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz who died as result of a conspiracy organized by his own family[142] is a clear proof of this thesis.

But efforts at religious purification, which take as their example of orthodoxy of the behavior of the Muslim community in the early period, dominate to a great extent the application of *tajdid.* This tendency creates a general impression that *tajdid* is always restricted to efforts at purifying Islam from *bid'ah* (innovation) and *khurafat* (superstition).[143] Therefore, when *tajdid* movements issue the call "back to the Qur'an and the *Sunna*," they actually mean that Islamic religious practices should reflect those of the pristine Islam of the early generations of Muslims.

Fazlur Rahman identifies this group with the people of tradition (*ahl al-hadith*) who existed in the third/ninth century. This movement had played a decisive role in the early struggles against the Mu'tazilites, and had helped to formulate Sunni orthodoxy. In the fifth/eleventh century al-Ghazali forged a synthesis of sufism and orthodoxy which has influenced the subsequent development of the Muslim community. During the seventh-eighth/thirteenth-fourteenth centuries, the movement for *tajdid* appeared under the leadership of Ibn

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[140]Voll. "Revivalism and Social", p. 174.

[141]This can be analogized with the emergence of Islam. A Hadith mentions that "Islam was born strange, and will become strange again, as at its beginning. Be happy the solitary men. Those are they who will come to reform that which had been corrupted of my *Sunna* after me."*Sahih al-Tirmidhi,* Bab al-Iman, pp. 104-105.

[142]Some indicate that they conspired against him and poisoned him at the young age of 39. See Maududi. *A Short History,* p. 50.

[143]In India and Pakistan, for example, these aspects, which seem to be the theme of "the proper application of shari'a," have been emphasized in the discussion of *tajdid* and in the reconstruction of religious thought from the eighteenth century to the present time. See Sajida Alvi. "The *Mujaddid* and*Tajdid,* p. 3.

Taymiya. He was a follower of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and a typical representative of orthodoxy. He opposed strongly popular Islamic practices, which, according to him found no justification in the Qur'an and the *Sunna.*[144] He rejected the authority of the medieval schools, thus earning the enmity of the orthodox 'ulama' who wanted to maintain the medieval beliefs and practices of Islam. His call for a return to the Qur'an and the *Sunna*was understood as an invitation to accept the formulations of the early generations of Muslims.[145]

The *tajdid* movements that existed in the Muslim world during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries exhibited this common characteristic. In the seventeenth century Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1563-1624) laid down the theoritical basis of a similar reform. He attacked both the theory and practice of heterodox sufism. He realized that the challenge which many preachers of sufism posed to Islam was serious. Commenting on the state of the religious life of his community, he said that people had developed a wrong view of sufism and of its relation with shari'a. Those who followed Ibn 'Arabi's *Wahdat al-Wujud* cared little for the shari'a. They believed that the goal of the shari'a was simply to obtain knowledge; hence anyone who realized the truth of *Wahdat al-Wujud* did not have to perfom the duties of the shari'a.[146] Like Ibn Taymiya, Shaykh Ahmad focused on re-emphasizing the shari'a. The Wahhabi movement founded during the eighteenth century was much more radical and uncompromising towards "un-Islamic"

[144]For detail of Ibn Taymiya's views on unprophetic religious practices, see Muhammad Umar Memon. *Ibn Taimiya's Struggle Against Popular Religion* (The Hague: Mouton, 1976).

[145]Rahman. "Revival and Reform," pp. 632-635.

[146]Shaykh Ah}mad Sirhindi not only differentiated the concept of *Wahdat al-Wujud* of Ibn 'Arabi and showed that the latter was incompatible with the former, he also formulated a philosophy based upon the ultimate sufi experience of Divine transcendence which would be compatible with the religion of the Prophet, called *Wahdat al-Shuhud* or *Tawhid Shuhudi*, Unity of Being in vision. For detail analysis of this subject, see Muhammad Abdul Haq Ansari. *Sufism and Shari'a: A Study of Shaykh A}mad Sirhindi's Effort to Reform Sufism* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), pp. 102-118.

teachings, and the superstitious cults linked with the popular sufism.[147] Other reform movements also grew up at around this time. Again, in India, in the eighteenth century, Shah Wali-Allah (1703-1762) emerged as the forerunner of the modern Islamic movements in the Indian Subcontinent. His teachings had a potent influence on subsequent generations[148]who further developed his orientation in a number of Islamic modernist,[149] reformist,[150] and even traditionalist[151] movements.

The basic ideas propagated by the earlier movements, in fact, inspired the modern *tajdid* movements. It was, therefore, not an accident that the most important ideas of the modern Muslim thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries came from the purificationist-reformist background of the earlier *tajdid* movements. They had agreed to maintain the pristine Islam as a source of

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[147]For his condemnation on certain practices of popular sufism, see Shaykh Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. *Kitab al-Tawhid* (Salimah, Kuwayt: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, n.d.), pp. 25-30.

[148]Among his followers were S.A. 'Aziz (1745-1823), M.I. Shahid (1779-1831), S.A. Shahid (1786-1831), and Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). Alvi. "The *Mujaddid* and *Tajdid,*" p. 1; Talip Küçükcan. "An Analytical Comparasion of the Aligarh and the Deobandi Schools" *The Islamic Quarterly,* 38(1994), p. 49.

[149]The most representative of this group is the Aligarh movement, and then the Nadwat al-'Ulama' which was founded in 1891.

[150]*Ahl-i Hadith* might represent this orientation. Founded in the late 19th century, its main concern was a return to the norms of the *Sunna.* Committing to revitalize the Islamic law, it denied the blindly acceptance of medieval schools of law. It insisted that the Qur'an and the *Sunna*were the only valid sources which must be used. Being influenced by Ibn Taymiya on the issues of popular religion and its manifestations, the *Ahl-i Hadith* reminded of a dangerous threat of sufism to the teaching of Islam, therefore, it discouraged the institutional forms of the sufi tradition. Fazlur Rahman. *Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 205.

[151]The Deoband School might be said to represent this movement. It was founded by three famous figures, Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1813-1887), Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1827-1905), whose undestanding was characterized by traditional orthodox element of Shah Wali-Allah's religious thinking, and Imdadullah (1817-1899). B.D. Metcalf. *Islamic Revival in British India, 1860-1900* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 72-79.

inspiration in seeking a response to the socio-political challenges of modernization. This because they were sure that Muslims were able to live in the modern world without neglecting the principles of their religious teachings. The impact of modern Western culture upon the Muslim world, which received added momentum with the political and economic hegemony of the West, had contributed to the deepening identity crisis which had besieged Muslim societies from Morocco to Indonesia. This crisis brought about with it political, social, and religious challenges for the Muslims. In the early period, Islam had confronted the cultural challenges from an alien civilization, but at least it had never found itself in a subordinate position. The challenge at that time was primarily how to provide a solid political infrastructure of the growing great empire of Islam. But in the modern era, the cultural challenge was one of facing the inferiority of Mulim societies vis-a-vis the West, while the political challenge involved setting an agenda for liberating the Muslim world from Western occupation. Such challenges subsequently influenced the orientation of *tajdid* movements whose aim, to use Nasr's terms, was to preserve part of the heritage of the past, justify the present challenges, and legitimize the perceived future, hence, creating a link between the old and the new, the existing culture, and the new values.[152]The *tajdid* efforts of the modern Islamic movements have focused primarily on the challenges of the situation and directed towards deriving the socio-political solutions to problems on the basis of a religious perspective.

The tendency to see Islam as the fundamental reference for solving every problem has in fact become the dominant ideological orientation among Muslims. In the context of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the starting point of this orientation was the problem of internal decay, and the need for an internal reform. It was in some way committed to the Islamic tradition, and yet at the same time upheld reform, wishing thereby to show that the modern Islamic movement was not only a legitimate but a necessary implication of the social teaching of Islam. Based

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[152]Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. "Reflections on the Myth and Reality of Islamic Modernism" *Hamdard Islamicus*, XII, 1(1990), p. 67.

on this assumption, Muhammad 'Abduh, the most outspoken modernist of this period, suggests that the first important point to be looked at is the need for the reconstruction of the intellectual basis of an Islamic world-view. The task which should be set therefore involves two things, first, a restatement of what Islam really is and, second, a consideration of its implications for modern society.[153] The former, using Gibb's terms, may be identified as a true Islam which is pure from corrupting influences and practices. The implications of this idea lead to the efforts such as the reformulation of Islamic doctrines in the light of modern thought, the reformation of Muslim higher education and, the defense of Islam against European and Christian influences.[154]

With regards to the ideal image of Islam, 'Abduh defined it according to many principles. First, he asserted that Islam is based on belief in God's unicity and the affirmation of Muhammad's message. When Islam calls people to believe in God it asks them to look at rational proof and not supernatural miracles. There is consensus in Islam that belief in God precedes the messages of the prophets and their books. One cannot believe that there are books revealed by God until one accepts the existence of God in the first place. The only supernatural thing Muslims are asked to believe in is the Qur'a>n, which has been proved to be the revelation of God. Thus the first principle of Islam is that rational proof is the foundation and means of true belief. The second principle which undergirds Islam is that if there is a conflict between reason and what is reported, that which is rational predominates.

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[153]Albert Hourani. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 140.

[154]H.A.R. Gibb. *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1947), p. 33; see also Charles C. Adams. *Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muḥammad ʿAbduh* (New York: Russel & Russel, 1968), pp. 68-90.

The third principle is related to the openness of Islam to various interpretations.[155] The fourth principle stresses the belief that Islam does not give religious authority to certain people, because the only true relationship is that between man and God, thus setting the believer free from any supervision.[156] The fifth principle is that of protecting the *da'wa,* the message of Islam, and stopping *fitna* (discord). Here, he reminds Muslims of the Qur'a>nic verse which insists that there is no compulsion in religion, and insists that it should be the basis of Islamic *da'wa.*[157] The sixth principle of Islam is its amity, *mawadda,* toward those who are of different faiths. Islam allows Muslims to marry Christian and Jewish women, who would then raise their children. Inter-marriage happens only where there is mutual affection between the families of the parties and ties of concord. These women are not forced to convert, but are allowed to practise the tenets of their faith, and to fulfil their religious duties.[158] The seventh principle is that Islam combines the walfare of the world with that of the hereafter. It does not deny the enjoyment of this world or command the renunciation of pleasure in order to assure happiness in the world to come. Islam does affirm the importance of life in this world.[159]

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[155]Muhammad 'Abduh. *al-A'mal al-Kamilah lil-Imam Muhammad 'Abduh,* III. edited by Muhammad 'Amara, (Beyrut: al-Mu'assasat al-'Arabiya lil-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr, 1972), pp. 278-279, 282-283.

[156]Ibid, p. 284; in another section he said that in Islam there is no final authority besides that of God and the Prophet. The only authority is the call to righteousness and condemnation of evil. This is the authority delegated by God to the humblest of Muslims by which they confront the haughty. Ibid, pp.185-186, 288.

[157]Ibid, 289; see also Muhammad 'Abduh. *Tafsir al-Fatiha.* edited by Rashid Rida (Cairo: al-Manar, 1330 H), p. 74.

[158]*al-A'mal,* III, pp. 292-293; citing the Qur'an, *al-Rum* (30): 21, he said that affection and concordance are greater factors than just the love of the particular husband for his wife of another faith. See Muhammad 'Abduh. *The Theology of Unity.* translated from Arabic by Ishaq Musa'ad and Kenneth Craqq (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 134-135.

[159]*al-A'mal,* III, pp. 294.

The ideal Islam that he defined was far from the reality of his time. The inflexibility of Islamic thought in his day made him realize the necessity to reformulate Islamic doctrines in order to transform society. Among the most fundamental issues raised was the relationship between Islam and reason. Although this question was not the first time the question had been raised in Islam [160] the question as it was posed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries acquired a new dimension, because of the emergence of a new scientific world-view. On this issue, 'Abduh had views similar to those of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Although there were some differences on certain issues between these two modernists,[161] nevertheless both argued that there was no conflict between Islam and science, and maintained that Islam was positive, rational and scientific. Sayyid Ahmad Khan developed an awareness of his own authentic cultural identity and committed himself to understanding the religious doctrines of Islam in the light of reason. He played a leading role in the establishment of the Aligarh College in 1875, which created an important intellectual tradition in Muslim India. The main purpose of this institution was to disseminate modern Western culture and science along with the Islamic religion.

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[160]The Mu'tazilites and the Muslim philosophers had asked the same question, and given their own solutions. Because of his continuing insistence on the use of reason 'Abduh was categorized as being a kind of neo-Mu'tazilite. Rahman. "Revival and Reform," p 645; Yvonne Haddad. "Muhammad 'Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform" in Ali Rahnema, ed. *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), pp. 45-46.

[161]On specific issues, 'Abduh does not reject the possibility of miracles as a principle, while Sayyid Ahmad rejects it. Similarly, on the question of the Hadith. 'Abduh says that Hadith must be accepted on principle and in general, but Sayyid Ahmad rejects all Hadith. See Rahman. "Revival and Reform," p. 645. 'Abduh is very selective in choosing Hadith as a basis of religious life. Although a Hadith might be recognized *sahih* (valid) according to the standard of Bukhari, Muslim, or other narrators of Hadith, as long as it is contradictory with the Qur'an, he will reject it. See 'Abd al-Hamid Mutawalli. *Mabadi' Nidam al-Hukm fi al-Islam* (Iskandariya: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1966), p. 275.

Meanwhile, in justifying the validity of the idea of *tajdid* in Islam, Muhammad 'Abduh argued that Islam was based on rationalism and the rule of reason. It was through the power of reason that Muslims were expected to distinguish truth from falsehood and hence to abide by religion.[162] He was convinced that Islam was a creed based not on fear or love of God, but on the knowledge of Him, an awareness of the presence of good and the ability to discern truth from falsehood. [163] Rationalism in 'Abduh's thought led him to reject *taqlid* (blind imitation) and to accept *ta'wil* (interpretation) based on reason rather than accept the literal translation of the religious sources.[164] The paradigm underlying the process of reform in Islam was based primarily on the argument that Islam contained within itself the potentialities of rational religion, social conscience and morality which could serve as the basis of modern life. It was also seen as being able to create a religious elite which could articulate and interpret the real Islam and so provide the basis for the emergence of a new society.

Another project to which 'Abduh dedicated most of his life was the reformation of education. This reform program was not only a necessary complement to the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern demands, but was also based on his concern with the modern schools established by foreign missionaries as well as those set up by the government,[165] which did not comply with 'Abduh's demands. He called for the provision of education for all children, both male and female, thus enabling everyone to acquire the rudimentary

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[162]Reason becomes a priority than other sources especially when there is a conflict between the Qur'an and the *Sunna* or between the *nass* (injunction of the text of the Qur'an) and reason. Muhammad 'Abduh. *Al-Islam wa al-Nasraniya ma' al-'Ilm wa al-Madaniya* (Cairo: Al-Manar, 1938), pp. 54-55; Rida. *Tarkh al-Ustadh*, I, p. 613.

[163]Nasr. "Reflections on the Myth," p. 74.

[164]Rida. *Tarikh al-Ustadh,* I, pp. 11, 613.

[165]In the former, the student was forced to learn about Christianity and in the latter he did not learn religion at all. Yvonne Haddad. "Muhammad 'Abduh", p. 50.

skills of reading, writing and arithmetic, as well as religious instruction.[166] In advancing this program, he demonstrated a conviction that the adoption of Western scientific method and technical skills was crucial to its success. This does not however mean that he encouraged the indiscriminate borrowing of Western culture; rather, he often questioned certain elements of it which had been indiscriminately adopted by his contemporaries.[167] 'Abduh's attitude towards the west could therefore be described as one of "selectivity and openness". Culturally, this attitude enabled him to encourage people to derive as many advantages as possible from other civilizations as long as they were not contradictory to the principal teachings of Islam. This cultural accommodation led to a political neutrality towards the colonial government. He was not a political activist offering pragmatic yet unrealistic solutions to the problems confronting the Muslim world. Unlike his predecessor, Al-Afghani, he was not concerned with practical political action, but rather with cultural and religious reforms.

This precedent may not only explain the similarity between the reformist ideas of the early and later *tajdid* movements but may also reveal the factors which

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[166]Ibid, 51-52; he devided the stage of education on the basis of content and duration into three levels. The elementary school which included in its curriculum the basic Islamic doctrines and ethics; and a brief lesson of Islamic history. The secondary school should introduce the knowledge, the art of logic, and the principles of reasoning. The Islamic history which included the conquests and spread of Islam should also be given to this level. The higher school included exegesis of the Qur'an, Arabic language and linguistics, the science of Hadith, the study of morality, principles of jurisprudence, historiography, theology and rational understanding of doctrine. For detail program of this reformed curriculum see 'Abduh. *al-A'mal,* III, pp. 77-83; this curriculum was promulgated under the Law of July 1, 1896. Bayard Dodge. *Al-Azhar: A Millennium of Muslim Learning* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), pp. 135, 141.

[167]He reminded people of the dangers of certain westernized elites who trapped in the superficial imitation. Their change on their mode of housing, the styles of clothing, the kind of food they ate and the furniture they used so as to appear more wertern was criticised by 'Abduh as weakening indigenous industry and becoming indigenous perpretators, preparing the road and opening up the gates for the foreigners. Haddad. "Muhammad 'Abduh", p. 51.

are very conducive to the emergence of such movements. With regards events in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Middle East (especially Egypt), the Indian Subcontinent, and Indonesia, there are similarities in the interpretion of Islam as the basis of religious as well as in specific socio-cultural reforms. During this period, all of these regions were occupied by Western colonial regimes: Egypt and the Indian Subcontinent under the British and Indonesia under the Dutch. It is therefore undeniable that their respective colonial experiences played an important role in forming their reform ideas and responses.

This chapter however asserts that certain similar approaches, experiences, and responses to challenges indicate a particular relationship of influence between the Egyptian reform movement and Indonesia. With specific reference to the Muˈammadiyah movement in early twentieth century Indonesia, this influence can be categorized as "polymorphic", in that it attached a variety of fields.[168] Here, the basic religious outlook and the modernist ideas of the Muh}ammadiyah, its efforts at social reform, and its attitude towards the colonial government and the Christian community may be considered as reflections of this influence. Although this study takes ʻAbduh's inspiration into consideration, other religious beliefs and ideas of reform from Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries, such as India and Turkey, may also have had a role in inspiring the modern Islamic movements in Indonesia. In focusing on this period however, the Middle East seems to dominate in disseminating new religious ideas, thus supplanting India's position of influence on the Indonesian archipelago in the early period.

The Transmission of the Tajdid ideas to some Islamic Movements in Indonesia in the early twentieth century

Tajdid, as defined above, has in fact become an important theme in the modern Islamic movements in Indonesia in this century. There are aspects of continuity between the earlier *tajdid* movements in some parts of Muslim world and

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[168]R.K. Merton. *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: the Free Press, 1968), pp. 467-468.

in Indonesia. These aspects may be an indication of an ideological relation between the movements both outside and inside Indonesia. Certain writers believe that the Middle East, in particular Mecca and Cairo, has inspired the *tajdid* movements in Indonesia.[169] The role of publications, the increasing number of Indonesian students who studied Islam in Mecca and lately in Cairo, and the *hajj* pilgrims, have all facilitated the spread of *tajdid* among Indonesian reformers.

The *tajdid* movements in Indonesia actually may have begun much earlier than many scholars had originally estimated.[170] The chief goal of the first phase of reform was to purify Islamic religious practices and beliefs of local traditional influences. To a great extent this effort was a continuity of the re-Islamization process among Indonesians, a process aimed at promoting more orthodox Islamic patterns and practices. The role of the *hajjis,* those recently returned from the pilgrimage to Mecca, played a crucial role in enlightening the religious insight of Indonesian Muslims. As William Roff states, with the new status of *hajji,* the pilgrim might reasonably be assumed to change his perception of Islam and the Muslim community. He belonged in consequence both to his own personal integrity and to his larger community, and by virtue of having re-enacted the origins of the faith, he

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[169]Deliar Noer. *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 32-42, 296; C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze. *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague/Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 45; Azyumardi Azra. "The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian 'Ulama' in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. (New York: Columbia University, 1992).

[170]Federspiel argued that Islamic reform movements began at the beginning of the nineteenth century coinciding with the rise of Padri movement. Federspiel. *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reformism in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), p. 4. But a recent study shows that they began as earlier as the seventeenth century with the existing intellectual networks between Indonesian and Middle East scholars. Azra. "The Transmission of Islamic Reformism," pp. 484-485.

was capable of linking the two and revitalizing that to which he returned.[171] This was how the *hajji'* s new status was realized by himself and recognized and accepted by the people of his homeland. Therefore, the pilgrimage, one of the pillars of Islam, was vital to the advancement of Indonesian Islam in the Dutch colonial period. It helped to build an Islamic identity for Indonesian Muslims, a not unimportant result when it is remembered that the latter were converted only in comparatively recent times, and that converts still retained the old local traditions in their religious beliefs and practices. From a theological perspective, going on pilgrimage was not only considered as fulfilling one's religious duty but also as the best way to improve one's knowledge of Islam. Mecca therefore not only became a holy destination but it also represented the place where Muslims could obtain a pure knowledge of Islam.

The growing number of pilgrims had a share in changing the picture of Islam in Indonesia, gradually making it became more orthodox. Snouck Hurgronje said that many pilgrims first became habituated in Mecca to their daily ritual duties, and returned home as well-disciplined faithful. Even those who had studied Islam in the *pesantren,* madrasah, or mosques before their departure to Mecca were most open to the current ideological developments in the Middle East, such as Pan-Islamic influences.[172] Politically, such influences were feared by the Dutch administrators, who saw as undesirable the religio-political effects of pilgrimage to and study in the

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[171]William R. Roff. "The Meccan Pilgrimage: Its Meaning for Southeast Asian Islam" in Raphael Israeli and Anthony H. Johns, eds. *Islam in Asia,* vol. 2 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 244. For the indigenous urban middle class of the Indonesian Muslims in the end of the nineteenth century, making the pilgrimage to Mecca and returning with the title of *hajji* was a way to place them on a par with the Javanese aristocracy, *priyayi,* a class who had enjoyed the privileges from the Dutch colonial government. Nakamura. "Professor Haji Kahar Muzakkir and the Development of the Reformist Movement in Indonesia." a paper given at the annual set of public lectures on Indonesia (Canberra: Monash University, 1977), p. 7.

[172]Christian Snouck Hurgronje. *Mekka in the Later Part of the 19th Century: Daily Life, Custom and Learning the Moslims of the East-Indian-Archipelago* (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1931), p. 249.

Middle East. For this reason, in the early nineteenth century, the Dutch attempted to make the *hajj* more difficult through taxation and passport restrictions; indeed, various debilitating regulations lasted throughout the century.[173] Regardless however of the fears of the Dutch,[174] Indonesian Muslims had come to realize found the many advantages of the pilgrimage as a means of securing religious knowledge. One study has found that the experience encouraged the Muslims to intensify their religious practices, the older Muslims wishing to devote their last days to religious practices in the Holy Land, and the younger ones devoting themselves to religious studies.[175]This growing consciousness of religious practice has been called by Konstiner as the first and main step towards reform.[176]

The continuity of transmission of religious ideas from the central lands of Islam to Indonesia was intesified by the considerable growth in the number of pilgrims, due in part to better transportation and growing stability in the Dutch East Indies. In the mid-nineteenth century, some two thousand pilgrims travelled

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[173]Fred R. von der Mehden. *Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction Between Southeast Asia and the Middle East* (Gainesville, FL.: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 3. For further discussion of the Dutch colonial attitude towards the *hajjis,* see Aqib Suminto. *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), pp. 91-98; W. Roff. "South-East Asian Islam in the Nineteenth Century" in P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds. *The Cambridge History of Islam,* 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), especially page, 171.

[174]This could be caused by their lack of Islamic knowledge. see, Ibid*.* A case was explained by Hurgronje that one day the Resident of Palembang heard that the Islamic law was taught in the mosque from a book called *sabil al-muhtadin* (the Path for those who wish to be guided), in which the Sacred law was explained in the usual way. The Dutchman, associating it with *perang sabil* (Holy War), believed that war against the Dutch was being preached publicly. Since then the officials did as much as possible to oppose the preaching in the mosques. See Hurgronje. *Mekka,* p. 246.

[175]Ibid, 220.

[176]Joseph Kostiner. "The Impact of the Hadrami Emigrants in the East Indies on Islamic Modernism and Social Change in the Hadramawt During the 20th Century" in Israeli and Johns, eds. *Islam in Asia,* p. 214.

annually to Mecca from Indonesia; by the end of the century, the number had risen to between seven and eleven thousand.[177] Although the pilgrimage itself required a month stay in Mecca, many of them decided to stay (*muqim*) temporarily or permanently there. This latter group gradually formed the colony which was known collectively as the *Jawa* community.[178] The colony facilitated the stay of pilgrims who wanted to reside in Mecca for a short period[179] to lead a quiet life devoted to religion or to stay longer to deepen their religious knowledge. With regards to its educational function, Snouck Hurgronje who spent six months in Mecca in order to carry out his observations portrayed the community in the mid-nineteenth century in these terms:

> The very kernel of the Ja>wah colony are the teachers and students. In Mekka they are the ones most highly regarded; from their countryfolk on pilgrimage they enjoy the deepest awe, and from Mekka they control the religious life of their homes. Almost all Jåwah who teach in the Holy City have

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[177]J. Vredenbregt. "The Hadjdj: Some of Its Features and Functions In Indonesia" *Bijdragen toot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde,* 118(1962), p. 93, and Appendix II, pp. 148-149; Mehden. *Two Worlds of Islam,* p. 3; the highest number was 11,788, which represented a "Great Pilgrimage" year, in 1895. The figure was fluctuating from this highest number to 7,000 in 1900. Together with many hundreds more from Aceh and elsewhere who departed from Singapore, they comprised in all about twenty per cent of the total number of pilgrims from overseas. Roff. "South-East Asian Islam", p. 172; and for the complete table of regional origin of the *hajj,* see Karel A. Steenbrink. *Beberapa Aspek Tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), pp. 249-253.

[178]The word *Jawa* was used in a Meccan sense in the nineteenth century which included the whole archipelago of the Dutch East Indies. D van der Meulen. "The Mecca Pilgrimage and Its Importance to the Netherlands East Indies" *The Muslim World,* 31(1941), p.52; it was also used to term the Southeast Asian staying in Mecca, see von der Mehden. *Two Worlds of Islam,* p. 13; such was the term that was used by Snouck Hurgronje to explain the Jawa colony in the last chapter of his *Mekka.* Hurgronje. *Mekka,* pp. 215-292.

[179]van der Meulen, based on his witness as a Dutch official in Jedda, reported that nearly all pilgrims prefered to stay in the Holy City for the fasting period. van der Meulen. "The Mecca Pilgrimage," p. 59.

risen to this height in Mekka herself. There are indeed in the East-Indian Archipelago opportunities for thorough Islamic studies, but no Jawah would dare to come to Mekka otherwise than as a pupil. The careers of these learned men thus form a very important part of the history of the Jåwah colony.[180]

The academic life in the colony attracted many students from the archipelago, students who later provided the network of religious transmission among the Indonesian Muslims. It also invited many countrymen to support the continuity of this tradition. Many families would send one of its sons to Mecca to devote his life to Holy knowledge in the name of the whole family, and supported him financially during his period of study there. Apart from this phenomenon there were many waqf-houses in Mecca, each belonging to a special branch of the Jawa peoples. Such houses were partly founded by gentlemen while making the pilgrimage and later supported at their cost; others were built from money collected by a (Jawa) Shaykh and his countrymen.[181] All efforts to facilitate the transmission of religious knowledge was a worthy activity. These facts demonstrate how Islam's high appreciation of the value of knowledge was manifested into broad-based social and cultural support for the process of education. The logical consideration of the Indonesian Muslims at that time was that they were encouraged to acquire at least the principal teachings of Islam in order to facilitate their performances of their daily religious duties.

What role did the Qur'an and Hadith play in this process? In the context of nineteenth century Mecca, the study of the Qur'an ranged from the art of reciting (*tajwid*) to the exegesis of the Qur'an. But the use of the Qur'ån for ritual purposes was of primary importance for every Muslim. These subjects of study together with other branches of religious knowledge such as Islamic theology (*'ilm al-tawhid*) and Islamic law (*fiqh*), were considered from the religious point of view as the important

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[180]Ibid, p. 254.

[181]Snouck Hurgronje. *Mekka,* pp. 254-255.

elements of the religious life of the community.[182] In the real religious life, Islamic theology provided the normative standard of belief in the transcendent Being, and Islamic law guided the Muslims on how to communicate with God. From the perspective of Islamic reform movements in nineteenth century Indonesia, the theology had become a means to cleanse the Islamic beliefs from superstitious (*khurafat*) elements, whereas law ensured the purity of ritual practices from the corrupt influences of innovation (*bid'ah*). Such a religious orientation had been a critical issue in the first phase of the Islamic movement in Indonesia. Early in the nineteenth century the *Paderi* had attempted to reform Islamic practices based on this religious notion. The movement gained important stimulus from the return of some *hajjis* from Mecca in the early nineteenth century.[183] Their uncompromising attitude towards *'adat* (customary) practices not only drew a reaction from *'adat*-oriented groups, represented by the officials of the kingdom and various clan chiefs,[184] but also resembled, as certain writers note, the Wahhabi movement in eighteenth century Arabia.[185] The *Paderi* efforts, on the one hand, reflects the link of religious ideas between Mecca and Indonesia in the nineteenth century, on the other

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[182]These subjects are discussed in detail in the "Learning in Mekka" by Snouck Hurgronje. See Ibid, pp. 153-212.

[183]Hamka. *Ayahku: Riwayat Hidup Dr. Abd Karim Amrullah dan Perjuangan Kaum Muda Agama di Sumatra* (Jakarta: Umminda, 1983), p. 14; Federspiel. *Persatuan Islam,* p. 4.

[184]Deliar Noer argues that another factor which creates the conflict between the *Paderi* 'ulama' and the *'adat*-oriented groups seems to be an internal struggle for power in the area with no group emerging victoriously except the Dutch. See Noer. *The Modernist Muslim*, p. 18.

[185]The discussion of the hypothesis of the Wahhabi influence to the *Paderi* movement is mentioned in Steenbrink. *Beberapa Aspek,* pp. 32-45; Hamka. *Ajahku*, p. 14; H.M. Federspiel. *Persatuan Islam,* p. 4; Clifford Geertz. *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 65-70; for detailed survey of the character of the movement, see C. Dobbin. "Islamic Revivalism in Minangkabau at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century" *Modern Asian Studies,* 8, 3(1974), pp. 319-356.

it is an early example of Islamic reformist movement in Indonesia, one which however was solely directed towards religious renewal.

The early movements seem to have been sporadic and to some extent are very individual, in terms of their ideas on how to implement reform. But in their later development, as will be seen later in chapter three, they became more organized and began to pursue a variety of options in the areas of their particular concerns. This change may be understood as reflecting the growing influence of religious reform and intellectual currents from Cairo, where 'Abduh's ideas on reform were attracting attention. This influence was primarily conveyed to Indonesia by the circulation of books and periodicals. Like the *hajj* and the *muqim* in Mecca, who built a network of transmission of religious ideas in the first phase of Islamic movements in Indonesia, printed materials became the chief means of transmitting reformist ideas at the turn of the century.

In the early decades of this century the publication which emerged as the most important in terms of transmitting reformist ideas from Egypt to Indonesia was *Al-Manar* (The Lighthouse). This periodical, which became the mouthpiece of the Egyptian reformers, had enthusiastic readers, both inside and outside Egypt.[186] In the Malay-Indonesian world, the availability of this periodical did not necessarily indicate that it was subscribed to by any great number of readers; rather it was usually received by community group which had good contacts with people in certain Middle Eastern countries like Turkey and Egypt. Thanks to copies received by one such group, Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah, had routine access to *Al-Manar.*[187] Indeed, *Al-Manar* was read by many people who had a direct

[186]Among its readers were the Arab emigrants in Indonesia and the Indonesian students in Cairo and Mecca. See Bisri Affandi, "Shaykh Ahmad Al-Surkati," p. 34.

[187]The Arab community in Jakarta who founded *Al-Jam'iyat al-Khairiya* (The Association for the Good) in 1901 were among the readers of *Al-Manår.* From them Ahmad Dahlan, who was registered in 770 number of the Association, got the periodical. Djarnawi Hadikusuma. *Dari Jamaluddin Al-Afghani Sampai K.H. Ahmad Dahlan* (Yogyakarta: Persatuan, n.d.), pp. 72-73; Solichin Salam. *K.H. Ahmad Dahlan:*

involvement in the social, political and religious problems facing the country. Those who cared greatly about issues of that time often used *Al-Manar* as a medium of correspondence on various matters.[188] This correspondence served to establish a dialogue on reform ideas between the Egyptians and the Malay-Indonesians in the early decades of this century.[189] This dialogue made the readers in both the Malay-Indonesian more aware of world and the Middle East issues affecting Muslims. The periodical provided an intellectual insight into the times and encouraged them not only to explore the sources of reformist ideas but also to disseminate them among their own people. This latter intention was realized, among other things, by establishing local periodicals which substantively reflected the reformist ideas of *Al-Manar* and its predecessor, *Al-'Urwah al-Wuthqa* (The Indissoluble Bond).

The establishment of local periodicals adds to the long row of links of reform ideas between the Middle East and Malay-Indonesian world. Some elements of the network which have been mentioned above, such as the *hajj* and the Malay-Indonesian students in Mecca and Cairo, served as midwives to the birth of local periodicals in Malay and Indonesian. In Malay states (including Singapore at the time) there were a number of such periodicals founded at about this time, including the monthly magazine, *Al-Imam,* (The Leader, 1906), a weekly newspaper, *Neracha,* (The Scales, 1911), and a monthly journal,*Tunas Melayu* (The Malay Young Generation, 1913), all of them closely connected with the four prominent figures of

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Tjita-tjita dan Perdjuangannja (Djakarta: Depot Pengadjaran Muˑammadijah, 1962), p. 30; for registered number of Ahmad Dahlan in *Al-Jam'iyat Al-Khairiya,* see Noer. *The Modernist Muslim,* p. 58; Aboebakar Atjeh. *Salaf: Muhji Atsaris Salaf Gerakan Salafijah di Indonesia* (Djakarta: Permata, 1970), p. 103.

[188]On the issue of Islam and nationalism, for example, a reader in Indonesia asked the editor whether there were Hadiths which forbad the national idea; what was the attitude of Islam itself toward nationalism, see *Al-Manar,* 33(1933), pp. 191-192; for other issues of correspondence sent from Malay-Indonesian world during the publication of *Al-Manar,* 1898 to 1936, see Jutta E. Bluhm. "A Preliminary Statement on the Dialogue Established Between the Reform Magazine *Al-Manar* and the Malayo-Indonesian World, "*Indonesia Circle,* 32(1983), pp. 35-41.

[189]Ibid, p. 35.

the urban Malay Muslim community, Shaykh Muhammad Tahir Jalal al-Din Al-Azhari,[190] Shaykh Ahmad al-Hady, Al-Hajj ʻAbbas Muhammad Taha, and Shaykh Muhammad Salim Al-Kalali, men who had extensive contacts with the Middle East.[191] All these periodicals, which contain an abundance of references to their predecessors,[192] were prolongations of *Al-Manar.* The circulation of *Al-Imam* reached vast areas in Indonesia where Malay was spoken or written.[193]

Parallel to the contents of *Al-Manar* (Cairo), and *Al-Imam* (Singapore), Hajji ʻAbdullah Ahmad's fortnightly periodical, *Al-Munir* (The Illuminative), which began publishing in Padang, West Sumatra in 1911, offerred Indonesian readers a taste of the new thought. Ahmad Dahlan, one of its readers in Java, translated some of the articles into Javanese for those who spoke only that language.[194] The emergence of *Al-Manar, Al-Imam,* and then *Al-Munir* formed an ideological link in a new transmission of reform, one which spread out from the Middle East (Egypt) and stopped over in Malay (Singapore) before finally reaching Indonesia (West Sumatra). Singapore represented a cross-section of the Muslim peoples of the

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[190]Shaykh Tahir admitted that the Al-Azhar of Cairo had "opened his eyes" and it was because his love for this institution that he added "Al-Azhari" to his name. Deliar Noer. *The Modernist Muslim,* p. 34; Hamka. *Ayahku,* pp. 97-98.

[191]For their original descendant and educational experience in Mecca and Cairo see, Roff. "Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua," 59-67; Ibrahim bin Abu Bakar. "Islamic Modernism in Malaya As Reflected in Hadi's Thought." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1992, pp. 80-124.

[192]*Al-Imam,* for example, often cited opinions of ʻAbduh and translated some articles from *Al-Manar.* Noer. *The Modernist Muslim,* p. 34; Roff. "Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua," p. 59.

[193]Noer mentions those areas such as, Sumatra, Java (where it had agents in Jakarta, Cianjur, Surabaya, and Semarang), Kalimantan (its agents in Pontianak and Sambas), and Sulawesi (in Makassar or Ujung Pandang nowadays). Noer. *The Modernist Muslim,* p. 35.

[194]A. Mukti Ali. *Alam Pikiran Modern di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Nida, 1971), p. 42; Hamka. *Ayahku,* p. 111.

Middle East and Indonesia. Its reputation as a transit region contributed to its role as a publication and distribution center for religious writings. Although it was also considered as a center of Islamic life and learning,[195] this did not mean that Singapore had a role equal to those of Mecca and Cairo. The absence of educational institutions like Al-Azhar and the reputation of Mecca as a center of religious life since the early Islamic period placed Singapore at a disadvantage in this respect. As a transit city, Singapore provided supplies for those travelling to other destinations. Since it was a major pilgrimage port, its reputation as a center of learning was related to the Pilgrimage.[196] Its service was mainly oriented to giving both technical and spiritual support to those who needed to be escorted to Mecca.[197] During the past century and in the first decade of this century many people worked in Singapore in order to obtain the means to undertake the pilgrimage;[198] Singapore was the starting point of the pilgrimage. The importance of the role of Singapore as a center on the Indonesia-Middle East route was its position in keeping the course of flowing reform ideas to the final destination, the Indonesian Archipelago. As mentioned earlier, publications had emerged as an important means to disseminate reformist ideas in Malay land,[199] and indeed some of them reached many big cities

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[195]Roff said that in the nineteenth century, many students from all over the Archipelago came to Singapore to study under the guidance of scholars from Hadramawt and the Hijaz, from Patani, Aceh, Palembang and Java. See Roff. "South-East Asian Islam," p. 177.

[196]Roff. "South-East Asian Islam," p.177.

[197]The most important knowledge is *manasik al-hajj,* a set of rituals during the pilgrimage.

[198]Although Vredenbregt does not mention explicitly, but it is clearly understood that they are Indonesians. See Vredenbregt. "The Hadjdj," pp. 127-129; this also can be associated with the growing number of Javanese emigrant in Singapore in the early nineteenth century. Craig A. Lockard. "The Javanese As Emigrant: Observations on the Development of Javanese Settlements Overseas" *Indonesia,*11(1972), p. 44.

[199]As it is seen later, the reform ideas get support from those who live in Strait regions such as Singapore, Malacca, and Penang. Djamal Tukimin. "Pemikiran-pemikiran dan Gerakan Tajdid di Singapore Rujukan Terhadap Aliran Pikiran dan

in Indonesia. The transformation of *Al-Manar* into *Al-Imam* (Singapore) and *Al-Munir* (Padang, Indonesia) indicated not only the existence of the religious ideological relationship between the Middle East and Indonesia, but also the use of publications as a means of transmission.

Unlike the pilgrims and Indonesian students in Saudi Arabia who had built a network of religious transmission to Indonesia, those who went to Cairo (Al-Azhar) did not play a role similar to the former until the early decades of the twentieth century. The number of the Indonesian students in Cairo grew in abundance in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Indeed, most of them were active in modern Islamic movements in Indonesia, but were members of the second generation in these movements.[200] Although there existed the office of the Shaykh of the Javanese *riwaq*,[201] i.e. the guardianship of the students from the "Jawa" quarter, at Al-Azhar as early as the 1890's,[202] speculation might conclude that they were still marginal.[203] If Dar al-'Ulum,[204] as one study observes, was preferred by students

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Pengaruh Ahmad Hassan dan Hubungan dengan Muhammadiyah" a paper presented in the Seminar Falsafah dan Perjuangan Ahmad Hassan (Singapore, 28-30 January 1979), p. 9.

[200]For discussion of these students and their role in reform movements, see Roff. *Indonesian and Malay;* B.J. Boland. *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), and the recent study on the field, Mona Abaza.*Islamic Education Perception and Exchanges: Indonesian Students in Cairo* (Paris: Association Archipel, 1994).

[201]According to the Law of October 15, 1885 (after reformation) a student who is not registered as belonging to a *riwag* or *harah* (the student lodges at Al-Azhar University) is not to be counted as a student of Al-Azhar. Dodge. *Al-Azhar,* p. 132.

[202]William R. Roff. "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920's" *Indonesia,* 9(1970), p. 80. In another page he argued that there had been Indonesian students in Cairo for many years prior to the first quarter of the twentieth century, but it was apparently not until 1922 that they increased in number. Ibid, p. 73.

[203]The known figure of the Indonesian students at Al-Azhar in the early period was Shaykh Tahir Jalal al-Din, who originally came from Minangkabau, West Sumatra. After studying at Mecca for some years, he went to Al-Azhar in 1310/1892. He left Cairo in 1906 and chose Malaya as his new place for campaigning his reform

from "Jawa" over Al-Azhar during the earlier period,[205] this marginality may not have been in numbers but also in interest in religious ideas which were being spread by 'Abduh at Al-Azhar at the time. The latter reason may also have been caused by the fact that Al-Azhar actually never became a reformist educational institution in spite of 'Abduh's efforts. This failure was due to the strong opposition of both the Al-Azhar Shaykhs and of the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi.[206] For this reason, the hope that Al-Azhar would become an agent of 'Abduh's reform ideas before the end of the nineteenth century never came into being. Thus, if there were Indonesian students at Al-Azhar at the time, they might not have become acquainted with reformist ideas; on the contrary they may have been more influenced by the Shaykhs who opposed reforms.

The fact that there were few if any Indonesian students at Al-Azhar in early stages of twentieth century, is supported by evidence that nearly all the leaders of

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ideas. Hamka. *Pengaruh Muhammad 'Abduh di Indonesia* (Djakarta: Tintamas, 1961), p. 8.

[204]The Dar al-'Ulum was founded in 1892 in order to train teachers of Arabic and Turkish; and to offer alternative religious and secular education to the religious system of Al-Azhar. Its creation went hand in hand with the growing interest of the Muslim intelligentsia to modernize the system of education. It later joined Cairo University (founded in 1902) in 1945. Mona Abaza. *Islamic Education,* footnote 4, pp. 25-26.

[205]Based on a case study it was found that during the period between 1925-1936, six young men from a nineteenth century urban city of Kotagede spent some years at Cairo University, and American University in Cairo to study secular subjects, taught in modern Arabic as well as in English. See Nakamura. "Professor Haji Kahar," pp. 7-8.

[206]The Khedive ultimately appointed ¯Abduh to become *mufti* in order to keep him from becoming the Shaykh Al-Azhar, which position was given to the conservative Shaykhs, Salim al-Bishri and then 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shirbini, who aborted 'Abduh's reform effort. Haddad. "Muhammad 'Abduh", footnote 59, p. 62; Dodge. *Al-Azhar,* p. 139.

the Indonesian reform movements were of Meccan background.[207] However, some of them kept in touch with 'Abduh's ideas during their stay in Mecca as well as when they returned home. Ahmad Dahlan was one of those who had such a chance. He went to Mecca in 1890 and stayed there for a period of time to study, and in around 1903 he again visited Mecca where he stayed for 18 months.[208] He studied under some 'ulama' in Mecca, one of them was Shaykh Ahmad Khatib, who gave him the opportunity to read 'Abduh's writings.[209] Hadikusuma mentions that he was quite interested in *Tafsir al-Manar,* besides other collections which provided the religious reformist ideas of 'Abduh.[210] If Egypt was considered as one of the chief promoters of reform ideas in the early twentieth century, it was not through the students who studied at Al-Azhar but through publications in the form of periodicals and books. They influenced the minds of readers in Indonesia, who then modified them to suit the local situation. This modification, in the case of the Muhammadiyah, was expressed in various activities which reflected more the populist rather than the elitist Egyptian reform.

The theological basis and historical experience of the *tajdid* ideas have, respectively, given legitimacy and precedent to the modern Islamic movements in Indonesia. The emergence of religious networks between the Middle East and

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[207]Despite the fact that Al-Surkati (the founder of *Al-Irshad* in Indonesia) was from Sudan, he never studied at Al-Azhar but went to Mecca. It is said that he was much influenced by ⁻Abduh and Ri∂å and corresponded with Al-Azhar scholars who were followers of ⁻Abduh. Abaza. *Islamic Education,* 54.

[208]H. Suja.' *Muhammadiyah dan Pendirinya* (Yogyakarta: P. P. Muhammadiyah, Majlis Pustaka, 1989), pp. 1, 13.

[209]Shaykh Ahmad Khatib was a follower of Shafi'i *madhab,* however, he did not prohibit his students from reading 'Abduh's writing. He did this, as Noer says, with the intention of refuting the ideas of this Egyptian reformist. Noer. *The Modernist Muslim,*p. 74.

[210]Certain writers, for examples, list Abduh's books which are much read by Ahmad Dahlan. Among them are: *Risalat al-Tawhid; Al-Islam wa-al-Nasraniya; Tafsir Juz' 'Amma; Tafsir al-Manar.* See Solichin Salam. *K.H. Ahmad Dahlan*, p. 6; Hadikusuma. *Dari Jamaluddin Al-Afghani,* 75.

Indonesia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has maintained the continuation of the *tajdid* tradition. This tradition reached maturity in twentieth century Indonesia with two major trends appearing in the movement, one purificationist, the other modernist. The former may best be said to have beeen connected with the influence of Mecca, while the latter looked to the Egyptian reformer Muhammad 'Abduh for inspiration. But in the larger spectrum of the modern movements there were also two other religious and political orientations present: conservative and muslim secularist. The *Sarekat Islam,* Muhammadiyah, *Al-Irshad, Persatuan Islam, Nahd}at al-'Ulama'* and certain Muslims in the nationalist movements represented these ideological orientations. These orientations reflected the particular social, religious, and political interests and commitments of the movements. Since they served as philosophical justification for their patterns of behavior, and goals, therefore they tended to be accepted as truth rather than as tentative theoritical formulations. Such ideological orientations subsequently reflected both the similarities and differences in their main religious orientation, their political objectives, and their efforts in putting Islamic teaching into practice. At certain levels the differences even supported the claim of each group to be the only true one.

III. THE TRANSMISSION OF THE MODERNIST IDEAS

1.   The Banckground of Religious Life of Tajdid in Seventeenth Century India

Many writers[1] connect the idea of *tajdid* in Islam with the Hadith of the Prophet that "Allah will send to this community at the turn of every century someone who will restore religion.[2] Another version of this Hadith appears in the *musnad* of Ahmad ibn Hanbal which, gives specific attention to the renewal of faith: "renew your faith."[3] Regardless of the various versions of Hadith which raise this issue, it is conceivable that their general purpose is to praise whoever disseminates true religious knowledge, and mends that which had been distorted.

A factor, which contributes to the possibility of an inevitable social and religious deterioration after the death of the Prophet, cannot be separated from the idea of *tajdid.* This interpretation is based on the idea that the Muslim community always tend to depart from the path ofthe Qur'an and the Sunna.[4] This does not

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[1]"Ignaz Goldziher on al-Suyuti" translated by Michael Barry, with additional notes by J.0. Hunwick, in *Muslim World,* 68 (1978), p. 81; Ella Landau-Tasseron, "The Cyclical Reform: A Study of the Mujaddid Tradition", *Studia Islamica*, 70 (1989), p. 79, Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, "Tajdid al-Din: A Reconsideration of its Meaning, Roots, and Influence in Islam", in William M. Brinner & Stephen D. Ricks. *Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions* (Atlanta, GA.: Scholars Press, 1986), P. 100; John O'Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah" in John L. Esposito, ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 33; Sajida S. Alvi, "The Mujaddid and Tajdid Traditions in the Indian Subcontinent: A Historical overview". Montreal, 1993.

[2] Sunan Abi Da'ud, 4/156.

[3]Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. *Musnad* (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-Islam, 1978/1398), 2:359.

[4] John 0. Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: tajdid and islah" in John L. Esposito, ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 33.

mean however that Islam is an imperfect religion,[5] as the qur'an itself clearly states that Islam, which is brought by Muhammad, is a perfect religion. The Qur'an says: "Today I have perfected your religion for you and completed My favour unto you, and I have chosen Islam for you as religion".[6] For the Muslim, religious deterioration is not caused by the lack of Islam, but rather it is more related to the condition in which Islam is implemented. Those who lived at the same place and at the same time during the Prophet's life have no problem incorporating Islam into their daily lives; as they could take examples directly from the Prophet. But for those who lived far from him, long after his death, the situation is very different. The influence of local traditions and the lack of Islamic knowledge of its followers also affect the implementation of Islam. This interpretation is in accord with the Hadith of the Prophet: "the best of my followers are those who are living in my generation, and then those who willfollow them, and then those who will follow the latter".[7]

It can be understood from this Hadith that the model of the Prophet should always have been the ideal for Muslims. It can lead to the notion that the period of the Prophet has been considered as the model of orthodoxy. After the death of the Prophet, every religious deterioration must be reconstructed based on this orthodoxy. Since the mission of the *tajdid* is to rebuild the deterioration of religious life; therefore, it is logical to say that the idea of *tajdid* can occur only after an orthodoxy had been established.[8] The already established orthodoxy and the deterioration of religion should respectively have existed before the *tajdid* took place.

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[5] Commenting on Voll's interpretation, Sajida S. Alvi agrees with Voll's idea, but Landau-Tasseron rejects Voll's interpretation and argues that Islam recognizes its own imperfection. See Sajida S. Alvi, "The Mujaddid", pp. 38-39; Ella Landau-Tasseron, "The Cyclical Reform", p. 79.

[6]The Qur'an, *al-Maidah* (5): 3.

[7] Al-Bukhari, "kitab fada'il ashab al-nabi," *Kitab al-jami' al-sahih 2* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1864), pp. 416-417.

[8] Fazlur Rahman, "Revival and Reform in Islam" in P.M, Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds. *Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 632.

In the context of seventeenth century India, this section explores the religious background during the period at Akbar's reign (1556-1605). It is based on a thesis that Islam had deteriorated during this time. This deterioration was due to Akbar's "religious policy" which considerably weakened the religious consciousness of Muslims, and won over his Hindu subjects.[9] It alsoconnects this religious deterioration to the appearance of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi who is claimed to be a *mujaddid alf-i thani* (the Renewer of the Second Millenium) in this period. But different from the above thesis, which claimed the fallacy of Akbar's religious policy, this writing will ilustrate that aspects of his policy, especially, the treatment of his Hindu subjects is not contradictory to Islam. This study discusses, first, the, theological basis, which gives a clear background of the concept of *tajdid,* from which a broader vision of Islamic teaching can be understood. Second, it analyzes some of the disputed War Policies based on the principles of Islamic teaching, the Qur'an and the Hadith, in the perspective of the historical experiences of the Muslims in India. Finally, it will relate all the issues to the claim of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi as a *mujaddid alf-i thani* in concluding remarks.

A Theological Basis of Tajdid

The idea of tajdid is actually a logical consequence of the characteristic of Islamic teachings. These characteristics are formulated in the beliefs that, first, Islam is a universal religion: "We sent thee not save as a mercy for the peoples".[10] The universality of Islamicteaching covers all aspects of life which gives the basic principles of the relationships between man and God, human being, and his environment. From the dimension of space and time, Islam is valid for the whole human race in the world without recognizing geographical and ethnic boundaries

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[9] B.A. Faruqi, *The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid: Study of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's Doctrine of Unity* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1989), pp. 6-8.

[10] The Qur'an, *al-anbiya'* (21): 107; Yusuf 'Ali comments this verses and says that the principle is universally applied to all peoples without questioning race or nation. See A. Yusuf 'Ali. *The Holy Qur'an, II* (New Delhi: Kitab Publishing House, n.d.), p. 846.

from the time of the Prophet Muhammad until the end of the time. Therefore, in its specific characteristics, Islam emphasizes on the equilibrium between worldly and non-worldly affairs, the spiritual and the material, ritual and social life. The basis of this notion is explained in the Qur'an: "But seek the abode of the Hereafter in that which Allah hath given thee and neglect not thy portion of the world".[11] The most significant aspect of this understanding, lies in the belief that Islam is a guidance for all mankind in the world, a guidance whose goal is the acquisition of a happy life in this world, as well as in the Hereafter. But it is also recognized that not all of this universal teaching is formulated explicitly in the Qur'an. Some of these are mentioned in general terms, therefore an interpretation is needed to correspond with the purpose of the teaching. For example, the general formulation of the *'ibadah khass* (the special ritual) has been detailed by the Prophet in his Hadith. But for the others, which are concerned with social life, the Muslims have an obligation to interpret and implement them in accordance with the demand of the time. To this end, ijtihad is an important effort in the undestanding of the meanings and the possibilities of the teaching of Islam.

Second, it is believed that Islam is the final religion, and that it contains in the Qur'an and the Sunna all the essential religious and moral truth required by all human beings, from now until the end of time. The claim to finality, is mentioned in the Qur'an where Muh}ammad is described as "the seal of the Prophets": "Muhammad is not the father of any man among you, but he is the messenger of Allah and the Seal of the Prophets".[12] The universal interpretation of this verse means that Muh}ammad is the last of the Prophets, after whom there will be no other. The claim of this finality leads to the idea that after the Prophethood function of Muhammad is over, functionally, however the role of 'ulama' is very important to preserve the dynamics of Islam. This is not exaggerated, as the Hadith also mentions that "the 'ulama' are the heirs of the Prophets".[13] Institutionally, this idea is manifested in the various movements of thought and *tajdid* in Islam.

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[11]The Qur'an, *al-qasas* (28): 77
[12]The Qur'an, al-ahzab (33):40.
[13]Al-Bukhari. *Sahih Bukhari*, 10

The concept of the universality of Islam and the finality of the prophethood function after Muhammad support the idea that *tajdid* is an important dimension of the historical experience of Muslims. An important aspect of the mission of Muslims, is the implementation of God's revelation in the actual conditions within human society. The *tajdid* movement which existed in India during the seventeenth century exhibits this common characteristic and brings into being the condition of orthodox Muslims.

The Dispute on Akbar's Religious Policy

The significance of the claim that Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi is a *mujaddid alf-i thani* cannot be dealt with in isolation from the condition of the religious life of Indian Muslim in the seventeenth century, which is considered to have been far from the genuine teachings of Islam. Burhan Ahmad Faruqi describes that in mystical life a pantheistic deity had replaced the monotheistic and transcendent God of Islam. Excessive belief in *karamat* or the miracles of the saints was commonly cherished, many non-Islamic means in the development of occult powers had been introduced into tasawwuf. The mystics had gone to the extent to deny the commandments of *shari'at* as universally binding, and regarded *shari'at* as external and superficial. Indulgence in *sama'* (the music hearing for the sake of bringing about ectasy, prevalent in mystic order) had become the order of the day.[14] On the other hand, the 'ulama' had taken exclusively to fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) as their whole religious learning; they had ceased to refer to the Qur'an and Hadith. Consequently, only the juristic view of Islam was alive, the spirit of Islam was dead.[15]

Ansari stated that such a condition was worsened by the effects of the imperial heresy of Akbar, who initiated policies which were seriously affecting Islamic life. He is said to have launched an eclectic religion of his own making and

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[14] Faruqi. *The Mujaddid's,* p. 5.
[15]Ibid, pp. 5-6.

replaced the religion which was brought by the Prophet Muhammad.[16] Furthermore, Faruqi mentions that Akbar's religious policy hurt and weakened the religious consciousness of Muslims, Amongst these are: wine was Declared lawful, bacon was made an ingredient of wine; *jizyah* or tho military tax was abolished, and beef was declared unlawful. Such names as Ahmad, Muhammad, Mustafa, and various other names of the Prophet of God, had become offensive to the emperor, and to utter them was a crime.[17] From Badauni's records it is said that Akbar'sreligious policy also consisted of the obligatory wearing of silk dresses at prayer times, the prohibition of Islamic prayers, and the stopping of the pilgrimage to Mekka, the discontinuance of the *adhan* as well as the study of the Qur'an and of the Hadith. They kept of swine and dogs in the Imperial palace, the prayer rooms were turned into stables, and offered *sijdah* to the king.[18] These anti-Islamic ordinances are some of the most important charges that were brought against Akbar. These charges lead to the impression that the emperor had renounced Islam.

Fazlur Rahman argues that on a closer study, these charges seem to be on the whole vague, exaggerated, and somewhat fantastic. Referring to Badauni's record of these ordinances, he says that it is not clear whether these ordinances were enforced throughout the whole empire or that it was confined to the Court circle alone.[19] But one cannot dismiss the charges as entirely baseless, though Sri Ram Sharma has refuted the charges of persecution that were levelled by Badauni against the emperor, and he argues that Badauni is self-contradictory. On the one hand, Badauni says that Akbar ordered "the obligatory wearing of silk dresses at prayer times", while on the other hand, he says that the emperor "prohibited theIslamic prayers". If the prayers of Islam had beer forbidden, Akbar could not have made the use of the unlawful silken dresses and ornaments obligatory. The obligation to wear

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[16] M.A.H. Ansari. *Sufism and Shariah: A Study of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's Effort to Reform Sufiam* (Leicester, UK.: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), p. 5.
[17] Faruqi.*The Mujaddid's*, p. 7-8.
[18] M.K.Md. Fazlur Rahman, "Akbar's Religion,"*Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan,* 10, 1 (1965), p. 132.
[19] Ibid.

silk dresses at prayer times could only have been imposed on his courtiers alone and that they also had to say their prayers in his company. On this basis Sharma says, it is rather ridiculous to suggest that the policy involved any persecution of Islam.[20] Sharma also rejects that Akbar forbade fasts, as that would have been impossible. He might have discontinued keeping fasts himself, but this would not amount to a persecution of Islam. Sharma supports this argument with the fact that by at least 1582, four years after Akbar was considered as a no longer Muslim,[21] the fasts were still kept by the emperor. The same case arises with the prohibition of *hajj*. The stopping of pilgrimages is mentioned in the year 1582; however a member of royal family (Gulbadan Begum) returned from Mekka this same year and was royally welcomed. Governor of Gujarat, Khan-i-A'zam, went to Makka in 1593 and returned in 1594. Many men and women in Gujarat went on pilgrimage in 1595.[22]

As for the other issues, such as turning mosques and prayer rooms into stables or porter's lodges, this could be true in some cases where Akbar's toleration made the maintenance of mosques in an entirely Hindu center both impolitic and useless. It is possible that in some villages, mosques were maintained simply as an emblem of the Muslim conquest, and the mosques were converted for other purposes. Some mosques were found in a state of ruin because they had not been repaired; but this does not refer to all towns and large cities which were already in a state of ruin.[23] Another source mentions that during the Mulla rebellion of the Bengal and Bahar, pseudo-mosques which had been used as centers of rebellion were destroyed.[24] The controversies of War's attitude towards Islam which have been clarified by Sharma lead to the clear impression that Akbar neither renounced Islam nor persecuted it. It

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[20] Sri Ram Sharma. *The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 36.

[21]Badauni mentioned that Akbar had been a pious Sunni Muslim from his childhood until 1578, when "Ibadat Khana" was established by Akbar. See Fazlur Rahman, "Akbar's Religion", p. 123.

[22]Sharma. *The Religious Policy*, pp. 36-37.

[23]Ibid, pp. 37-38.

[24]Makahn Lal Roy Choudhury. *The State and Religion in Mughal India* (Calcutta: Indian Publicity Society, 1951), pp. 192-193.

implies that Akbar remained Muslim but he did not consider himself as someone fulfilling all the ordinances of Islam.

Some scholars agree that Akbar remained Muslim throughout his life. Sharma has proven that Akbar was a Muslim to the very end of his life.[25] Makhan Lal RoyChoudhury holds the view, that Akbar remained Muslim even after the promulgation of the *Din-i-llahi* on the basis that it was not a new religion.[26]Abu'l Fadl, the court historian of the emperor, says that the emperor was a firm believer in God and he never forgot Him for a moment.[27] Even Badauni describes that Akbar had been a pious Sunni Muslim from his boyhood until 1578: he was very earnest in his prayers, fastings and other Islamic practices, and he was very respectful towards the 'ulama', the shaykhs, and Pirs. He was said to be under the influence of shaykh Abd al-Nabi, the Sadr. Akbar was so passionately devoted to Abd al-Nabi in early years that he used to go to his house to hear lectures on the Hadith of the Prophet.[28] It seems that there is no doubt that Akbar was a Muslim, even though Badauni believed that he stopped practicing in 1578. The true analysis of Badauni's information has become complicated by the fact that scholars have expressed differing views on this subject.

Sharma, Choudhury and others held the view that Akbar remained a Muslim until the end of his life. They have proven that some of the accusations of Akar's religious policy were untrue; however this paper cannot judge whether Akbar was heterodox, rather, it argues that someissues of his religious policy met with the spirit of the universal character of Islamic teaching. An indication of this can be attributed to his intense desire to understand Islam better. He established the "Ibadat Khana" in 1578 where he invited the ulama, to hold religious discussions, it is said that "Ibadat Khana" was at first provided for the Sunnis. Dissatisfaction with

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[25]Ibid, pp. 39-40.
[26] Makhan Lal Roy Choudhury. *The Din-i-Illahi.* (Calcutta: Das Gupta & Co. Ltd., 1952), pp. 195-196.
[27] Fazlur Rahman, "Akbar's Religion", p. 121.
[28] Ibid, p. 123

the discussion in this forum, he then invited the Shi'a 'ulama' to join in this Sunni assembly, and at the end it was also opened to the Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Zoroastrians, Jews, Buddhists, and Christians.[29] He became greatly annoyed with the 'ulama' for the pride and intolerance they displayed during their discussions in the "Ibadat Khana". Each group of 'ulama' would not accept any version, or interpretation but their own, as they had a fear of losing their prestige; because of these intentions the discussion were not in the spirit of a search for the truth, but for victory. The discussions were often characterized by bitterness on all sides.[30] Such a condition produced a tremendous effect in Akbar's religious outlook. This encouraged Akbar to issue the famous decree of 1579, which was signed by the principal 'ulama' of the state, whose leader was Shaikh Mubarak. It was determined that any controversy which arose regarding a religious matter, divided the opinions of the 'ulama,' Akbar was empowered to decide the issue by accepting any of their opinions.[31] It is no doubt that the decree was intended to reduce the bitter impact of the dispute among thy 'ulama' concerning religious life. It is also apparent that by the decree, Akbar established his right to intervence in a controversy over a religious matter.

As far as his policy regarding the *dhimmis*[32] is concerned, the historical background of Islam in India, which manifested the conciliatory processes of Islamization,[33] created a precedent of how his predecessors conquered and treated their non-Muslim subjects. Akbar was a Muslim no doubt, but his government was not just what an orthodox theologian would want. In respect to his treatment to the non-Muslim subjects, he offered the widest latitude to all his peoples, on the

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[29] Roy Choudhury. *The Din-i-Illahi,* pp. 49-50.

[30]Ibid, p. 46.

[31] Fazlur Rahman, "Akbar's Religion," p. 125.

[32]*Dhimmi* is a non-Muslim subject in a Muslim state who has accepted the Muslim sovereignty but not Muslim religion.

[33]There is a polemical debate on the dual questions of conquest and conversion in India. Maclean studies that the majority of explanations of conversion in Sind have tended to operate on a simplistic and mutually antagonistic coercive or voluntary model of conversion. For details, see Derryl N. MacLean, "Religion and Society in Arab Sind", unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Montreal: Institute of Islamic studies, McGill University, 1984), pp. 80-102.

grounds of their personal security and their freedom of religious worship. Thus, the *dhimmis* submitted to the rule of Akbar and were allowed to live in the Mughal empirepeacefully. He saw no reason as to why being a Muslim should prevent his respect to the religious sentiments of the vast majority of his subjects. This belief prevented him from becoming a blind fanatic. As far as the right to personal security was concerned, Akbar gave a new orientation to the Islamic rule in India by guaranteeing "Peace of the State" to every citizen irrespective of race, religion, or color. By doing so he recognised the position of the Hindus as members of the state. Choudhury said that the criterion of state protection, was loyaltyto the throne and not loyalty to the religion[34]. In otherwords, allegiance to the emperor and not to religion would guarantee protection.

An unjust treatment to non-Muslim subjects, as aupposedly done by some over-zoalous rulers elsewhere, not happen in India. Akbarlz policy, however, was not contradictory to the teaching of Islam. Regarding the full security to every person, the Qurlan mentions: "And it anyone saved a life, it would be as if he save the life of the whole of mankind", [35] At a number of places, the Qurlan has oraered not to take a person's life because Allah has made life sacred: "Do not take life which Allah has made sacred, except for just cause".[36] The question of taking a life in retaliation for murder, or the question of punishment for spreading corruption on the earth, will be decided only by a proper and competent court of law. Thus, these verses give the foremost fundamental right to live, and the respect for human life. More specifically, the Prophet says "the blood of *dhimmis* is the blood of a Muslim".[37] Therefore the question of depriving the Hindus to the right of freedom from personal violence did not occur.

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[34]M.L.R. Choudhury, "Hindu Muslim Relation During the Mughal Period 1526 to 1707 A.D." the proceedings of the Indian history congres ninth session, 1946, pp. 286.

[35]The Qur'an, *al – ma'idah* (5): 32

[36]The Qur'an: *al-isr'* (17): 33: *al an'am* (6): 151.

[37] Choudhury, "Hindu muslim", P. 285

The status of *dhimmi* was fixed by the Prophet, and later this was reenforced by the jurists and by precedents of the rulers in different Muslim countries at different Ages, Abu Bakr, the first caliph, said "don't kill any of protected people, for if you do, God will require the protection of them from you and will cast you on your face in hell".[38] Abu Yusuf, a chief qadi during the reign of Harun al-Rashid, in his *Kitab kharaj* narrated that the Prophet said, "if anyone violates a man to whom a treaty has been granted, or burdens him above his strength, I am an advocate against him until the day of judgment,"[39] the later period, some Muslim rulers legalized the status of non-Muslim subjects in various institutional forms. In iraq, the department for the protection of dhimmis was jihbazah, and in Spain, it was called the diwan al *dhimmi*[40] Although there are many proofs that non -Muslim subjects were treated justly by the Muslim rulers in the history of Islam, there were some instances where they were denied their ordinary civic rights by the rulers.[41] This different treatment may have happened because of the interpretation of the injunctions and laws; their actual application depended upon the attitude of the individual Muslim rulers towards a particular incident.

In respect to the freedom of religious worship, Akbar removed all restrictions regarding non-Muslim public religious worship. For his Hindu subjects, these riqhts included the abolition of the pilgrimage tax, and the removal of all restrictions on building places of public worship. This led to the building of numerous public temples in the famous places of the Hindu pilgrimage. In many places, Christian churches were also built in manyplaces.[42] These policies, which were implemented during the period of Akbar, created fierce opposition from some of the 'ulama'. But if it is studied carefully, suchpolicies do not contradict the injunction of the Qur'an.

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[38] Ibnu Sa'd. *al–Tabaqat al Kubra*, 1(Beirut: Dar Beirut, 1957), p. 137.

[39] Abu Yusuf. *Kitab Kharaj*. (Qairo: Matba'at al – Salafiyah,1352), p. 71.

[40] W. Husain, *Administration of justice during the muslim rule in India* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1934), P. 155.

[41] Choudhury records these instances happened in the period of Caliph 'Umar II, Caliph al-Mutawakkil, and reflected in the fatwas of some 'ulama'.   See   Roy Choudhury. *The State and Religion,* pp. 234 – 235.

[42] Sharma, *the Religious Policy*, p. 20

This is based on the verses: "To you your faith and to me mine;"[43] and, "There is no compulsion in religion, the right way is indeed clearly distinct from error."[44] Another verse emphasizes: "If it had been thy Lord's Will, they would all have believed, all who are on earth, Wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will to believe."[45] Although the Muslims believe that there is no truth and virtue greater than Islam, if somebody does not accept islam, Muslims will have to recognize and respect thin decision and will allow him freedom of conscience and religion, and that no moral, social or political pressure will be put on him to change his mind. As to the question whether Akbar interpreted those verses of the Qur'an to support his policy, there is no evidence. However his religious background and his capacity as a Muslim ruler, surrounded by prominent religious classes, suggest that Akbar understood this principal injunction. It is quite understandable, that Akbar also forbade forcible conversion everywhere in the empire. At this point Du Jarric reports from his travel that:

> "There were in his country some who had been enslaved by his subjects, and who, to regain their freedom, had renounced the Christian faith (for very often the saracens offer liberty to the Christians whom they capture, on condition that they abandon their faith) it happened at this time that some of the latter desired to revert to their own religion, and, that they might be able to practice the same without molestation, begged from the King permission to return to their own country, that they might live amongst Christians. His Majesty at once granted their request; and when one of them expressed a desire to remain in indostan, he not only permitted him to live and clothe

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[43]The Quran, Al – kafirun (109): 6.

[44] The Qur'an, *al-baqarah* (2): 26.

[45]*wa – lau sha'a rabbuka la amana man fii al ardi kulluhum jami'a, afa anta tukrih al – nas hatta yakunu mu'minin* (Yunus, 99)

himself after the Christian manner, but received him into the service of his own household."[46]

The precedent of how his predecessors treated their non-Muslim subjects also shared the same role in inspiring akbar religious policy. Nizami said that Muhammad ibnu qasim placed the Hindus under the category of mushabah ahli al – kitab (those who resembled the possessors of revealed Books).[47] With regards to the Buddhists MacLean says that the problem of the status of the non-Muslims of Sind was resolved by considering the Hindus and Buddhists as *ahl alkitab* similar to the Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians.[48] All the Sultan of Delhi accepted this position of the Hindus. In another article Nizami further explains that Alaudin Khalji did not discriminate between the Hindus and the Muslims. Muhammad ibnu Tughlug was anxious to introduce measures for the political unification of India by integrating the Muslims and his Hindus. This necessitated the creation of a greater involvement of the Hindus in the functioning such as appointed Hindus to important posts, established contacts with hindu religious thinkers.[49] The muslim administration in India during the period or the early conquest followed the general patterns of their predecessors who had employed local talent and made minimum amounts of charges about local practices. The Caliph 'Umar, who was acknowledged as the creator of the Muslim system of administration, laid down the working principle that the Muslims could not acquire property in the conquered territories. Under his system, the conquering general ofthe new territory became its Governor, but most of his subordinate officers were allowed to retain their previous Posts.

Following these policies, Sher Shah's rule is one of the most significant Islamic administrations in Indian history. His knowledge of earlier history and his practical experience with the people enabled him to utilize what was good in the past and to

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[46] Pierre du Jarric. *Akbar and the Jesuits: an account of the Jesuit mission to the court of akbar.* Translated with introduction and notes by C.H. Payne. London: George routledge & sons, ltd.' 1926' p. 28.

[47] K.A. Nizami. *Some aspects of religion and politics in India during the thirteenth century.* (new Delhi: idarah–i adabiyat–i Delhi. 1974), p. 315.

[48]Maclean, "Religion and Society," p.315.

[49] K.A. Nizami, "Aspect of Muslim Political Thought in India During the Fourteenth Century" *Islamic Culture*, 52 (1978), pp. 215, 219.

improve onto it. By doing so, he paved the way for the final phase of the Muslim administration under akbar, and the later Mughals. With regards to his treatment to his non-Muslim subjects, ikram tells us that although Sher Shah was rigidly orthodox, Hindus were held in high positions in his army, and Todal Mal, who later was renowned under Akbar, was originally in his service. one of his best-known generals was Bramajit Gaur, who he sent in pursuit of humayun; Raja Ram Singh or Gwalior, is also said to have been in his service. His army also included a contingent of Rajputs.[50]

All of the above, created precedents for defining the status of Hindu subjects in the Indian Muslim state. Although there was no discussion of the status of Hindus in War's administration, it is believed that Akbar practiced these precedents and they were a major concern of his policies. These policies not only led the Hindus to have their own right to personal security, freedom frompersonal violence and freedom of religious worship, but also allowed them to have high official ranks in the Mughal empire. Through her study on Jahangir's policy, sajida Alvi analyzes that the climate of liberalism characterized by freedom of religion for Muslims as well as non-luslims subjects posted the Mughals on the higher respect comparing to the preoccupation of the neighboring powers, the safavids, the ottomans and the Uzbeks.[51] These policies caused bitter opposition from the orthodox ulama'. Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi urged these ulama' to adopt opposing attitudes towards the Hindus, towards their theological point of view and their position in the government. He believed that the Hindus were not the "People of the book" (ahl al-Kitab), and that they had no right to have a status of *dhimmis* in the Mughal state[52]

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[50] Ikram, Muslim Civilization, p. 140.

[51] Sajida S. Alvi, "Religion and state during the reign of mughal emperor Jahangir (1605 - 27): nonjuritical perspectives" *Studia islamica*, 69 (1989), p. 112.

[52] His rejection is based on his belief that there was not any reliable information concerning religious community before. Although he believes that prophet were sent to India, but all wererejected, and none had more than three followers. They were not successfully in founding a community. He says that the ruins scattered all over India are those of towns and villages which rejected the prophets and were consequently destroyed by the devine wrath. See Yohanan Friedmann. Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi: An Outline of His Thought and a Study of His

In the context of India, Ahmad Sirhindi believed that Hinduism was infidelity (kufr).

He regards Islam andHinduism as opposites, antithetical and therefore mutually exclusive. The two opposites cannot integrate; one can, thrive only at the expense of the other. if the unbelievers find opportunity they will reconvert Muslim to Hinduism or kill them. It should be realized that the honor of Islam is dependent upon the disgrace of the unbelievers and their faith. Therefore, one who holds infidels in affection and esteem or keeps company with them, dishonors his own religion; a good Muslim, as Sirhindi suggested, should avoid contact with non believers even in daily life.[53] With regards to the issue of the non-Muslims, specifically the classification of the dhimmis, there was no unanimous opinion amongst the jurists. Imam Shafi'i restricted the application of the *dhimmi* law to the ahl al-kitab (the Jews and the Christians) and the Zoroastrians alone. Abu Hanifa and Ahmad ibn Hanbal extended its application to all except the infidels of Arabia. Imam Malik and Qadi Abu Yusuf adopted the most liberal attitude and accorded the status of dhimmis to all non-Muslims, whether Arab or non-Arab without any exception. According to Nizami, the consensus of juristic opinion was, therefore, in favor of extending the priveleges of dhimmis to all non-believers.[54] M. Mujeeb has suggested that during the last phase of his career, Ahmad sirhindi considerably modified his aggressiveness towards the Shi'ahs and the Hindus.[55] The change in his attitude, towards the Hindus, can allow one to conclude that contacts with the polytheists have never been forbidden and that in the conditions of India, they were even inevitable.[56] Friedmann says that the modification of Sirhindi's attitude

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Image in the Eyes of Posterity (Montreal: Mc Gill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1971), p. 71.

[53]Aziz Ahmad,"Religious and Political ideas of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi" *Rivista Degli Studi Orientali,* 36 (1961), P.264.

[54] Nizami, *Some Aspect*, pp. 308 – 309.

[55] M. Mujeeb. *The Indian Muslims* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1967), p. 244.

[56]Friedmann concludes Shirhindi's attitude from his maktubat, III. See friedmann, *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi,* p.74.

towards the Hindus does not indicate a change in his views in regards to their participation in the Mughal administration. All of the violent expressions of hostility towards them, in the first volume of the maktubat, are included in letters addressed to nobles of the Mughal court. Sirhindi's intention in these letters was to undermine the position of the Hindus in the mughal administration, rather than to restrict their contacts with Muslims in other areas of life.[57] If Friedmann's contention is correct, Sirhindi's objection to the Hindus was to their participation in the government. He therefore expressed his hostility towards the Hindus in letters to government officials, who presumably had the power to purge the administration of Hindu influence.

From this point, it is clear that the dispute was actually more political rather than theological. Such a situation usually occurs among powerful groups of elite, who want to have more access within an administration. in the history of Islam, some evidences support thic idea. From here one may trace the struggle between qaisis and kalbis who were of the elite political power in the Umayyad period; the struggle between the elite military leaders who were dominated by the descent of the Turks and the administrative elites of the mawalis, in the 'Abbasid period; and between the clerical estate of local 'ulama' and the religious professionals who came from the Arab lands in the Safavid period: imposing religious issues on the struggle among the elite groups in the period of the mughal, supports the idea that Islam should play a prominent role in the conduct of the state as it has been propagated by Ah}mad Sirhindi. Akbar considered the condition of the Indian atmosphere and forced himself to make new policy about assimilation within his country. The laws of the Qur'an and the Hadith, the decisions of the jurist 'ulama and the precedents of the Caliphs, can be applied differently in a country where the number of *dhimmis* to the Muslims is comparatively quite imbalanced. Akbar realized that in India, where the number of *dhimmis* far exceeded that of the Muslims, a strict application of Islamic laws, as the orthodox 'ulama want, would create many administrstive problems and would threaten a collapse,of the whole administrative machinery. The

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[57] Ibid, pp. 74 – 75.

impossibility of ruling India on rigid orthodox principles, as has been shown by Akbar, has in fact contributed valuable principles for the ruling elite in the history of Medieval Islam.

The religious deterioration of Muslims in seventeenth century India which has been closely related to the effect of Akbar's religious policy demands further research. The information provided by some writers have denied this connection and have shown that some charges of anti-Islamic ordinances which were brought against Akbar were exaggerated.   This study concludes that the orthodox 'ulama's opposition to Akbar's religious policy was motivated by the Emperor who had given more freedom to his non-Muslim subjects. They considered that such a treatment not only weakened the religious and political position of the Muslims but also violated their Islamic teachings. Concerning the latter issue, this study argues that Akbar's policy, which led the Hindus to have their own rights in religion and politics, had a strong base on the spirit of the universal characteristics of !slam which are prescribed in the basic principles of Islamic teaching and implemented in the historical experiences of the Muslim rulers.With regards to the claim that Shaykh Ah}mad Sirhindi was a *mujaddid alf-i thani* this study shows that a thesis which raises the religious deterioration in seventeenth century India which was due to Akbar's religious policy is difficult to accept, if a general opinion accepts a theory by which the religious deterioration is regarded as a factor in encouraging the appearance of a *Mujaddid,* it is logical to say that since akbar's policy did not prove such a factor, therefore the claim of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhaindi as a mujaddid is questionable. This conclusion supports the idea of a recent study on mujaddid and tajdid, in India which hypothesises that Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi was one of the three mujaddid in India who were not so acclaimed by many of their contemporaries and later generations.[58]

2. The Transformation of the Tajdid Ideas in Indonesia

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[58]See Sajida Alvi, "the Mujaddid and Tajdid," p. 2.

The increased contacts between the Middle East and Indonesia[59] provided an important stimulus in bringing the ideas of renewal and the process of religious change within Indonesian Islam in the early twentieth century. The pilgrims (*hajjs*), the increasing number of Indonesian students who studied in Mecca (*muqim*) and later in Cairo, and the increasing availability of publications, became the sources of inspiration to Indonesian reformers. Our discussion below shows that the basic religious outlook of the modern Islamic movements have shaped the idea of reform. We also witness variations in the perception of these movements on reform and their application within the context of socio-religious affairs. There is also a discernible correlation between their ideological orientations and the actual activities of the movements.

2.1. The Establishment of Religious Networks

2.1.1. *The Hajj and the Muqim*

The idea of reform has been a central theme of the modern Islamic movements in Indonesia since the early twentieth century. There are similarities between earlier reform movements in some other Muslim countries and those in Indonesia. Some similarities may be traced back to the seventh-eighth/thirteenth-fourteenth century reform movement, which appeared under the leadership of Ibn Taymiya. He was a follower of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and a typical representative of orthodoxy. He opposed strongly popular Islamic practices, which, according to him

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[59]Although some scholars mention that the Middle East, in particular Cairo, have inspired the reform movements in Indonesia they do not elaborate how this inspiration reaches the land. Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 32-42, 296; C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague/Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 45. This thesis however hypothesizes that during the first two decades of this century, there was no direct influence of Al-Azhar in Cairo on the reform movement in Indonesia.

found no justification in the Qur'an and the *Sunnah.*[60] He rejected the authority of the medieval schools, thus earning the enmity of the orthodox 'ulama' who wanted to maintain the medieval beliefs and practices of Islam. His call for a return to the Qur'an and the *Sunna* was understood as an invitation to accept the formulations of the early generations of Muslims.[61]

The reform movements that existed in the Muslim world during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries exhibited this common characteristic. In the seventeenth century Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1563-1624) laid down the theoritical basis of a similar reform. He attacked both the theory and practice of heterodox sufism. He realized that the challenge which many preachers of Íufism posed to Islam was serious. Commenting on the state of the religious life of his community, he said that people had developed a wrong view of sufism and of its relation with shari'a. Those who followed Ibn 'Arabi's *Wahdat al-Wujud* cared little for the shari'a. They believed that the goal of the shari'a was simply to obtain knowledge; hence anyone who realized the truth of *Wahdat al-Wujud* did not have to perfom the duties of the shari'a.[62] Like Ibn Taymiya, Shaykh Ahmad focused on re-emphasizing the shari'a. The Wahhabi movement founded during the eighteenth century was much more radical and uncompromising towards "un-Islamic"

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[60]For detail of Ibn Taymiya's views on unprophetic religious practices, see Muhammad Umar Memon. *Ibn Taimiya's Struggle Against Popular Religion* (The Hague: Mouton, 1976).

[61]Rahman. "Revival and Reform", pp. 632-635.

[62]Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi not only differentiated the concept of *Wahdat al-Wujud* of Ibn 'Arabi and showed that the latter was incompatible with the former, he also formulated a philosophy based upon the ultimate sufi experience of Divine transcendence which would be compatible with the religion of the Prophet, called *Wahdat al-Shuhud* or *Tawhid Shuhudi*, Unity of Being in vision. For detail analysis of this subject, see Muhammad Abdul Haq Ansari. *Sufism and Shari'a: A Study of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's Effort to Reform Sufism* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), pp. 102-118.

teachings, and the superstitious cults linked with the popular sufism.[63] Other reform movements also grew up at around this time. Again, in India, in the eighteenth century, Shah Wali-Allah (1703-1762) emerged as the forerunner of the modern Islamic movements in the Indian Subcontinent. His teachings had a potent influence on subsequent generations[64] who further developed his orientation in a number of Islamic-modernist,[65] reformist,[66] and even traditionalist[67] movements.

The basic ideas propagated by the earlier movements, in fact, inspired the modern reform movements. It was, therefore, not an accident that the most important ideas of the modern Muslim thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries came from the purificationist-reformist background of the earlier reform movements. They had agreed to maintain the pristine Islam as a source of

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[63]For his condemnation on certain practices of popular Íufism, see Shaykh Muˑammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. *Kitåb al-Tawhid* (Salimah, Kuwayt: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, n.d.), pp. 25-30.

[64]Among his followers were S.A. 'Aziz (1745-1823), M.I. Shahid (1779-1831), S.A. Shahid (1786-1831), and Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). Alvi. "The *Mujaddid* and *Tajdid* ", p. 1; Talip Küçükcan. "An Analytical Comparasion of the Aligarh and the Deobandi Schools" *The Islamic Quarterly,* 38(1994), p. 49.

[65]The most representative of this group is the Aligarh movement, and then the Nadwat al-ˉUlamåˇ which was founded in 1891.

[66]*Ahl-i Hadith* might represent this orientation. Founded in the late 19th century, its main concern was a return to the norms of the *Sunna.* Committing to revitalize the Islamic law, it denied the blindly acceptance of medieval schools of law. It insisted that the Qur'ån and the *Sunna* were the only valid sources which must be used. Being influenced by Ibn Taymiya on the issues of popular religion and its manifestations, the *Ahl-i Hadith* reminded of a dangerous threat of sufism to the teaching of Islam, therefore, it discouraged the institutional forms of the Sufi tradition. Fazlur Rahman. *Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 205.

[67]The Deoband School might be said to represent this movement. It was founded by three famous figures, Muˑammad Qasim Nanautawi (1813-1887), Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1827-1905), whose undestanding was characterized by traditional orthodox element of Shah Wali-Allah's religious thinking, and Imdadullah (1817-1899). B.D. Metcalf. *Islamic Revival in British India, 1860-1900* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 72-79.

inspiration in seeking a response to the socio-political challenges of modernization. The impact of modern Western culture upon the Muslim world, which received added momentum with the political and economic hegemony of the West, had contributed to the deepening identity crisis which had besieged Muslim societies from Morocco to Indonesia. This crisis brought about with it political, social, and religious challenges for the Muslims. In the early period of the history of Islam, the Muslim community had confronted the cultural challenges from an alien civilization, but at least they had never found themselves in a subordinate position. The challenge at that time was primarily how to provide a solid political infrastructure of the growing great empire of Islam. But in the modern era, the cultural challenge was one of facing the inferiority of Mulim societies vis-a-vis the West, while the political challenge involved setting an agenda for liberating the Muslim world from Western occupation. Such challenges subsequently influenced the orientation of reform movements which focused their efforts primarily on the challenges of the situation and directed towards deriving the socio-political solutions to problems on the basis of a religious perspective.

The tendency to see Islam as the fundamental reference for solving every problem has in fact become the dominant ideological orientation among Muslims. In the context of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the starting point of this orientation was the problem of internal decay, and the need for an internal reform. It was in some way committed to the Islamic tradition, and yet at the same time upheld reform, wishing thereby to show that the modern Islamic movement was not only a legitimate but a necessary implication of the social teaching of Islam. Based on this assumption, Muhammad 'Abduh, the most outspoken modernist of this period, suggests that the first important point to be looked at is the need for the reconstruction of the intellectual basis of an Islamic world-view. The task which should be set therefore involves two things, first, a restatement of what Islam really

is and, second, a consideration of its implications for modern society.[68] The former, using Gibb's terms, may be identified as a true Islam which is pure from corrupting influences and practices. The implications of this idea lead to the efforts such as the reformulation of Islamic doctrines in the light of modern thought, the reformation of Muslim higher education and, the defense of Islam against European and Christian influences.[69]

In Indonesia, the reform activities may actually have begun much earlier than many scholars have estimated.[70] The chief goal of the first phase of reform was to purify Islamic religious practices and beliefs of local traditional influences. To a great extent, this effort was a continuation of the re-Islamization process among Indonesians, a process which was originally aimed at promoting more orthodox Islamic patterns and practices. The role of the *hajjs,* who returned from the pilgrimage to Mecca, was crucial in developing the religious insight of Indonesian Muslims. In Roff's view, with the new status of *hajj,* the pilgrim might reasonably be assumed to have changed his perception of Islam and the Muslim community. He belonged in consequence both to his own personal integrity and to his community, and by virtue of having re-enacted the origins of the faith, he was capable of linking

[68]Albert Hourani. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 140.

[69]H.A.R. Gibb. *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1947), p. 33; see also Charles C. Adams. *Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad 'Abduh* (New York: Russel & Russel, 1968), pp. 68-90.

[70]Some writers argued that Islamic reform movements in Indonesia began at the beginning of the nineteenth century coinciding with the rise of Padri movement, which was stimulated by the return of some *hajjs* from Mecca. Howard M. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reformism in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), p. 4. A recent study, however, shows that they began as earlier as the seventeenth century with the existing intellectual networks between Indonesian and Middle East scholars. Azyumardi Azra, "The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian ˉUlamåˇ in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" Ph.D dissertation. (New York: Columbia University, 1992), pp. 484-485.

the two and revitalizing that to which he returned.[71] This was how the *hajj*'s new status was realized by himself and recognized and accepted by the people of his homeland. In this way, the pilgrimage, one of the pillars of Islam, became vital to the advancement of Indonesian Islam in the Dutch colonial period. It helped to build an Islamic identity for Indonesian Muslims, a not unimportant result when it is remembered that the latter were converted only in relatively recent times, and that converts still retained the old local traditions in their religious beliefs and practices. From a theological perspective, going on pilgrimage was not only considered as fulfilling one's religious duty but also as the best way to improve one's knowledge of Islam. Mecca therefore not only became a holy destination but it also represented the place where Muslims could obtain a basic knowledge of Islam.

The growing number of pilgrims changed the orientation of Islam in Indonesia, gradually making it become more devout (*santri*). According to Hurgronje, many pilgrims first became habituated in Mecca to their daily ritual duties, and returned home as well-disciplined faithful. Even those who had studied Islam in the Islamic traditional seminary in their home country (*pesantren*), or mosque before their departure to Mecca were quite open to the current ideological developments in the Middle East, such as Pan-Islamic influences.[72] Politically, such

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[71]William R. Roff, "The Meccan Pilgrimage: Its Meaning for Southeast Asian Islam" in Raphael Israeli and Anthony H. Johns, eds. *Islam in Asia,* vol. 2 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 244. For the indigenous urban middle class of the Indonesian Muslims at the end of the nineteenth century, making the pilgrimage to Mecca and returning with the title of *hajj* was a way to place them at par with the Javanese aristocracy, *priyayi,* a class who had enjoyed the privileges from the Dutch colonial government. Nakamura, "Professor Haji Kahar Muzakkir and the Development of the Reformist Movement in Indonesia". a paper given at the annual set of public lectures on Indonesia (Canberra: Monash University, 1977), p. 7.

[72]Christian Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Later Part of the 19th Century: Daily Life, Custom and Learning the Moslims of the East-Indian-Archipelago* (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1931), p. 249. The Pan-Islamic idea among the reformist Muslims in Indonesia was oriented to building the feeling of Muslim brotherhood to oust the Dutch colonial government. A feeling which caused the Dutch government enforce a tight censor of any idea from the Middle East.

influences were feared by the Dutch administrators, who considered the religio-political effects of pilgrimage and study in the Middle East to be undesirable. For this reason, in the early nineteenth century, the Dutch made the pilgrimage more difficult through taxation and passport restrictions; indeed, various debilitating regulations lasted throughout the century.[73] Regardless of the fears of the Dutch,[74] Indonesian Muslims had discovered the value of the pilgrimage as a means of securing religious knowledge. It encouraged the Muslims to pay greater attention to their religious duties with older Muslims wishing to devote their last days to worshiping and praying in the Holy Land, and the younger ones devoting themselves to religious studies there.[75] This growing consciousness of religious practice has been called by Konstiner as the first and main step towards reform.[76]

The continuous transmission of religious ideas from the central lands of Islam to Indonesia was intensified by a considerable growth in the number of pilgrims, due in part to better transportation, and growing stability in the Dutch East Indies. In the mid-nineteenth century, some two thousand pilgrims travelled

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[73]Fred R. von der Mehden, *Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction Between Southeast Asia and the Middle East* (Gainesville, FL.: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 3. For further discussion of the Dutch colonial attitude towards the *ḥåjjs* see Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), pp. 91-98; W. Roff. "South-East Asian Islam in the Nineteenth Century" in P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds. *The Cambridge History of Islam,* 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), especially page, 171.

[74]This could be caused by their lack of Islamic knowledge. *Ibid.* A case was explained by Hurgronje that one day the Resident of Palembang heard that the Islamic law was taught in the mosque from a book called *sabil al-muhtadin* (the Path for those who wish to be guided), in which the Sacred law was explained in the usual way. The Dutchman, associating it with *perang sabil* (Holy War), believed that war against the Dutch was being preached publicly. Since then the officials did as much as possible to oppose the preaching in the mosques. Hurgronje, *Mekka,* p. 246.

[75]Ibid*.,* 220.

[76]Joseph Kostiner, "The Impact of the Hadrami Emigrants in the East Indies on Islamic Modernism and Social Change in the Óa∂ramawt During the 20th Century" in Israeli and Johns, eds. *Islam in Asia,* p. 214.

annually to Mecca from Indonesia; by the end of the century, the number had risen to between seven and eleven thousand.[77] Although the pilgrimage itself only required a month's stay in Mecca, many of them decided to stay there temporarily or permanently. This group gradually formed the colony which was known as the Javanese (*Jawi*) community.[78] The colony facilitated the stay of Indonesian pilgrims who wanted to reside in Mecca for a short period[79] to lead a quiet life devoted to prayers or for a longer one in order to deepen their religious knowledge. Hurgronje spent six months in Mecca in order to carry out his observations, and thus portrayed the community in the mid-nineteenth century:

> The very kernel of the Jåwah colony are the teachers and students. In Mekka they are the ones most highly regarded; from their countryfolk on pilgrimage they enjoy the deepest awe, and from Mekka they control the religious life of their homes. Almost all Jåwah who teach in the Holy City have risen to this height in Mekka herself. There are indeed in the East-Indian Archipelago opportunities for thorough Islamic studies, but no Jåwah would dare to come to

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[77]J. Vredenbregt, "The Hadjdj: Some of Its Features and Functions In Indonesia" *Bijdragen toot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde,* 118(1962), p. 93, and Appendix II, pp. 148-149; Mehden, *Two Worlds of Islam,* p. 3; the highest number was 11,788, which represented a "Great Pilgrimage" year, in 1895. The figure was fluctuating from this highest number to 7,000 in 1900. Together with many hundreds more from Aceh and elsewhere who departed from Singapore, they comprised in all about twenty per cent of the total number of pilgrims from overseas. Roff, "South-East Asian Islam", p. 172; and for the complete table of regional origin of the *hajj,* see Karel A. Steenbrink, *Beberapa Aspek Tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), pp. 249-253.

[78]In Mecca, in the nineteenth century the word *Jawa* was used for the whole archipelago of the Dutch East Indies. D. van der Meulen, "The Mecca Pilgrimage and Its Importance to the Netherlands East Indies" *The Muslim World,* 31(1941), p.52; it was also used for the Southeast Asians staying in Mecca, see von der Mehden. *Two Worlds of Islam,* p. 13; Snouck Hurgronje explained the *Jawa* colony in this sense in the last chapter of his book. Hurgronje, *Mekka,* pp. 215-292.

[79]van der Meulen, as a Dutch official in Jedda, basing on his observation, reported that nearly all pilgrims prefered to stay in the Holy City for the fasting period. van der Meulen, "The Mecca Pilgrimage", p. 59.

Mekka otherwise than as a pupil. The careers of these learned men thus form a very important part of the history of the Jåwah colony.[80]

The academic life in the colony attracted many students from the archipelago, students who later became part of the network of the transmission of knowledge of Islam among Indonesian Muslims. This tradition was maintained by families who would send a son to Mecca to devote his life to acquiring Islamic knowledge in the name of the whole family, and they supported him financially during his period of study there. Besides, there were many *waqf* -houses in Mecca, each belonging to a special group of the *Jawi* peoples coming from Aceh, Banten, Pontianak and some other cities. Many such houses were founded by individuals while performing the *hajj,* who later contributed to their upkeep; others were built with money collected by a (*Jawi*) Shaykh and his countrymen.[81] Any effort to facilitate the transmission of Islamic knowledge was a worthy activity. These facts demonstrate that Indonesian Muslims highly appreciated the value of knowledge and there was broad-based social and cultural support for the cause of education. Unquestionably, the general Indonesian Muslims of that time were encouraged to acquire at least the principal teachings of Islam to enable them perform their daily religious duties.

In the context of nineteenth century Mecca, the study of the Qur'ån ranged from the art of reciting (*tajwid*) to exegesis of the text. But the use of the Qur'ån for ritual purposes was of primary importance. Besides the Qur'an and *Hadith,* other branches of religious knowledge such as Islamic theology ʻ*ilm al-kalam*) and Islamic law (*fiqh*), were considered from the religious point of view as the most important elements of the religious life of the community,[82] and, therefore, were taken

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[80]Hurgronje, *Mekka,* p. 254.

[81]Ibid*.,* pp. 254-255.

[82]These subjects are discussed in detail in the "Learning in Mekka" by Snouck Hurgronje, Ibid*,* pp. 153-212.

seriously by the students and teachers. From the perspective of the Islamic reform movements in nineteenth century Indonesia, theology had become a means of cleansing the Islamic beliefs of superstitious (*khurafah*) elements, whereas law ensured the purity of ritual practices from the corrupt influences of innovation (*bidˉah*). Such orientation was a critical issue in the first phase of the Islamic movement in Indonesia. Early in the nineteenth century the *Paderi* attempted to reform Islamic practices based on this pattern. The movement gained important stimulus from the return of some hajjs from Mecca at that time.[83] Their negative attitude towards customary practices (*ʿadah*) drew a reaction from *ʿadah*- oriented groups, represented by the officials of the kingdom and various clan chiefs.[84] It resembled, according to some scholars, the Wahhabi movement in eighteenth-century Arabia.[85] The *Paderi'* s efforts, on the one hand, reflect the strong links in religious thinking that existed between Mecca and Indonesia in the nineteenth century, while on the other they represent an early manifestation of a local Islamic reformist movement, one which however was solely directed towards religious renewal.

The early Islamic movements in Indonesia were sporadic and individualistic, at least in terms of their reform activities. But in their later development, they

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[83]Hamka, *Ayahku: Riwayat Hidup Dr. Abd Karim Amrullah dan Perjuangan Kaum Muda Agama di Sumatra* (Jakarta: Umminda, 1983), p. 14; Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam,* p. 4.

[84]Deliar Noer argues that another factor which creates the conflict between the *Paderi* ˉulamåˇ and the ˉǎdah- oriented groups seems to be an internal struggle for power in the area with no group emerging victoriously except the Dutch. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim*, p. 18.

[85]The discussion of the hypothesis of the Wahhabi influence to the *Paderi* movement is mentioned in Steenbrink, *Beberapa Aspek,* pp. 32-45; Hamka, *Ayahku*, p. 14; Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam,* p. 4; Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 65-70; for detailed survey of the character of the movement, see C. Dobbin, "Islamic Revivalism in Minangkabau at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century" *Modern Asian Studies,* 8, 3(1974), pp. 319-356.

became more organized and pursued a variety of options in the areas of their particular concerns. This change may be attributed to the growing influence of religious reform and intellectual currents from Cairo, where 'Abduh's ideas on reform were attracting attention. This influence was primarily conveyed to Indonesia by the circulation of books and periodicals. Furthermore, the *hajj* and the *muqim'*s networking in Mecca transmitted religious ideas in the first phase of the Islamic movement in Indonesia, whereas the printed materials were the chief means of transmitting reformist ideas at the turn of the century.

2.1.2. *The Publications*

In the early decades of this century, *al-Manar* (the Lighthouse) emerged as the most important vehicle of bringing reformist ideas from Egypt to Indonesia. This journal, the mouthpiece of the Egyptian reformers, had many enthusiastic readers both inside and outside Egypt.[86] In the Malay-Indonesian world, the circulation of this journal did not indicate a large number of subscribers; rather it was usually received by community groups that maintained contact with people in certain Middle Eastern countries like Turkey and Egypt. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah, had regular access to *al-Manar* through one such community group.[87] Indeed, many people who were directly involved in the social, political and religious problems of the country, were among the readers of *al-Manar.* They also

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[86]Among its readers were the Arab emigrants in Indonesia and the Indonesian students in Mecca. Bisri Affandi, "Shaykh Ahmad Al-Surkati: His Role in Al-Irshåd Movement in Java in the Early Twentieth Century". M.A. thesis. Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1976, p. 34.

[87]The Arab community in Jakarta who founded *al-Jamiyah al-Khairiyah* (The Association for the Good) in 1901 were among the readers of *al-Manar.* From them Aˑmad Daˑlån, who was registered in 770 number of the Association, got the periodical. Djarnawi Hadikusuma, *Dari Jamaluddin Al-Afghani Sampai K.H. Ahmad Dahlan* (Yogyakarta: Persatuan, n.d.), pp. 72-73; Solichin Salam, *K.H. Ahmad Dahlan: Tjita-tjita dan Perdjuangannja* (Djakarta: Depot Pengadjaran Muˑammadijah, 1962), p. 30; for registered number of Ahmad Dahlann in *al-Jamiyah al-Khairiyah,* see Aboebakar Atjeh, *Salaf: Muhji Atsaris Salaf Gerakan Salafijah di Indonesia* (Djakarta: Permata, 1970), p. 103.

corresponded on various topics covered in the journal.[88] This correspondence served to establish a dialogue on reform ideas between Egyptians and Malay-Indonesians in the early decades of this century.[89] Thus, the readers in the Malay-Indonesian world became aware of the international and Middle East issues affecting Muslims. This journal provided an intellectual insight into the times and encouraged them not only to explore the sources of reformist ideas but also to disseminate them among their own people. This goal was realized by, among other means, establishing local magazines which substantively reflected the reformist ideas of *al-Manar* and its predecessor, *al-'Urwah al-Wuthqa* (The Indissoluble Bond).

The founding of local magazines was just one more link in the chain of reform ideas connecting the Middle East and the Malay-Indonesian region. The hajjs and the Malay-Indonesian students in Mecca, were also instrumental in the birth of local periodicals in Malay and Indonesian. In the Malay states (including Singapore at the time) there were a number of such magazines founded earlier this century, including the monthly magazine *al-Imåm,* (the Leader, 1906), a weekly newspaper, *Neracha,* (The Scales, 1911), and a monthly journal,*Tunas Melayu* (The Malay Young Generation, 1913), all of them closely connected with the four prominent figures of the urban Malay Muslim community, Shaykh Muhammad Tahir Jalal al-Din al-Azhari,[90] Shaykh Ahmad al-Hadi, al-Hajj 'Abbas Muhammad Taha, and Shaykh

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[88]On the issue of Islam and nationalism, for example, a reader in Indonesia asked the editor whether there were Had¥ths which forbad the national idea; what was the attitude of Islam itself toward nationalism, *al-Manår,* 33(1933), pp. 191-192; for other issues of correspondence sent from Malay-Indonesian world during the publication of *al-Manar,* 1898 to 1936, Jutta E. Bluhm, "A Preliminary Statement on the Dialogue Established Between the Reform Magazine *Al-Manar* and the Malayo-Indonesian World", *Indonesia Circle,* 32(1983), pp. 35-41.

[89]Ibid.*,* p. 35.

[90]Shaykh Tahir admitted that the al-Azhar of Cairo had "opened his eyes" and it was because his love for this institution that he added "al-Azhari" to his name. Hamka, *Ayahku,* pp. 97-98.

Muhammad Salim al-Kalali, who had extensive contacts with the Middle East.[91] All these periodicals contained many references to *al-Manar.*[92] *Al-Imam* was read extensively in Indonesia where Malay was spoken or written.[93]

Like *al-Manar* of Cairo, and *al-Imam* of Singapore, Haji 'Abdullah Ahmad's fortnightly magazine, *al-Munir* (the Illuminative), published in Padang, West Sumatra in 1911, offered Indonesian readers a taste of the new thought. Aḥmad Daḥlån, one of its readers in Java, translated some of the articles into Javanese for those who read only that language.[94] The emergence of *al-Manar, al-Imam,* and then *al-Munir* formed an ideological link in a new transmission of reform, one which extended from the Middle East and passed through Malaysia/Singapore before finally reaching Indonesia, and especially West Sumatra. Singapore represented a cross-section of the Muslim peoples of the Middle East and Indonesia. Its reputation as a transit point contributed to its role as a publication and distribution center for religious writings. Although it was also considered as a center of Islamic life and learning,[95] this did not mean that Singapore had a role equal to that of Cairo- it did

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[91]For their original descendant and educational experience in Mecca and Cairo see, William R. Roff, "Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua: Innovation and Reaction" *The Origin of Malay Nationalism* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 59-67; Ibrahim bin Abu Bakar, "Islamic Modernism in Malaya As Reflected in Hadi's Thought" Ph.D. dissertation. Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1992, pp. 80-124.

[92]*Al-Imam,* for example, often cited opinions of ʿAbduh and translated some articles from *al-Manar.* Roff, "Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua," p. 59.

[93]Noer mentions those areas such as, Sumatra, Java (where it had agents in Jakarta, Cianjur, Surabaya, and Semarang), Kalimantan (its agents in Pontianak and Sambas), and Sulawesi (in Makassar or Ujung Pandang nowadays). Noer, *The Modernist Muslim,* p. 35.

[94]A. Mukti Ali, *Alam Pikiran Modern di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Nida, 1971), p. 42; Hamka, *Ayahku,* p. 111.

[95]Roff said that in the nineteenth century, many students from all over the Archipelago came to Singapore to study under the guidance of scholars from

not have educational institutions like al-Azhar. Nevertheless, Singapore remained an important destination on the pilgrimage route.[96] Its role was mainly to giving both technical and spiritual support to those who needed to be escorted to Mecca.[97] During the past century and in the first decade of this century many people travelled to Singapore to find work and thus obtain the means to undertake the pilgrimage;[98] Singapore in such cases became the starting point of the pilgrimage. The importance of the role of Singapore as a center on the Indonesia-Middle East route was its position in keeping the course of reform ideas flowing to their final destination, the Indonesian Archipelago. As mentioned earlier, publications had emerged as an important means of dissiminating reformist ideas in Malay land,[99] and indeed many of them reached some of the larger cities in Indonesia.

2.1.3. *Students and the Reform*

Unlike the pilgrims and Indonesian students in Arabia, those who went to Cairo (*al-Azhar*) did not play a role in the transmission of knowledge to their homeland until the early decades of the present century. The number of the Indonesian students in Cairo significantly increased in the first quarter of the

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Hadramawt and the Hijaz, from Patani, Aceh, Palembang and Java. Roff, "South-East Asian Islam", p. 177.

[96]Ibid.

[97]The most important knowledge is *manasik al-hajj,* a set of rituals during the pilgrimage.

[98]Although Vredenbregt does not mention explicitly who they are, but it is clearly understood that they are Indonesians. See Vredenbregt, "The Hadjdj", pp. 127-129; this also can be associated with the growing number of Javanese emigrant in Singapore in the early nineteenth century. Craig A. Lockard, "The Javanese As Emigrant: Observations on the Development of Javanese Settlements Overseas" *Indonesia,* 11(1972), p. 44.

[99]The reform ideas, in fact, get support from those who live in Strait regions such as Singapore, Malacca, and Penang. Djamal Tukimin, "Pemikiran-pemikiran dan Gerakan Tajdid di Singapore Rujukan Terhadap Aliran Pikiran dan Pengaruh Ahmad Hassan dan Hubungan dengan Muhammadiyah" a paper presented in the Seminar Falsafah dan Perjuangan Ahmad Hassan (Singapore, 28-30 January 1979), p. 9.

twentieth century. Most of them were already active in modern Islamic movements in Indonesia, in that they belonged to the second generation of Islamic reformism.[100] Although as early as the 1890 there existed at al-Azhar the office of the Shaykh of the Javanese *riwaq,*[101] i.e. the guardianship of the students from the *Jawa* quarter,[102] speculation might conclude that they were still marginal.[103] If Dar al-'Ulum,[104] as one study observes, was preferred over al-Azhar by students from "Jawa" during the earlier period,[105] this marginality may not have been in numbers but also in interest

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[100]For discussion of these students and their role in reform movements, see Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920's" *Indonesia,* 9(1970), pp. 80-87; and the recent study on the field, Mona Abaza. *Islamic Education Perception and Exchanges: Indonesian Students in Cairo* (Paris: Association Archipel, 1994), pp. 73-86.

[101]According to the Law of October 15, 1885 (after reformation) a student who is not registered as belonging to a *riwaq* or *harah* (the student lodges at al-Azhar University) is not to be counted as a student of al-Azhar. Bayard Dodge, *Al-Azhar: A Millenium of Muslim Learning* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 132.

[102]William R. Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920's" *Indonesia,* 9(1970), p. 80. In another page he argued that there had been Indonesian students in Cairo for many years prior to the first quarter of the twentieth century, but it was apparently not until 1922 that they increased in number. Ibid, p. 73.

[103]The known figure of the Indonesian students at Al-Azhar in the early period was Shaykh Tahir Jalal al-Din, who originally came from Minangkabau, West Sumatra. After studying at Mecca for some years, he went to Al-Azhar in 1310/1892. He left Cairo in 1906 and chose Malaya as his new place for campaigning his reform ideas. Hamka, *Pengaruh Muḥammad 'Abduh di Indonesia* (Djakarta: Tintamas, 1961), p. 8.

[104]The Dar al-'Ulum was founded in 1892 in order to train teachers of Arabic and Turkish; and to offer alternative religious and secular education to the religious system of al-Azhar. Its creation went hand in hand with the growing interest of the Muslim intelligentsia to modernize the system of education. It later joined Cairo University (founded in 1902) in 1945. Abaza, *Islamic Education,* footnote 4, pp. 25-26.

[105]Based on a case study it was found that during the period between 1925-1936, six young men from a nineteenth century urban city of Kotagede spent some years at Cairo University, and American University in Cairo to study secular subjects,

in the religious ideas which were being spread by 'Abduh at al-Azhar at the time. It has even been suggested that al-Azhar actually never became a reformist educational institution in spite of 'Abduh's efforts. This failure was due to the strong opposition of both the al-Azhar Shaykhs and of the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi.[106] For this reason, the hope that al-Azhar would become an agent of 'Abduh's reform ideas before the end of the nineteenth century never came into being. Thus, if there were Indonesian students at al-Azhar at the time, they might not have become acquainted with reformist ideas; on the contrary they may have been more influenced by the Shaykhs who opposed reforms.

The fact that there were few if any Indonesian students at al-Azhar during the early twentieth century is supported by evidence that nearly all the leaders of the Indonesian reform movements were of Meccan background.[107] They, however, kept in touch with ¯Abduh's ideas during their stay in Mecca as well as when they returned home. Aˑmad Daˑlån was one of those who had such a chance. He went to Mecca in 1890 and stayed there for a period of time to study. In 1903 he again visited Mecca, staying there this time for 18 months.[108] He studied under some ¯ulamåˇ in Mecca, one of them being Shaykh Aˑmad Khat¥b, who gave him the

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taught in modern Arabic as well as in English. See Nakamura, "Professor Haji Kahar", pp. 7-8.

[106]The Khedive ultimately appointed 'Abduh to become *mufti* in order to keep him from becoming the Shaykh al-Azhar, which position was given to the conservative Shaykhs, Salim al-Bishri and then 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shirbini, who aborted 'Abduh's reform effort. Yvonne Haddad, "Muhammad 'Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform", in Ali Rahmena, ed. *Pioneer of Islamic Revival* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), 62; Dodge. *Al-Azhar,* p. 139.

[107]Despite the fact that al-Surkati (the founder of *Al-Irshad* in Indonesia) was from Sudan, he never studied at al-Azhar but went to Mecca. It is said that he was much influenced by 'Abduh and Rida and corresponded with al-Azhar scholars who were followers of 'Abduh. Abaza, *Islamic Education,* 54.

[108]H. Sudja,' *Muhammadiyah dan Pendirinya* (Yogyakarta: P. P. Muhammadiyah, Majlis Pustaka, 1989), pp. 1, 13.

opportunity to read ⁻Abduh's writings.[109] Hadikusuma mentions that he was quite interested in *Tafsir al-Manar,* in addition to other collections which provided the religious reformist ideas of ⁻Abduh.[110] Thus, if Egypt may be considered as one of the chief sources of reform ideas in the early twentieth century, it was not through the students who studied at al-Azhar but through Egyptian publications in the form of periodicals and books. These influenced the minds of readers in Indonesia, who then modified them to suit the local situation. This modification, especially in the case of the Muhammadiyah, was expressed in various activities which reflected more the populist rather than the elitist aspects of Egyptian reform.

2.2. Modern Islamic Movements and the Idea of Religious Reform

The emergence of a religious network between the Middle East and Indonesia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries maintained the continuity of the Islamic religious tradition. The modern Islamic movements in the early decades of this century reflect this process, a process which eventually led to efforts at reform. There were some characteristics in the Indonesian experience which were common to social and religious reform movements in all Muslim lands under colonial rule. This section covers such characteristics as the stages of development, the role of leaders in directing the movements, and the themes they stressed. As we shall note later, one of the most important of these themes was the purification of Islamic teachings. Moreover, these movements also held in common similar ideas respecting reform, social mobility and economic activities.

2.2.1. *The Movements and their Leadership*

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[109]Shaykh Ahmad Khatib was a follower of Shafi'i *madhab,* however, he did not prohibit his students from reading 'Abduh's writing. He did this, as Noer says, with the intention of refuting the ideas of this Egyptian reformist. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim,* p. 74.

[110]Certain writers, for examples, list 'Abduh's books which are much read by Ahmad Dahlan. Among them are: *Risalat al-Tawhid; al-Islam wa-al-Nasraniyah; Tafsir Juz' 'Amma; Tafsir al-Manar.* Solichin Salam, *K.H. Ahmad Dahlan*, p. 6; Hadikusuma, *Dari Jamaluddin Al-Afghani,* 75.

The early twentieth century was a new era for Indonesian Muslims with the emergence of Islamic movements such as the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Muslim Trade Association) in 1905 (which later changed its name to Sarekat Islam in 1911),[111] the Muhammadiyah in 1912, al-Irshåd in 1913, Persatuan Islam in 1923, and Nah∂at al-'Ulama' in 1926.[112] Naturally, these organizations did not begin with a fully developed structure and organization. When Haji Samanhudi founded Sarekat Dagang Islam, his lack of modern organizational skill and his under-appreciation of the importance of propaganda caused it to fall virtually into oblivion until 1911, when Cokroaminoto came onto the scene.[113] For the first few years after its establishment, the Muhammadiyah's popularity languished due to the lack of effort shown by its founding members. Ahmad Dahlan alone was active in *tabligh,* and in spreading the Muhammadiyah's message to his close friends in Yogyakarta,[114] partly because it had been forced to limit its activities to the region of Yogyakarta.[115] Persatuan Islam, which laid much more emphasis on the spread of religious ideas,

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[111]This name was changed into *Partai Sarekat Islam* (Muslim Association Party) in 1921 and into *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslim Association Party) in 1930. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim*, p. 101; the name of Sarekat Islam formally appeared again when the Party fused its political aspiration into *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (Development Unity Party) in 1973. Muhammad Abdul Gani, *Cita Dasar dan Pola Perjuangan Syarikat Islam* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), p. 8.

[112]There are some other Islamic movements and organizations such as Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia in 1929 (West Sumatra), al-Jam'iyah al-Khairiyah in 1905, Persatuan Ulama Madjalengka in 1917 (Java), but most of them were local or only lived for a short time.

[113]*Hikmah,* X, 1-2(1957), pp. 36, 43; Timur Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam Movement: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism" M.A. thesis (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1959), p. 26.

[114]Aboebakar Atjeh, *Salaf* (Djakarta: Permata, 1970), p. 113.

[115]*Statuten dan Qa'idah Moehammadijah* (Djokjakarta: Hoofdcomité Moehammadijah, 1935), p. 10.

for a long time neglected its organizational development.[116] Nor did the organization of the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' originally have any well-defined policies, except in connection with the change of rule in the Hijaz.[117] There were no statutes agreed upon until some time after its founding, and no accurately registered membership.[118] From a developmental perspective, therefore, all of these movements were at first loosely organized; nevertheless as they developed, their activities tended to become more systematic. They acquired organization, established leadership, and patterns of activities, rules and values. Such phenomena are generally characteristic of social movements as suggested by Blumer.[119] Movements of this kind tend to pass through certain stages in their evolution before reaching their final shape.[120] In considering the development of such movements, the crucial aspect deserving attention is their internal mechanisms,[121] through

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[116]Muhammad Isa Anshari, *Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam* (Bandung: Pimpinan Pusat Persatuan Islam, 1958), p. 6.

[117]The religious ideology of the new rulers of Hijaz made some 'ulama' in Indonesia worried about prohibiting *madhab* practices in Mecca. Their concern on this issue led them to establish *Komite Hijaz* in 1926 whose main purpose was to send a delegate to meet King Ibn Saud in Mecca to express their concern. Abdul Halim, *Sejarah Perjuangan K.H. A. Wahab Hasbullah* (Bandung: P.T. Baru, n.d.), p. 12; for detail issues proposed to the King, see Aboebakar, *Sedjarah Hidup,* p. 473.

[118]Noer, *The Modernist Muslim,* p. 230.

[119]Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements" in Alfred McClung Lee, ed. *Principles of Sociology* (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1966), p. 202.

[120]Using the scheme of stages suggested by Dawson and Gettys, they are the stage of social unrest, the stage of popular excitement, the stage of formalization, and the stage of institutionalization. See C.A. Dawson and W.E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1935), pp. 710-726. But every social movement tends to traverse a cycle of change. When the last stage occurs some one usually feels a new need and either the institution changes to meet that need or in time it is superseded. Jerome Davis, *Contemporary Social Movements* (New York: The Century Co., 1930), pp. 8-9.

[121]There are five important aspects of these mechanisms: (1) agitation, (2) development of *esprit de corps,* (3) development of morale, (4) the formation of an

which they were able to grow and become organized. At the stage of development, the role of leaders on influencing those mechanisms was quite important. In the case of the movements mentioned above, their role could be seen in the formation of the ideological orientations of the movements.

At the ideological centre of all these movements lies the Islamic faith. Although culturally enriched by national and local elements, they essentially reflect the religious outlook and aspirations of the central lands of Islam, where the standard of teaching and tradition was set. The leaders of all five movements had in fact visited Mecca, where they performed the hajj. Some of them even spent a number of years in the Hijaz deepening their Islamic knowledge (during a period of *muqim*), among them Haji Ahmad Dahlan of the Muhammadiyah, Haji Ahmad al-Surkati of al-Irshad, Haji Zamzam of Persatuan Islam, and Haji Håshim Ash¯ar¥ of Nahdlat al-'Ulama.'[122] The only exceptions to this rule were Haji Samanhudi, the founder of Sarekat Dagang Islam, and Haji Muhammad Yunus, the co-founder of Persatuan Islam.[123] Ahmad Dahlan and Hashim Ash'ari even studied under the same

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[122]There is no information of how many years Aˌmad Daˌlån stayed in Mecca. But some writers mention that he went to the Holy Land in 1890 and stayed there from 1903-1905. M. Junus Anis, et. al. *Kenalilah Pemimpin Anda: Riwayat Hidup dan Perjoangan Ketua-Ketua P.P. Muhammadiyah A. Dahlan s/d Pak AR* (Yogyakarta: P.P. Muhammadiyah, Majlis Pustaka, n.d), p. 5; and Djarnawi Hadikusuma, *Dari Jamaluddin al-Afghani*, p. 75; Ahmad Surkati lived in Medina for four years and in Mecca where he studied there for eleven years, and, meanwhile, Haji Zamzam spent three and a half years in Mecca. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim,* pp. 63, 84; and Hashim Ash'ari at least spent seven years in Mecca. Aboebakar, *Sedjarah Hidup,* pp. 66, 69, 70, and 72.

[123]Haji Samanhudi went to Mecca in 1904 at the age of thirty six, and it was after his return from the Holy Land that he founded the Sarekat Dagang Islam in Solo, on October 1905. It seems that he stayed at Mecca only a few months. Timur Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam Movement", p. 34. The same as Haji Samanhudi, Muˌammad Junus was predicted not too long to stay at Mecca. He was primarily a trader who was interested in religious matters and had a collection of books on Islam. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim,* p. 84.

'ulama' while in Mecca.[124] Moreover, some of them also derived their ideas and aspirations from Egypt,[125] India,[126] and Turkey.[127] Their experiences had a significant impact on the doctrines and the ideological orientations of the

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[124]One of the recognized 'ulama' with whom they studied was Shaykh Ahmad Khatib, an Imåm of the Shafi'ites at the Masjid al-Haram. Hamka, *Ayahku,* p. 273. This does not close the possibility that they also studied seperately or jointly under some other 'ulama.' It is also reported that both Ahmad Dahlan and Hashim Ash'ari studied at the same *Pesantren* in Semarang. Ahmad Adabi Darban, "Sejarah Kauman Yogyakarta Tahun 1900-1950: Suatu Study Terhadap Perubahan Sosial" M.A. thesis (Yogyakarta: Universitas Gajah Mada, 1980), p. 59.

[125] The first generation of the Indonesian Islamic reformers, such as Ahmad Dahlan Ahmad al-Surkati got their inspiration from Egypt through publications. Moreover, Ahmad al-Surkati, during his stay in Mecca, was to acquaint himself the teaching of ˉAbduh by corresponding with some Azhar scholars under the influence of 'Abduh. Majlis Dakwah al-Irshad, *Riwayat Hidup Syech Ahmad as-Surkati,* part 1(Surabaya: Siaran Majlis Dakwah, 1972/1973), p. 3. Meanwhile, the second generation, mostly, who later were active in the Muhammadiyah were the students of al-Azhar and Dar al-'Ulum in Cairo. They were Haji Mas Mansur, Muhammad Farid Ma'ruf, 'Abdul Kahar Muzakkir. Roff, "Indonesian and Malay", pp. 81, 84; Mona Abaza. *Islamic Education*, pp. 74-79; Nakamura, "Professor Haji Kahar Muzakkir", p. 8; *Kiyai Haji Mas Mansur: Kumpulan Karangan Tersebar* (Yogyakarta: P.T. Percetakan Persatuan, 1992), p. x

[126]The most conspicuous leader who got inspiration from India was Cokroaminoto, the leader of Sarekat Islam. His works, such as *Islam dan Sosialisme* (Islam and Socialism) was much influenced by the Indian writer Qidwa'i; his *Tarich Agama Islam* (the History of Islamic Religion) was based on Amir 'Ali's *The Spirit of Islam,* Maulana Muhammad 'Ali's *Muhammad the Prophet,* and Kwaja Kamal al-Din's *The Ideal Prophet;* he even translated some parts of Muhammad 'Ali's Qur'anic exegesis before his death. See H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, *Islam dan Socialisme* (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1950), *Tarich Agama Islam* (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952); Jusuf Wibisono, *Islam dan Sosialisme* (Djakarta: Pustaka Islam, n.d.), p. 3; Timur Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam Movement", p. 48; Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto: Hidup dan Perdjuangannja* (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), p. 72.

[127]Certain Arab community who later established *al-Jam'iyah al-Khairiyah* sent several youths to Turkey to pursue advanced study, first in 1890, but this activity was soon hampered by the lack of funds as well as by the decline of the caliphate. Aboebakar, *Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar* (Djakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan Almarhum K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), p. 228; 'Abdu-l Mu'ti 'Ali, "The Muhammadijah Movement: A Bibliographical Introduction" M.A. thesis (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1957), p. 49.

movements they founded. On a theoretical level, ideology is formulated on the basis of national priorities. It plays a significant role in the life of the movement; and becomes an essential internal mechanism in its development. It consists of a body of doctrines and beliefs which are formulated in its objectives and purposes. There is a body of criticism of the existing structure which the movement is seeking to change; a body of defense doctrine which serves as a justification of its objectives; and a body of belief dealing with its policies, tactics, and practical operation.[128]Ideology provides a movement not only with the necessary platform to resolve its problems but also, as Blumer suggests, a set of values, a set of convictions, a set of criticisms, a set of arguments, and a set of defenses. In other words, it gives direction, justification, weapons of attack as well as of defense, inspiration, and hope.[129] Basing ourselves on this ideological framework, we can detect three major orientations among the groups that concern us: the Muslim conservative-traditionalist, modern-reformist, and puritan-radicalist. The conservative-traditionalists are those who have resisted the Westernizing tendencies of the last century in the name of Islam as understood and practised in their particular areas, and have been found particularly among the 'ulama,' sufi orders, and generally among the rural populations and lower classes. Modern-reformists have insisted that Islam is relevant to all areas of life, public as well as private, but that traditional

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[128]All of the movements referred to in this chapter gave expression to their respective ideologies in the texts of their Statutes. For the Sarekat Islam, see Petrus Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch Indië* (Haarlem, 1931), pp. 58-59; the Muˑammadiyah, see *Statuten Lan Pranatan Tjilik Oemoem Toemrap Pakoempoelan Moehammadijah Hindia Wetan* (Ngajogjakarta: Pangreh Gede Moehammadijah, 1928); "Statuten Moehammadijah" in *Statuten dan Qa'idah,* pp. 21-42; and *Azas dan Pedoman serta Anggaran Dasar dari Persjerikatan Moehammadijah*. duplicated by Pengoeroes Moehammadijah Tjabang Pontianak, pp. 17-21; Al-Irshad, see Affandi, "Shaykh Ahmad Al-Surkati", appendix I; Persatuan Islam, see *Qanun Asasi dan Qanun Dachili Persatuan Islam* (Bandung: Persatuan Islam, 1968); and Nahdlat al-'Ulama,' see *Statuten Perkoempoelan Nahdlaat ul-ˉOelama, 1926.* Quoted from Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama* (Sala: Jatayu, 1985), Appendix III.

[129]Blumer, "Social Movements", pp. 210-211.

views and practices must be reformed in the light of the original sources of authority, the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* (the authoritative precedent of the Prophet Muhammad and, for the Shi'tes, also the twelve of Imams) and of contemporary conditions and needs. For modernists the *shar'ah* applies to all of life, but they emphasize its flexibility and tend to interpret it in terms of Western-derived ideas. Puritan-radicalists also want to interpret Islam in terms of the original sources of authority in the light of contemporary needs, but they strongly object to the modernists's tendency to Westernize Islam. For them the *shari'ah* is indeed flexible and capable of development to meet changing needs, but interpretation and development must be done in a genuinely Islamic manner and not be a covert way of Westernizing. They also criticize many of the traditional ideas and practices.[130]

2.2.2. *The Ideological Orientation of Islamic Movements*

Some scholars argue that these orientations are reflected in the Islamic movements in Indonesia in the early twentieth century. They group the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' as traditionalist and Sarekat Islam, the Muhammadiyah, and al-Irshad as modernists.[131] Some of them also include Persatuan Islam as modernist, but this

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[130]William Shepard, "Fundamentalism Christian and Islamic" *Religion,* 17(1987), 358; and his "Islam and Ideology: Towards A Typology" *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 19(1987), pp. 307-335; Hans Bräker, "The Islamic Renewal Movement and the Power Shift in the Near/Middle East and Central Asia" in Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, G. Veinstein, and S.E. Wimbush, (eds.). *Turco-Tatar Past Soviet Present* (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1986), pp. 515-516. The puritan-radicalist orientation used in this thesis to some extent refers to Shepard's "fundamentalist." It, however, does not include the call, as many Western observers used to designate a number of movements and tendencies in the present century, for an "Islamic state" which would bring all public law into conformity with the *shari'ah,* and somewhat more recently a concern with such matters as the "Islamicizing" of knowledge, economics and politics.

[131]Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 148-161; Noer, *The Modernist Muslim;* and Benda, *The Crescent andthe Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945* (The Hague/Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 32-102.

study prefers to call it a "radical group".[132] Some of the movements defined themselves in ways that parallel these orientations. Al-Irshad, for example, claimed in its statutes that part of its mission was to spread the idea of "Islamic reform,"[133] and Persatuan Islam clearly identified itself as a movement which is bound to eradicate innovation (*bid'ah*), superstition (*khurafah*), whim (*takhayyul*), *taqlid*, and practice of associating something with God (*shirk*) in the religious life of Muslims.[134] It argued that the eradication of superstitious beliefs and innovative practices should be reformed radically.[135] The Nah∂at al-⁻Ulamå˘, for its part, was sponsored by the 'ulama,' who were primarily preoccupied with the religious life of the majority of Muslims at the time. In its statutes, this movement claimed to be a religious organization based on the doctrines of the *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama'ah* and held firmly to the teachings of only one of the four *madhahib*, the Shafi'i.[136] Ideologically, that position set the organization apart from the mainstream of the reformist movements which did not bind themselves to any specific Islamic school of law. The Nahdlat al-'Ulama's commitment to spreading Islam according to the teachings of the Shafi'i school of law, and to preserving certain Indonesian religious traditions, have led some scholars to interpret the emergence of the Nahdlat al-

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[132] Federspiel mentions this fundamentalist phenomenon has been an inclination since the period of Haji Zamzam. Federspiel. "The Persatuan Islam", p. 19; Syafiq A. Mughni, *Hassan Bandung Pemikir Radikal* (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1994), pp. 36-38.

[133]Statute of Al-Irshåd, article 2.2. Appendix I of Bisri Affandi, "Shaykh Ahmad Surkati", p. 161.

[134]Statute of Persatuan Islam, Article 5. Aboebakar, *Sedjarah Hidup,* 216.

[135]Classifiying the religious trends in Indonesia into three categories, conservative-reactionarism, moderate-liberalism, and revolutioner-radicalism, Muhammad Isa Anshari, the leader of Persatuan Islam in 1950's, identifies the Persatuan Islam with the third category. Muhammad Isa Anshari, *Manifes Perdjuangan,* pp. 25-26.

[136]*Statuten Perkoempoelan Nadlatoel-'Oelama,* article 2, in Anam, *Nahdlatul Ulama,* appendix III.

'Ulama' as a reaction to the reformist movements in Indonesia.[137] However, neither Sarekat Islam nor the Muhammadiyah identifies itself as reformist in their statutes. Both of these organizations referred to their mission in general terms, stating their goal to be the advancement of the religious life of Muslims.[138]

2.2.3. *Religion as an Instrument of Change*

Another general characteristic of the Islamic movements in Indonesia is that religion functions not only to legitimize their existence but also as an institutional means of social and religious improvement. It is important therefore that a certain purpose be formulated in order to measure the standard value whose realization is appropriate. The general tendency of these movements can be viewed as collective enterprise to establish a new order of life. From a sociological perspective they may be said to have had their origin in conditions of unrest,[139] dissatisfaction with the current standard of living and wishes and hopes for a new life.[140] The contextual

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[137]Zamakhsyari Dhofier, a well-known author, raised in the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' tradition, comments that the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' then became the defender of the religious tradition of the people in rural areas against the influences of the modernist Muslims. Zamakhsyari Dhofier, "K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari: Penggalang Islam Tradisional" *Prisma,* 1(January, 1984), p. 80; see also his *Tradisi Pesantren* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), p. 149.

[138]While Sarekat Islam wants to advance the commercial, help members who are in difficulty, advance the spiritual development and material interests of Indonesians, it also binds itself to advance the religious life among Indonesian peoples in accordance with the laws of the religion. Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto,* pp. 96-97; the Muhammadiyah formulates its goal in the Statute of organization, for the first time, to spread Islam in the Netherland Indie, and to promote religious life among its members. See Article, 2 of *Statuten Lan Pranatan Tjilik Oemoem*, pp. 9-10. Literally, the formulation of the goal of the movement has changed for many times, but the essence of its contents is still the same.

[139]One of the most interesting traits of unrest is the character of behavior. People are likely to move around in an aimless way. This condition, in the absence of regulated means for its release, will express itself usually through uncoordinated activity. Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements", pp. 171-173.

[140]Ibid., p. 199.

significance of the Islamic reform movements in Indonesia lies in the socio-religious conditions faced by Indonesian Muslims in the early twentieth century, which were considered by many to have been far from the ideals of Islam.[141] Their emergence may also be considered as a reaction against the growing foreign domination of their societies and the resulting cultural impoverishment.[142] These two factors contributed to a deepened Islamic consciousness among the Muslims. It resulted in the defensive approach of the modern Islamic movements, which the orientalists label as "apologetic."[143] This defensiveness was a reaction against the encroachment of colonialism and Western culture on the Muslim peoples.

Some movements are alike in believing that the key to restoring Islam is through providing better understanding of religious teachings to the people. The general theme of reform movement, "back to the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* ", therefore aims at deriving both the spirit and the letter of the teachings contained in these two sources in order to respond to the challenges of the modern world. In the context of reformist ideas in twentieth-century Indonesia, this process was meant to yield an interpretable Islam which not only gave a notion of uniformity to certain

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[141]Religious life in the early twentieth century was described by Snouck Hurgronje in his *De Islam in Nederlandsch-Indie.* It was a feature which mixed with the local elements of *takhayyul* and *khurafah.* Such was the condition of religious life which was reported by Daʾlån before Muslim leaders in Yogyakarta in 1335 H. And, it caused both Ahmad Dahlan and Ahmad al-Surkati promised each other to rehabilate the life of Indonesian Muslims. See Christian Snouck Hurgronje, *De Islam in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij, 1913), pp. 30-36; Roeslan Abdoelgani, "Muhammadijah Sebagai Gelombang Pemukul Kembali dari Islam terhadap Imperialisme dan Kolonialisme" in *Muhammadijah Setengah Abad* (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, R.I., 1962), pp. 41-42; Hadjid, *17 Kelompok Ayat-Ayat al-Qur'an Ajaran K.H.A. Dahlan,* p. 6; Hadikusuma, *Dari Jamaluddin Al-Afghani,* p. 76.

[142]Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and Style,* vol 2 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), pp. 391, 396; Stephen K. White, *The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 124.

[143]H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 39-62.

fundamental aspects but also allowed for a plurality of social, political, and humanistic responses. Therefore, change was a universal issue in every modern Islamic reformist movement. In Indonesia, change may be seen in the ongoing process of re-Islamization which involved, first of all, an attempt at fostering a real understanding of religious practices as well as an effort directed at the purification of Islamic belief and ritual from corrupt influences. Second, an interpretation of Islam was being fostered which provided a basis of legitimacy for the claim that Islamic teaching contained within itself the ability to adapt and change. It provided an ethos which supported permissible changes in certain aspects of social life.

As regards the first aspect, the emphasis on religious purification, which normally revolved around disputed religious issues (*khilafiyah*), originally forced the Islamic movements in Indonesia to formulate responses to such issues in their programs.[144] The resulting discussion on controversial issues[145] led to a polarization among Muslim scholars in two groups, the reformist group (*kaum muda*) and traditionalist group (*kaum tua*).[146] Although this thesis will not elaborate

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[144]Persatuan Islam clearly declares itself to involve its mission on this religious matters. It states that religious innovation, superstition, and whim must be eradicated radically. It even challenges people who did not agree with its ideas to defend their views in public debates. Although the mission of Al-Irshåd was not radical as that of Persatuan Islam this organization claimed to reform the religious life of the Muslims. It was not a coincidence therefore that its emergence was, among other reasons, stimulated by the religious disputes among Indonesian-Arab community. See "Statute of Persatuan Islam", article 5; Isa Anshari, *Manifes Perdjuangan,* pp. 25-26; "Statute of Al-Irshåd", article 2.2; Majlis Daˉwah al-Irshåd, *Riwayat Hidup Syech,* p. 5.

[145]The heating conflict on religious disputes, such as *bid'ah* and *taqlid* between *kaum Muda* and *Kaum Tua* in some parts of Sumatra motivated Sultan Soelaiman Sjarifoel Alamsjah of local kindom of Serdang to sponsor the meeting between the two groups, which was held in February 1928. see Tengkoe Fachroeddin, ed. *Verslag Debat Faham Kaoem Moeda dan Kaoem Toea* (Medan, 1934). In Java, some ˉulamåˇ of the two groups also held intensive meetings to discuss the disputes. See pages 52-53.

[146]The terms *Kaum Muda* and *Kaum Tua* were often used in West Sumatra to call the reformist group and the traditionalist one. Another term for *Kaum Muda* was

these disputes, it nevertheless argues that for the reformist group, their involvement in the discussion of these issues focused not only on correcting the implementation of religious practices but also on re-evaluating the way in which Muslims practice their religion. The religious stance of the reformist group therefore unavoidably attracted strong criticism from the traditionalist group.[147] This reaction is understandable because many of the religious practices which were considered wrong by the reformists had become established customs in the lives of Indonesian Muslims, and were therefore difficult to change. Moreover, some of the beliefs and practices which according to the reformist group were heterodox, were supported by religious argument. Here, the disputes became increasingly bitter because they touched upon the issues of individual belief and the truth of each person's opinion. Therefore, the traditionalists refused to change their religious practices, because they thought that change was an attack on the religion itself. The reformists however insisted that change was necessary as long as such corrupt influences, which they referred to as *bid'ah,* were practiced.

The second aspect of change, i.e. believing in the ability of Islamic character to adapt itself to changing circumstances, likewise characterized the reform

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Malim Baru ('Ulama' Muda). People used *Malim,* instead of 'ulama,' to describe the reformist group because in their minds the word 'ulama' was too honor for them. Likewise, another call for *Kaum Tua* was *Kaum Kuno* (ancient group), which for this group was synical term, to denote their rigid and conservative character. B.J.O Schrieke, *Pergolakan Agama di Sumatra Barat: Sebuah Sumbangan Bibliografi* (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1975), p. 69. To mention some of them, in Sumatra the first group was represented by Persatuan Guru-guru Agama Islam (Union of Muslim Teachers), set up in Minangkabau in 1921, (Sekolah) Dinijah (Religious School), founded in Padang Pandjang in 1915, and Sumatra Thawalib, founded in 1920. While the second group was represented by Ittihadul Ulama Minangkabau (Union of ˉUlamåˇ Minangkabau), founded in Bukittinggi in 1921, and Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah (Union of Islamic Education), founded in Bukittinggi in 1930. For the division of the two groups of national organizations, see page 31.

[147]Most of works on Indonesian Islamic reform movements generally deal with these religious disputes or *khilafiyah* matters. This due to a notion that the idea of reform is mainly identified with the restoration of religious deterioration which is restricted on religious practical matters of *'ubudiyah.*

movements in Indonesia. Their reform endeavors were also oriented towards rebuilding the social fabric of the community. The first step in this process usually was to search for the religious legitimacy of the proposed changes. In doing so, attention was drawn to the relationship between religious values and social change. The social role of Islam may then be understood to be an institutional means towards inspiring the emergence of new ideas. Thus, in early-twentieth century Indonesia, there were indeed certain theological assumptions which were favourable towards change; however, they were sufficiently developed to respond to the challenge. Since there was no satisfactory alternative, Muslim reformists usually accepted western ideas. This trend was discernible in the movements which adopted modern institutional format for their educational and social endeavors. This was a universal phenomenon, common to most Muslim countries at that time.

2.2.4. *The Reformers and the West*

The relations between the Muslim world and the West in the second half of the nineteenth century attracted the attention of two reformers in particular, al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) and Khayr al-Din Tunisi (d. 1889),[148] both of whom had direct experience with the West. They both thought that it was reasonable for Muslims to accept scientific knowledge from the West, a thesis which was of great importance

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[148]Both were grouped as the first generation of Arabic thought in the Liberal Age (1798-1939). Rifa'ah Badawi Rafi' al-Tahtawi was an Egyptian reformer who from 1826 to 1831 stayed in Paris as an *imam* of the Egyptian students in that city. The thought of the French Enlightenment left a permanent mark on him. When he returned to Egypt, he worked for a time as translator in the new specialist schools, and in 1836 was a head of the new School of Languages. At the same time he acted as inspector of schools, examiner, member of educational commissions and editor of the official newspaper, *al-Waqa'i' al-misriya.* His contemporary, Khayr al-Din, was a Tunisian who in 1871 controlled the interior, finance, and foreign affairs, and in 1873 he became Prime Minister. He held the position for four years, and used it to carry out many reforms. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 67-99.

to the development of the reformist movement.[149] 'Abduh (1849-1905) took this idea a step further by saying that Muslims were only taking back what they had originally given.[150] Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), the ideological father of the Aligarh movement, committed himself to co-operating with the British and emphasized social reforms based on Western models.[151] Unlike Sayyid Ahmad Khan, however, Ahmad Dahlan of the Muhammadiyah discouraged cooperation with the Dutch colonial regime. Nevertheless, like A·mad Surkati of al-Irshåd and later Ahmad Hassan (d. 1958) of Persatuan Islam, Ahmad Dahlan tried to conceal his anti-Dutch sentiment while at the same time encouraging Indonesian Muslims to derive as much cultural benefit as possible from the West. This is an example of a "love/hate" orientation toward the West in the early twentieth century.[152] It reflected the conviction of certain reformists that the institutions that had evolved in the West were an effective method which would allow Muslims to mobilize their efforts in response to the challenges of the modern world, in spite of the fact that they also showed their hatred for the West because of imperialist domination.

Some Muslim leaders have questioned how the West was able to achieve such a dominant position in the modern world. Among the many in explanations of

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[149]They said that since European civilization was based mostly on what Islam had contributed to it in the past, it was the duty of Muslims to take it back. Al-Tahtawi, *Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz* (Cairo: Wizarat al-Thaqafah wa al- Irshad al-Qawmi, 1958), p. 79; Khayr al-Din Tunisi, *Muqadimah Kitab Aqwam al-Masalik fi Ma'rifat Ahwal al Mamalik* (Tunis: Matba'at al-Dawlah, 1284/1867/1868), p. 6. In another book Tahtawi convinces that most of the knowledge had been translated from Arabic. Al-Tahtawi, *Manahij al-Albab al-Misriyah fi Mabahij al-'Adab al-'Asriyah* (Al-Iskandariyah: Maktabat al-Iskandariyah, 1911), p. 373.

[150]*Al-Manar,* IX (1906), pp. 597-598.

[151]Hafeez Malik, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization In India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 8-9.

[152]Ibid., p. 14.

this phenomenon, chief being the spirit of rationality.[153] This ethic, in fact, once monopolized by the Christian world, and especially by the Protestants, became the common property of modern society, both in the Christian and non-Christian worlds.[154] In the Muslim world, both Sayyid Aˑmad Khẳn and ˉAbduh raised the

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[153]In Western world, this spirit was discussed in connection with the emergence of Capitalism. Two articles which discussed the issue were "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" and a supplementary article "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism", which appeared in 1906, constituted the first studies in Max Weber's collected essays on the sociology of religion. Robert W. Green, ed. *Protestanism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics* (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1959), p. vii; in other works, Weber maintains that history always moves to the direction of rationalization. One of the forms of rationalization is "action", whose function is to organize all means systematically in order to achieve goals effectively and efficiently. He, however, believes that rationalization of action cannot be separated from spiritual power, whose function is to motivate changes in behavior. In European history, this was exemplified by Protestantism, which culminated in the Calvinism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. His analysis holds that this puritan group was stimulated by the doctrinal spirit which always demands rationalization of action to establish a systematic movement. Max Weber, *The Theories of Social and Economic Organization.*edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons. (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 115, 151, and 185. ____, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1958) pp. 13-31; James L. Peacock, *Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in South East Asian Islam* (Berkeley, L.A.: University of California Press, 1978), p. 2.

[154]In the non-Protestant world, this phenomenon can be found in the works of many scholars, such as: Robert N. Bellah, "Epilogue: Religion and Progress in Modern Asia" in *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 168-229; ____,"Reflection on the Protestant Ethic Analogy in Asia" *Journal of Social Issues,* 19, 1(1963), pp. 52-61; ____, "Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and Japan" *American Journal of Sociology,* 61, 1(1958), pp. 1-5; Clifford Geertz. "Modernization in a Muslim Society: The Indonesian Case" in Robert N. Bellah (ed.) *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia,* pp. 97-108; ____, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town" *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* 4, 2(1956), pp. 134-158; ____, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960);James L. Peacock. *Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam* (Berkeley, L.A.: University of California Press, 1978); Maxim Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974); Bryan S. Turner. *Weber and Islam* (London & Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974); W. F. Wertheim, "Religious Reform Movements in South and Southeast Asia" in *East-West Parallels: A Sociological Approaches to Modern Asia* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1964), pp. 133-146.

issue of reason in connection with religion in their efforts to reform their communities. Although this was not the first time the question had been raised in Islam,[155] the question as it was posed in the twentieth century acquired a new dimension, because of the emergence of a new scientific world-view. On this issue, ˉAbduh argued that Islamic teaching was based on rationalism and the rule of reason. It was through the power of reason that Muslims were expected to distinguish truth from falsehood and hence to abide by religion.[156] Rationalism in 'Abduh's thought led him to reject *taqlid* and to accept interpretation (*ta'wil*) based on reason rather than accept the literal translation of the religious sources.[157] The paradigm underlying the process of reform in modern Muslim world was based primarily on the argument that Islamic basic principles contained within itself the potentialities of rational religion, social conscience and morality which could serve as the basis of modern life. It was also seen as being able to create a religious elite which could articulate and interpret the real meaning of Islamic values and so provide the basis for the emergence of a new society.

'Abduh's ideas, however, do seem elitist and intellectually oriented,[158] and they appear to be individualistic rather than collectively oriented. The adoption of modern organizational structures by Indonesian Islamic movements in the early

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[155]The Mu'azilites and the Muslim philosophers had asked the same question, and given their own solutions. Because of his continuing insistence on the use of reason 'Abduh was categorized as being a kind of neo-Mu'tazilite. Fazlur Rahman, "Revival and Reform in Islam" in P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds. *Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 645; Haddad, "Muhammad 'Abduh," pp. 45-46.

[156]Muhammad 'Abduh, *Al-Islam wa al-Nasraniyah ma'a al-'Ilm wa al-Madaniyah* (Cairo: al-Manar, 1938), pp. 54-55; Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Tarikh al-Ustadh al-Imam al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh,* 1(Egypt: Matba'at al-Manar, 1931), p. 613.

[157]Ibid., pp. 11, 613.

[158]Nakamura says that the Egyptian reformism, compared to its Indonesian counterpart (the Muhammadiyah), was more narrowly theological, elitist, and intellectually oeriented. Nakamura, "Professor Haji Kahar Muzakkir", p. 8.

twentieth century shows that they did not operate along the same lines as the Egyptian reformers did. This decision not only reveals their desire to rationalize their struggle along more efficient and effective lines, but it is also a clear example of the continuing practice of borrowing institutions from the West. In view of their effectiveness, modern organizational practices have been utilized to build a variety of social endeavors, ranging from permanent institutions such as schools, orphanages and hospitals to the mobilization of social assistance for community emergencies. Although there have been different nuances in the internal structures of the Sarekat Islam, Muˑammad¥yah, al-Irshåd, Persatuan Islam, and Nah∂at al-ˉUlamåˇ, nonetheless all these organizations have made use of foreign ideas in this area. This differentiates them from their contemporaries such as the *Jadidists*[159] in Central Asia, who adopted more traditional forms of organization in pursuing their goals.

2.2.5. *The Common Features of the Reform Movements*

The correlation between the reform ideas of the movements and their memberships is another common characteristic. It is worth noting that each of the

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[159]The *Jadidist* movement, pioneered by the Tatars, was not restricted to the religious reform, but extended to the economic and cultural spheres. On religious reform, emerged some figures such as Abdul Nazir Kursavi (1775-1813), Shihabeddin Marjani (1815-1889), Razaeddin Fahredin Oglu (1854-1939), and Musa Jarullah Biqi (1875-1949). Cultural and linguistic renaissance followed closely the religious reform. It was a collective endeavor undertaken by Kayyum Nasyri (1824-1904) of the Volga Tatars, Ismail Garprinskii (1851-1914) of the Crimean Tatars, Hasan Malikov Zerdabi (1837-1907) of Azeris, and Abay Kunanbaev (1845-1904) of the Kazakhs. The modernization of the Muslim educational system gave some famous figures such as Marjani, Gasprinskii, and Hussein Feitskhani (18-26-1866), Marjani's leading student. Alexandre Bennigsen, "Modernization and Conservatism in Soviet Islam" in Dennis J. Dunn, ed. *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 240-242; Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 24-25; Achmad Jainuri, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii: His Role in Jadidist Movement in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Russia" term paper (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1993), p. 11.

movements, with the exception of the Nahdlat al-'Ulama,'[160] is supported by a particular class of entrepreneurs. This corroborates what Geertz has called the "mosque and market" theory,[161] which points to a historical and functional connection between Islam and trade.[162] In fact, the founders and the most prominent leaders of the Islamic reformist movements in Indonesia were themselves members of the mercantile class. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah, was a merchant. His successors and supporters were merchants as well. Similarly, Sarekat Islam was mainly a commercial organization founded by a prosperous merchant, which later developed into a political movement. Al-Irshad was pioneered by Indonesian Arab merchants.[163] Such was also the case with Persatuan Islam, whose founders, Haji Zamzam and Haji Muhammad Yunus, were religious teachers as well as well-known merchants. They came from merchant families who had migrated from Palembang (South Sumatra) and then settled in Bandung (West Java). The movement showed its modernist tendency especially after A˙mad Óassan joined the movement. Óassan himself was from Singapore, and had migrated to Surabaya (East Java), only to settle finally in Bandung to take up a career as a merchant.[164]

Significantly, these kinds of factors played a less important role in the foundation of the Nahdlat al-'Ulama,' in 1926, an organization which was sponsored

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[160]There are also found in this organization certain entrepreneur supporters, but the leadership is always dominated by the *Kiyai.* Kuntowijoyo, *Paradigma Islam: Interpretasi Untuk Aksi* (Bandung: Mizan, 1991), pp. 94, 96.

[161]Geertz, *Islam Observed,* p. 68.

[162]Showing the ralationship between Islam and trade in south Central Java, Nakamura argues that Geertz's idea cannot be accepted. Mitsuo Nakamura, "The Crescent Arises Over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Mu˙ammadiyah Movement in A Central Javanese Town" Ph.D dissertation (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1976), pp. 12-13.

[163]Affandi, "Shaykh Ahmad Al-Surkati", p. 64.

[164]Mughni, *Hassan Bandung,* pp. 14-19.

by the 'ulama' who were strongly rooted in the *pondok pesantren.* Nevertheless it was similar to other Islamic movements in that its promotors were of a higher class than the people who supported it. If the founders and leaders of the first four movements were middle class merchants and government officials, the leaders of the NU were mostly middle class *santri* landowners from rural areas. Although both may be described as middle class, they were nevertheless quite different from one another. Those who constituted the first group were much influenced by the spirit of liberal society, while the second generally lived in a relatively closed society.[165] This difference subsequently characterized the orientation of the movements.

Economic Factors: The relation between ideas of reform and economic activity seems to be a universal phenomenon. Thus Wertheim and Geertz find what they call a conspicuous analogy when they consider the parallels between the modern European Protestant reformism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and Islam in Indonesia in the early twentieth century.[166] Weber goes on to indicate that those who made up the great trading-class of the bourgeoisie, the merchants, financiers, and technical experts, were chiefly Protestants. Capitalist activity was very prevalent among the Protestant and Calvinist churches of the Huguenots of France, the Dutch merchant class and the Puritans of England.[167] In Indonesia, reform ideas grew prolifically in the mercantile and middle classes of urban communities. The mobility of traders had a great role in spreading ideas. As a *batik* trader, Ahmad Dahlan, for example, often visited one city or another for business purposes. His trade network gave him a platform to spread the ideas of the Muhammadiyah, once this organization was allowed to operate ouside Yogyakarta.

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[165]Kuntowijoyo, *Paradigma,* p. 80.

[166]W.F. Wertheim, *East West Parallels: Sociological Approaches to Modern Asia* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1964), pp. 133-145; Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 49.

[167]Weber, *The Protestant Ethic,* pp. 35-45.

The emergence of branches of the Muhammadiyah in some regions was created through this discourse and was in fact sponsored by the local traders.[168]

Social Mobility: There is a relationship between ideas of reform and a social group which has horizontal mobility. This mobility, an important element of modernization,[169] could be found in the mercantile class of society in the early period of this century. People who often moved from one place to another indicate their readiness, at least psychologically, to leave behind traditional boundaries which were a part of their culture since childhood. It also indicated their readiness to adapt themselves to a new environment, where they could live and develop in a new atmosphere. Daniel Lerner referrred to such people as having a "mobile personality", who were distinguished by a high capacity for identification with the new aspects of their environment. They came equipped with the mechanisms needed to accomodate new demands that arise outside of their habitual experience.[170] Similarly, the entrepreneurial activity of Ahmad Dahlan and the leaders of some other movements at the time made it much easier to form such attitudes, compared to the non-mercantile groups. Using Wertheim's terminology, these reformist leaders were urban traders of the first years of the present century. Their ethical philosophy and faith indicated typical bourgeois individualism and rationalism, which regarded mankind not as a totality but as a collection of

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[168]To mention some of them, thus *Nur al-Islam* (Light of Islam) in Pekalongan (Central Java) which was founded by the Minangkabau traders, was transformed into a Muhammadiyah branch. In Surabaya, the establishment of the Muhammadiyah could find fertile ground among the audence of traders. *Muktamar Muhammadijah ke-40* (Surabaya: Panitia Muktamar Muhammadiyah ke-40, 1978), p. 27; in Pekajangan, it was initiated by the prominent leaders of the community who all of them were *batik* merchants. Solichin Salam, *Muhammadijah di Pekajangan* (Djakarta: Iqbal, 1968), pp. 10-11; in East Sumatra, the same role was pioneered by the merchants. *30 Tahun Muhammadijah daerah Sumatera Timur* (Medan: Panitia Besar Peringatan, 1957), p. 99.

[169]Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 47-52.

[170]Ibid., p. 49.

individuals. Just as the city dwellers resisted the authority of the feudal nobility and the feudal tradition, so too, they resisted the authority of the recognized 'ulama' and certain religious traditions. They lived in a world which offered opportunities to energetic, conscientious individuals, who were full of confidence. They saw no sin in acquiring earthly possessions; they could become virtuous Muslims by devoting themselves diligently and honestly to their business.[171] Religious values in fact motivated them at certain periods of time to achieve worldly success.

Purification of religious practices and social significance: Another parallel can be seen in their belief that religion must be purified from corrupted ritualism and mysticism. This led to an attitude that their lives should be thrifty, active and responsible.[172] In its application, this attitude encouraged the movements, and especially the Muhammadiyah, to seek a social significance for every ritual form so that ritual not be separated from social ethic. There is a certain worldly quality to this approach which apparently can almost be qualified as anti-*tasawwuf.* But when it is considered carefully, we find that this is not the case; it is simply a matter of a different understanding of *tasawwuf* on the part of the Muhammadiyah, according to which it does not represent a rejection of the temporal world for that of the spirit. A ritual which is very individualistic and isolative is thus transformed by the movement into a positive endeavor for the sake of society. For a mysticism which rejects all worldly things and leads to mere asceticism is not accepted by the Muhammadiyah.[173] The value of gaining worldly property lies in its ability to

[171]W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1969), p. 212.

[172]Syafiq A. Mughni, "Islam dan Modernisasi Dengan Rujukan Khusus Terhadap Masalah Indonesia" a paper presented at the inauguration of new students of the Muḣammadiyah University Surabaya, 1985, p. 14.

[173]'Abdul Mukti 'Ali, "Muhammadiyah dan Universitasnya Menjelang Abad XXI" in Rusli Karim. *Muhammadiyah Dalam Kritik dan Komentar* (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986), p. 242; Raymond LeRay Archer, "Muhammadan Mysticism in Sumatra" *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch,* 15, 2(1937), p. 110. This is what Weber means when he says that the Puritans' contribution was in bringing asceticism out

facilitate religious observance. In this sense, it is in accordance with the idea that Islam actually teaches that an economically strong believer (*mu'min*) is better than an impoverished one.[174]

Although there are some similarities between Protestant reformism and Islam in Indonesia, there are also many differences. Historically, whereas Protestant reformism arose in reaction to what it perceived as a systematic abuse of religion, in Indonesian Islam reformist thought emerged in response to a lack in religious practices and to the cultural and political domination of the West. If this background is not properly understood, those who hope that Islamic reform in Indonesia will produce the same results as Protestantism did in the West will be disappointed. Wertheim reflects this feeling in concluding that Islamic reformism in Indonesia has produced literalism, rigidity, exclusivism, and communalism.[175] The Islamic value system of "brotherhood, mutual responsibility, cooperation, forbidding the practice of usury", which has been fused with Indonesian socio-cultural elements such as mutual cooperation (*gotong royong*) and sense of communal belonging (*milik bersama*), leads one to assume that Western capitalism may be difficult to implement in the face of the Islamic reform movements in Indonesia. To expect the emergence of Western capitalism in Islamic societies is therefore to ignore the Islamic system of values which is different from that of Protestanism. However, the emergence of Islamic reform movements which employ implicitly Weberian arguments questions Weber's claim that the rationalizing tendency cannot be found outside Europe.[176]

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of the monastery and into the home and marketplace. H. Wood, "Puritanism and Capitalism" *The Congregational Quarterly,* 29, 2(1951), p. 113.

[174]A Hadith mentions that "a strong believer is better and more favorable by God than a weaker one". *Sahih Muslim,* 5 (Beyrut: Mu'assa 'Izz al-Din, 1987), p. 218.

[175]Wertheim, *East-West,* pp. 140-144.

[176]Weber, *The Protestant Ethic,* p. 13.

Sociological research shows that the Islamic world has undergone a transition from a monetary economy to an agricultural, military regime.[177] The Muhammadiyah, which emerged within the agricultural Kingdom of Yogyakarta, is devoted to reviving the old Islamic tradition of cosmopolitanism. The spirit of rationalism, however, which was encouraged in the movement, had to deal with the supersitious and irrational tendencies of the people in the administrative areas of the Kingdom. In pursuing humanistic and religious aims, rationalization also deemed certain ritual practices, which have had no religious basis and which were ruinously expensive, to be useless. Such rational approach subsequently led to a reaction from certain groups within the Muslim community. This reaction, which claimed to be based on religious reasons, actually emerged from socio-economic factors. It is on this issue that the Muhammadiyah found itself the target of the greatest opposition, when compared to other Islamic reform movements in Indonesia.

2.2.6. *Religious and Socio-Political Challenges*

The movements responded to these challenges differently. All the movements stated that their sole intention was to spread Islamic teachings among the people, and their objective was primarily directed towards maintaining the process of re-Islamizing the Muslims. This process wass overshadowed by the fact that although Islam was the faith of a majority of Indonesians, there was nevertheless an enormous gap between theory and practice. There were no precise figures for the number of both "practising and non-practising Muslims". Those who practiced their faith were estimated to be less than 10 % of those who adhered to

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[177]Bryan S. Turner, *Capitalism and Class in the Middle East: Theories of Social Change and Economic Development* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1984), p. 30.

Islam.[178] They were called *santri* or orthodox, in contrast to the majority of Muslims, known as *abangan* or heterodox.[179] The second group became the object of attention not only of Muslims wishing to re-convert them, but also of proselytizers representing other religious communities. In the nineteenth century, certain groups of the Dutch had great hopes that they would be able to convert this group to Christianity by means of their colonial Islamic policies.[180] They assumed that the syncretic beliefs of nominal Muslims (*abangan*) in the rural areas would render them susceptible to Christianity easily.[181]

Re-Islamization: In their effort to re-Islamize this group, all the movements felt it necessary to base their mission on the grounds of Islamic *daʿwah.* It is not surprising that each of the movements coordinated this mission under their own Department of Religious Propaganda (*Majlis Tabligh*). From this perspective, it is plaucible to note that the history of the Indonesian Islamic movements has been the history of re-Islamization, in that the movement did not target Indonesians in

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[178]This figure is based on the statement of the Minister of Religious Affairs in 1960, who estimated no more than 10 % of the Indonesian population were practising Islam. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, p. 186.

[179]For the socio-religious ideas of these variants, see Gerrtz, *The Religion of Java;* and for the basis of regional supporters of the two, Benda, *The Crescent and,* p. 12.

[180]The Dutch Islamic Policy, based on Snouck Hurgronje's concept, showed a particular attitude towards Islam. It divided Islam into three separate aspects, pure ritual (*ibadah*), social *(mu'amalah)*, and politic (*siyasi*), which each of them required a different alternative solution. The colonial government gave Muslims the freedom to perform their *'ibadah* as long as they did not disturb the authority of the government; through *mu'amalah,* the colonial government benefited the existing social and cultural instituions to pursue the indigenous people to be in touch with Dutch culture; and for the aspect of *siyasi,* the government did not tolerate any Muslim activity which was suspected of having relations with political movements. Aqib Suminto. *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986), pp. 12-14. Pijper argues that the emergence of the Muhammadiyah was, among other things, to respond adequately to the agressive policy of the Dutch in those days to convert Indonesians, including Muslims, to Christianity. G.F. Pijper, *Studiën over de geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesië 1900-1950* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), p. 106.

[181]Benda, *The Crescent and,* pp. 19, 208 (ft39).

general but the Muslims alone. They all worked towards the deepening of Islamic knowledge of Muslims rather than the proselytization of non-Muslims; and traditionally stressed the quality of faith rather than the number of adherents.

With regards to the discrepancy between the number of *santris* and the number of *abangan,* it has been argued that a community of devout Muslim was not established.[182] This argument asserts that Muslims were encouraged to create the model of devout community. It is therefore logical to say that the religious deterioration, which is usually seen as a requirement for the emergence of a reform movement, cannot be said to have come to pass.[183] The *abangan* groups' lack of the practice of Islamic rituals does not mean that they intentionally ignored it; rather it indicated that the *da'wah* has not reached them. Their lack of knowledge of Islam was due to the process of conversion which directed them to an understanding of the religion that was more emotional than intellectual. Such was the general phenomenon of the Islamization process in the early period. If the meaning of reform in Indonesia also implied the process of re-Islamization then the Nah∂at al-ˉUlamåˇ played a major role in this process. This was due to the fact that this organization from its very inception was popular and acquired a strong basis in rural areas, where most non-practising Muslims lived.

Indeed, because of its traditional presence amidst the syncretic Muslim population of rural Java, the Nahdlat al-'Ulama's activities were community-oriented. Its mission focused on guiding such communities in improving their

[182]Geographically, the orthodox Muslims centered in certain regions such as Aceh and Minangkabau in Sumatra, West jawa, and South Sulawesi. Ibid, p. 12; in Jawa, they lived in parts of city called *Kauman,* and *Pondok Pesantren.*

[183]Since the mission of reform is to reverse the deterioration of religious life, the idea of reform can occur only after an orthodoxy has been established. The established orthodoxy and a deterioration of religion must already exist before reform can take place. See John O. Voll, "Wahhabism and Mahdism: Alternative Style of Islamic Renewals" *Arab Studies Quarterly,* 4, 1-2(1982), p. 114; Fazlur Rahman, "Revival and Reform in Islam" in P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds. *Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 632.

religious knowledge. The movement took its inspiration from the example of the nine saints (*Walisongo*) who spread Islam peacefully throughout Java in the early period. One of these saints, whose efforts mirrored the policy of Islamization, was Sunan Kalijaga, who tended to be tolerant towards non-Islamic traditions. He did not want to abandon the old traditions all at once, since it would have caused difficulties in spreading Islamic *da'wah* among the people. What he did instead was give a new content to the old traditions so that the process of guiding them to the teachings of Islam was set in motion, to be completed either by later preachers or by the people's own religious consciousness.[184]

The *da'wah* efforts directed at such communities prudently avoided doctrinal rigidity, resulting in only very gradual progress. This, in the eyes of the puritanists, was not sufficient to bring about the radical changes necessary in the religious life of Muslim Indonesians. The puritanists regarded certain 'ulama' being trapped into defending such religious orientation, whereby they in effect were maintaining the status quo. For that reason, Persatuan Islam took upon itself a radical religious mission. The efforts of the movement were concentrated upon defending the principles of Islamic beliefs from threats to the purity of the faith. Its members publicly challenged any individual or group who they believed had distorted proper religious belief and practice.[185] From that point of view, the relatively later emergence of Persatuan Islam, compared with that of Sarekat Islam, the Muhammadiyah, and al-Irshad, made the movement somewhat different in nature from others. Although Sarekat Islam based its movement on Islam, it nevertheless gave only secondary attention to the purely religious aspects of its program. As for the Muhammadiyah, the movement which impressed many people as a religious movement, concentrated more on educational, social, and welfare activities.[186] The

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[184]Solichin Salam, *Sekitar Wali Sanga* (Kudus: Menara, 1974), pp. 28-30.

[185]Federspiel, "The Persatuan Islam", p. 32.

[186]*Kitab 40 Tahun Muhammadijah* (Djakarta: Panitia Pusat Perajaan 40 Tahun Berdirinja Perserikatan Muhammadijah, 1952), p. 32.

efforts of al-Irshad in religious matters were indeed impressive, but they were mostly oriented to the exclusive Arab-Indonesian communities.

Thus, Persatuan Islam represented the radical element among the Islamic movements in Indonesia in the early twentieth century, and this radicalism subsequently encouraged the emergence of an ideologically extreme group, devoted to defending the religious views of the traditionalist camp. With the foundation of the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' in January 1926, only two years and three months after that of Persatuan Islam, the traditional aspirations were accommodated. These events reflected increasing tensions between reformists and traditionalists over religious issues, whereas up to the early 1920's religious disputes between the reformists and the traditionalists were usually resolved through joint discussions. In Surabaya, the town in which the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' was born, Kiyai Haji 'Abd al-Wahhab Hasbullah, who had come from Mecca in 1914, and Kiyai Haji Mas Mansur, who had finished his studies at al-Azhar in 1915, founded an organization called Jam'iyat Nahdlat al-Watan. 'Abd al-Wahhab, who was later known as one of the founders of the Nahdlat al-'Ulama,' was very active in coordinating religious study groups. His efforts were directed towards training the young 'ulama' to counter criticism from the reformist group as well as to facilitate contacts between the two groups to discuss religious and political matters. Mas Mansur, who established a branch of the Muhammadiyah in Surabaya in 1921, was an effective partner in creating an atmosphere of dialogue, and only left the leadership of the Nahdlat al-Watan in 1922.[187]

For a period of time, Surabaya was an arena where both sides could express their ideas. All the prominent leaders of Islamic movements came to the city to listen to the debates. It is said that in the 1920's Ahmad Hassan, before joining the Persatuan Islam, visited Surabaya from Singapore in connection with his family's *batik* business and while there had discussions with Indonesian ˉulamåˇ on the

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[187]Aboebakar, *Sedjarah Hidup,* pp. 469-471; Yunus Anis, *Kenalilah Pemimpin,* pp. 14-15.

issues of *khilafiyah.*[188] Aʿmad Surkati and Ahmad Dahlan are also reported to have participated in the discussions. Daʿlån travelled to the city several times and even hosted the traditionalist group when it came to Yogyakarta for a discussion.[189] It became clear from this series of debates that the traditionalist group would have to coordinate itself as an organized movement. Although 'Abd al-Wahhab had trained many cadres to face the reformists, he felt that it was not enough and would not guarantee the success of his group in the face of this new religious ideology.[190]The momentous decade of the 1920's and the main issues which had been the crucial topics of discussion during this period encouraged this new organization to declare itself formally as the defender of the *madhhab.*

With the emergence of the Nahdlat al-'Ulama,' the religious aspirations of the so called *abangan* were protected from the humiliations of the reformists. Their level of religious understanding was strengthened by the methods of *madhhab,* in which they received instruction from the ¯ulamåˇ on matters of religious practice. These were the people whose faith was most liable to be undermined, whether by the influence of local tradition or by lack of knowledge of their own religion. Such a situation led the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' to defend the view that *madhhab* and *taqlid* were permissible in religious life. In other words, it was reasonable for the people of their day to adopt *taqlid* as a way to apply religious practices given the absence of an absolute (*mutlaq) mujtahid.* Clarifying this issue in its *Qanun Asasi* (Basic Rule), the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' stated that *taqlid* was forbidden (*haram*) for those who had the capability of *ijtihåd,* and necessary (*wajib*) for those who did not. The latter were allowed to follow one of the four *madhahib.*[191] Since none of the people of that period were able to fulfil the requirements of a *mujtahid, taqlid* was the only option.

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[188]Federspiel, "Persatuan Islam", pp. 19-20.

[189]Aboebakar, *Sedjarah Hidup,* pp. 470-471.

[190]Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan,* pp. 29-30.

[191]K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari, *Qanun Asasi Nahdlatul 'Ulama'* (Kudus: Menara, 1971), pp. 63-66.

The Nahdlat al-'Ulama' argued that to understand and practice religious teachings properly people must follow their predecessors, just as the generation born in the period of *sahaba* (the *tabi'un*) followed the *sahaba*, and the successors of the *tabi'un* (the *atba' al-tabi'in*) followed the *tabi'un,* and so every generation followed their predecessor.[192] Although, given the situation at the time, it was reasonable that people should have been guided by *taqlid,* it was nevertheless also true that the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' never progressed beyond this stage. This situation was blamed for encouraging the emergence of *bid'ah* practices and was the target at which the criticism of the reformists was most often directed. For this reason, the reformists accused the traditionalist 'ulama' of unwillingly changing their religious outlook because of vested interests.[193]

If the reason for allowing *taqlid* [194] was based on the assumption that earlier generations had somehow achieved perfection,[195] this should not have precluded the possibility that some later generation could at least fulfill the requirements of a good *ummah.* In the eyes of the reformists, the strict application of *taqlid* has caused a psychological burden for Muslims. They must worry that every effort to understand Islamic teachings should always depend on the interpretations of other people. While there are indeed certain limitations to the scope of *ijtihad* given the complex problems of the period, an effort should nevertheless consistently be made to create an atmosphere which enables people to practice *ijtihad.* It is to provide this psychological support, the reformist groups maintain, that "the gate of *ijtihad"*

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[192]Ibid*.,* p. 53.

[193]*Sual-Djawab,* 2(1930), p. 15.

[194]The discussion of *ijtihad* and *taqlid* among the reformist and traditionalist groups in Indonesia has been covered by many writers. See, for examples, Federspiel, "The Persatuan Islam", pp. 72-82; Noer, *The Modernist Muslim,* pp. 233-234; Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan,* pp. 164-165.

[195]Although it is not explicitly mentioned so but implicitly it argues that, at least, certain generation know their own generation. See Ibid*.,* pp. 53-56.

should still be regarded as open,[196] and therefore, that it should be considered part of the ongoing process of Muslims' striving to understand religious, social, and historical phenomena. The declaration of the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' that it is an organization maintaining the doctrines of the *ahl al-Sunnah wa-al-Jama'ah* and that it recognizes just one *madhhab* is understood not only as denial of the existence of other *madhahib* in Islam but also an incitement to adopt of blind imitation (*taqlid a'ma),* the lowest level of *taqlid.* This worrying phenomenon, in fact, has become a matter of great concern to certain members of the Nahdlat al-'Ulam.' As expressed by Choirul Anam, a youth activist of NU, they realize that this is one of the weak points of the organization compared to the other Islamic movements. Generally, the rank and file members of the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' are satisfied with the answers provided by the *kiyai,* and do not strive to achieve the same level of knowledge as their masters possess. He further maintains that, given this attitude, the process of eliminating *taqlid* from the organization's membership could prove to be a slow and difficult process.[197] The dominant impression then is that the Nahdlat al-'Ulama' does not seem willing to attempt a rationally-tinged religious re-education of its followers, so as to make them individually capable of understanding the tenets of their religion.

The new wave of Islamic ideas from the central lands of Islam not only encouraged a spirit of re-Islamization, thereby creating a new religious consciousness, but it also provoked a national awakening and a subsequent challenge to Dutch colonial domination. From the Muslims' perspective, the policies of the Dutch colonial government not only contributed to the deterioration of their social life and the postponement of their acquiring political power, but it also threatened their religious freedom. Throughout the country everything came up

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[196]Ahmad al-Surkati, "Fatwa Kepada P.P. Muhammadijah" in Majlis Da'wah al-Irshad. *Riwayat Hidup Syech Ahmad as-Surkati,* part 4, pp. 22-35.

[197]See Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan,* p. 166.

against that single thing called colonial policy.[198] This national sentiment, on the one hand, narrowed the gap between the conflicting groups of an urban-centered reformism and a rural-centered traditionalism and, on the other, aroused a national spirit of opposition to the colonial government's policies. Although this opposition subsequently created a variety of attitudes towards the colonial government, from which the issues of nationalism, cooperation and non-cooperation became subject of the endless debate among the various factions within Indonesian society, there nevertheless emerged a determined effort to forge "a national unity."

Certain modernists diagnosed this situation and tried to advance ideas which they believed capable of resolving these problems. As regards political issues, the solutions proposed emerged from the debate over such issues as nationalism, whether to adopt a cooperative or non-cooperative attitude towards foreign colonialism, and how this problem was to be resolved necessarily affected the solution of social problems. Here, the important issue was not whether to imitate or not to imitate foreign ideas and institutions in an effort to improve the social welfare and education of Muslims, but rather how to relate such solutions to the religious mission. Islam, regarded as providing a complete system of teaching, should be understood as containing within itself the insights required to arrive at a solution. On this basis, the modern Islamic movements continue to try to derive socio-political solutions from religious perspectives.

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[198]Chr. L.M. Penders, *Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism, 1830-1942* (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1977), p. 260; for detail on Dutch colonial Islamic policy, see Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985).

IV. MAJOR ISSUES OF MODERNIZATION

1. **The Dispute on Inheritance Among the Muslims in Indonesia in the 1980's**

   This section is based primarily on an issue which has been discussed by Muslim intellectuals, notably by the so-called contextualist and textualist groups, in their efforts to find a solution to the problem of uniform application of Islamic law of inheritance. According to Munawir Sjadzali, the application of religious teachings are problematic in this area. In his speech on the "Dynamics of Islamic Law" in 1987, Munawir Sjadzali, the Minister of Religious Affairs, criticized the ambiguous attitudes of some Muslims towards bank interest and the application of the Islamic law of inheritance in Indonesia. He said that many Muslims consider bank interest as riba (usurious interest), but ironically in daily life they derive many benefits from the services of the bank, such as interest on their deposits. While diagnosing the inconsistency of the application of inheritance he proposed a formulation of provisions of inheritance which is quite different from the existing interpretation of the 'ulama.' He said that the provision of inheritance could be done so that the female might receive the same portion to the male.[1] It means that the provision by which the Qur'an gives the male and the female the portion 2 equivalent 1 (Qur'an, 4:11), is now changed to be 1 equivalent 1.

   In fact, this new formulation not only invites many reactions from the Muslims, but also opens the way to questioning the interpretation of a fundamental source of Islamic law which has been accepted by the Indonesian 'ulama' for a long time. Can the status of something which is explicitly expressed by the Qur'an be modified or changed? Although this question becomes the central issue among the involved groups, it inevitably leads to a second question. How can we define the explicit and

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[1]Munawir Sjadzali, *Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam* (Jakarta, 1987), 1-11.

implicit verses of the Qur'an? A verse which is explicit for somebody may be implicit for another; a verse which is *qat'i* (definitive) for one 'alim is *dhanni* (speculative) for others; a verse which is considered as *qat'i* in a certain time is dh*anni* at other times because of changes of social setting, and the development of science and technology. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the fields of *ijtihadiyat* and *non-ijtihadiyat.*

To support his idea, Munawir Sjadzali underlines three points. First, is how the *nass* (a clear injunction) to be understood contextually. Here, the *maslaha* (utility) becomes an important consideration for the *maqasid al-shari'ah* (the purposes of *shari'ah*) and the spirit of religious teachings. He bases his argument on the comment of some *mufassirs* (interpreters) who say that, principally, law is issued for the benefit of human beings, and this benefit may differ with time and place. If a law is issued at a time when it is needed, and then such a need no longer exists, then a wise effort is needed to modify the former law to make it suitable for the recent development.[2] Munawir relates this idea to the concept of *naskh* (abrogation) in the Qur'an and Sunna. He refers to cases of abrogation of laws which were revealed to the Prophet.[3]

Second, he refers to some cases of *nass qat'i* which, according to him, were abandoned by many Muslims. He says that there are at least four verses in the Qur'an which explain the permissability of using slaves as an alternative to wives in fulfilling the needs of sexuality. But this regulation, according to him, has been ignored by many Muslims. He also relates the precedent of the ijtihad of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. It is said that 'Umar practiced a judicial policy which was not completely in accord with the textual meaning of *nass qat'i.* In this case, the *ghanima* (booty) which according to the tradition of the Prophet, 4/5 of the booty should be divided among those who participated in the war, but 'Umar did not do that. He also did not practice the law mentioned by the Qur'an (5:38) which gives the injunction to cut off the hand of the thief.

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[2]Ibid, 7.
[3]Ibid, 6.

Realities of the Muslim communities also inspire Munawir to propose his new formulation of the Islamic law of inheritance. He says that in some regions many Muslims prefer to solve their problems of inheritance in the civil courts rather than the religious courts, which usually give *fatwa* according to the Islamic law of inheritance (*faraid*). In fact, those who go to the civil courts are not only the laymen but also include many who have some degree of religious knowledge. In some cases he also finds indirect deviations of the application of the Islamic law of inheritance. Many Muslims share their properties with their children when they are still alive, and give each of them an equal portion through the institution of *hibah* (gift) without differentiating on the basis of gender. In certain regions, such a practice is called *wasiat wajib* (obligatory bequest). When the parents die, no propertyremains. Although the Qur'an does not prohibit these two latter cases, according to Munawir such practices are categorized as "tricks" with respect to the religious teachings.[4]

Using reasonable arguments he appeals to the Muslims to find modification of the application of Islamic law of inheritance without neglecting the spirit of Islamic teachings. Caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab is promoted as an examplary figure who had intellectual courage in interpreting the laws mentioned in the Qur'an and Sunna. More importantly, Munawir stresses the *maqasid al-shari'ah* as one of the important alternative ways in understanding the Islamic law. This aspect is very important in making a legal decision. The decision which is made is notmerely for the sake of the law but also for the sake of public order and for the prosperity of society. In practice, the *maqasid al-shari'ah* have often been neglected in understanding Islamic law. As a result, some concepts of *'ibadah* (ritual) in Islam which have social purpose remain dry endeavors which are far from the ideals of shariah. Based on this idea Munawir stresses *'adalah* (justice) and *maslaha* (utility) as dominant factors in modifiying the formulation of provision of inheritance.

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[4]Ibid, 3.

Reactions to Munawir's Ideas

The new formulation of inheritance proposed by Munawir Sjadzali leads to reaction from many 'ulama.' Most of them criticize Munawir as having weak arguments to support his idea. They say that the stipulation of inheritance mentioned in the Qur'an (4:11), "to the male the equivalent of the portion of two females", is detailed (*tafsil*) and clear (*sarih*). According to them, every verse which has these characteristics is *qat'i* and, therefore, there is no room for ijtihad. Since the content of this *nass* is detailed, the Muslims are just required to apply it without giving any interpretation.[5] Perhaps it is true that the basic reason of their rejection to the Munawir's interpretation is based on the conventional doctrine of *usul fiqh* which does not accept the consideration of the social realities in the communities, and the psychological and emotional factors which cannot be separated from the interpretation of the last part of the Qur'an (4:11): *faridhatan min allah, innallaha kana 'aliman hakiman* (it is an injuction from Allah. Allah is Knower, Wise). They emphasize the *faridhatan min allah,* and the rest of the verse is subject to this phrase.

However, another version may be derived from the interpretation of the word *faridhatan.* According to Harahap, the word can be meant as:

1. Giving right and status to all children (male and female) to receive the inheritance from their parent.

2. The portion of the daughter is "minimal": half of that of the son.

3. If the condition is permissible, the minimal portion can be increased.

4. This minimal portion may be increased to the levelequal to the portion of the son.

Based on this interpretation, the word *faridhatan* refers to the legal duty which gives the right and status to the daughter as an inheritor to receive the inheritance from her parents. In other words, the verse prohibits the abolishment of the right

5 M. Yahya Harahap, "Praktek Hukum Waris Tidak Pantas Membuat Generalisasi" *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988),140.

and status of the daughter as an inheritor. It must be noted that the portion of the daughter may not be less than half the portion of the son. Allah has determined the minimal limit of half the portion of the son which must be given to the daughter. Since the portion which is stipulated is a minimal limit, it means that this stipulation is changeable. The change of the amount can be up to the level of the son, depending on the situation.[6] This interpretation of the Qur'an (4:11) is perhaps true as long as the inheritance is a part of *mu'amalat,* not *'ibadah*. If the interpretation of the legal principle of the Qur'an surah an-Nisa', verse 11 gives the right and status to the daughter a minimum of a half-portion of the son, then to give the daughter and son the same portion does not contradict to the principal injunction of the verse.

Meanwhile, the idea of changeability of the status of something which is explicitly explained in the *nass qat'i* obviously invites reaction from the Muslims. Although they recognize *taghayyur al-ahkam,* the change of law, of the *nass qat'i* such a change happens only in specific cases. To this case they refer to the *naskh* concept. But differing from Munawir's concept, they argue that *naskh* only occured at the time of the Prophet. In other words, it happened during the period of revelation, and God is the only one who has the authority to abrogate a law revealed to the Prophet. After the revelation is over, the *naskh* no longer exists.[7] Relating to the ijtihad of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, critics give their different arguments. Jalaluddin Rakhmat proposes at least four reasons for the ijtihad of 'Umar. First, 'Umar did not leave the *nass,* change or abandon its injunction; second, 'Umar left the *dhanni* (appearance/speculative) of *nass,* but he held up the *maqasid al-shari'ah;* third, though his ijtihad was in the realm of *qat'i,* this was permissible for 'Umar; fourth, 'Umar left the *nass qat'i,* because of a lack of information.[8]

Some 'ulama' say that it is impossible for 'Umar to leave the *nass qat'i* because he was among the prominent companions of the Prophet who were guaranteed to live in Paradise. But it must be remembered that such status does not excempt him

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[6]Harahap, "Praktek Hukum Waris", 141-142.

[7] Rifyal Ka'bah, *Bawalah Kepada Kami al-Qur'an Yang Lain, atau Gantilah* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988), 61-64.

[8] Jalaluddin Rakhmat, *Kontroversi di Sekitar Ijtihad Umar r.a.* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988), 45.

from the possibilities of error or falsehood.Some examples which denote that 'Umar acted against the law, as given by Munawir, can be explained in other ways that do not contradict the law. 'Umar witheld the right of zakatto the *muallaf* not because he abandoned the injunction as it is mentioned in al-Taubah 60, rather he believed that the status of *muallaf* is not valid forever, like the status of *miskin* (poor). He did not cut the hand of the slave Hatib ibn Balta'ah because it was hunger that had encouraged him to steal.[9]

Munawir's formulation of the provisions of inheritance which gives the male and female equal portions is based on the concept of justice. He bases this idea on his own experience, fromwhich he feels it is unfair to give his sons more than his daughters, simply because he has spent more money for the former than for the latter.[10] Some 'ulama' reject this idea and say that "justice" should not be counted mathematically, but should be put proportionally. The difference of right between son and daughter on provision of inheritance is based on the responsibilities of each.[11] A further explanation of responsibility can be perhaps traced back to the orthodox opinion in Islam. The Qur'an itself mentions that the male is entitled to be the leader, has a responsibility to protect the safety of his family, provides the living expenses and prosperity for his wife and all members of his family. With such duties, it is natural if his provision of inheritance is more than the female. But it should be remembered that his provision is, actually, a gross income comparing to the female who receives less, but a nett one.

If a wife receives an inheritance from her father one thousand dollar, for example, then this amount of money is hers alone. The money cannot be spent for the living expenses of her family, unless she agrees to do so. She can save or use it for her own purposes. Unlike her, if her brother receives twice as much from their parent, then such money may be spent on the needs of his family because he is responsible for them.[12] In this case, the method of provision of inheritance is clearly

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[9]*Panjimas,*535 (1987), 61.
[10] Munawir Sjadzali, *Reaktualisasi,* 3-4.
[11]Azhar Basyir, "Reaktualisasi", 111-112.
[12] Rifyal Ka'bah, *Bawalah,* 67.

laid down in the Qur'a>n and the general rule is that women are entitled to inherit half the portion given to a man. If taken in isolation from other legislation, this may appear to be unfair; however, it must be remembered that in accordance with the verse of the Qur'a>n quoted earlier, men are charged with the maintenance of all the women and children in the family, and therefore their necessary obligations of expenditure are far higher than those of women. The half-portion that a woman inherits may therefore be considered a generous one since it is for her alone. Any such money or property which a woman owns or any business which she runs is entirely her own and her husband has no right to any of it.

It can be understood that the main point of the dispute on the provision of inheritance is not over the way to share the inheritance mathematically, but the wish to underline the principle of law itself. The demanded responsibility of men is greater than that of women, at least as quantitatively expressed in the symbol number of 2:1. The problem will arise when the man cannot fulfill his responsibility, or in certain communities the role of women is the dominant one in the family. These women are usually active in public activities and may even be breadwinners for their families. To this question Muslims have different opinions.Some say that the basic function of women is to remain in the household. They may work outside the house with the permission of the husbands. But their jobs are not dedicated to fulfilling the expenses of their families, because such duties are their husbands' responsibility. In Indonesia, for example, according to 1974 Marriage Law, a husband is the head of family and a wife is the mother of household. It also says that a husband must protect his wife and give her living expenses according to his ability. Therefore, they say that such conditions will not affect the formulation of provision of inheritance.[13] The others argue that if a man cannot fulfill his responsibilities, the status of law for him will change. With regard to the provision of inheritance, the portion of this man is not necessarily twice that of a woman. With the decision of the judge or the existing regulation, his portion can be changed, and the rest of it is

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[13] Rifyal Ka'bah, *Bawalah,* 68; Azhar Basyir, "Reaktualisasi",112.

handed to those who handle his responsibilities.[14] Principally, this latter group agree that the application of the Islamic law of inheritance in Indonesia can be modified because of certain conditions. Some traditions which exist in the communities, such as *gono-gini* (the property brought by the bride before marriage), *wasiat wajib* (obligatory bequest), and *dhawu'l-arham* (non-agnate relatives), perhaps, will help to solve the problem of the application of the Islamic law of inheritance. Since it does not cover these traditions, there are many disadvantaged inheritors. This is very unfortunate, says Darokah, because such cases are mentioned in the Qur'an which are respectively found in surah an-Nisa' 30, al-Baqarah 180, and al-Anfal 75. Although some 'ulama' are disputing these verses, some of them say that they are *mansukh,* but these verses may still be brought into consideration.[15] From the above passages it is understandable that the Islamic law of inheritance, especially in Indonesia, needs to be modified to a concrete one. The modification does not merely base on the direction of the Qur'an and Sunna, but also consider some aspects of tradition which exist in the communities. Thus, conflicts on the application of inheritance can be avoided.

Parallel to such a purpose, what has been offered by Munawir Sjadzali should not only be considered as an attempt to formulate a specific *fiqh* for the Indonesians, but most importantly, to find the solution to recognized *fiqh* as a positive law in Indonesia. Because as long as *fiqh* is not included in positive law, the dichotomy between national and Islamic law will still exist; and in consequence, it will create conflicts and tensions among the Indonesian communities.

Perhaps it is clear to conclude that the formulation of the provision of inheritance in Islamic law between the male and female as it is mentioned in the Qur'an (4:11) can be modified. In fact, the modification has lasted for a long time and many 'ulama,' included those who oppose Munawir's idea, recognize it through the way of *hibah* or *wasiat wajib.* In other words, there is no difference in substance

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[14]Ali Darokah, "Reaktualisasi Mencari Kebenaran, Ikhtiar Yang Wajar" *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988), 84.

[15]Ibid, 82-83.

between Munawir Sjadzali and the others. What Munawir demands has been accepted and practiced by those who reject his idea. Munawir wants to say that he demands the provision of inheritance clearly stated in the portion of 1:1. If he makes such a demand mwithout giving other alternatives of formulation, it would be a very rigid modification. Because, in certain cases, the male receives nothing comparing to the female; so, the comparison can be 0 for the male and 2 for female.

2.   The Jadidist Movement in Late Nineteenth and Early Twetieth Century Russia: The Role of Ismail Gasprinskii

A fruitful discussion of modern Islamic movements in Russian Empire demands some prior clarity concerning the meaning and character of modernity. It is suggested that no trend can reasonably be called characteristically "modern" simply because it is temporary, for there are admittedly certain contemporary trends that are legitimately described as reactionary or traditional. It would be correct to characterize modernity as a term represents, respectively, cultural and social attitudes or programs dedicated to supporting what is perceived as modern. Thus it would be inappropriate to speak of "modernization" of a religion unless we mean as part of a self-conscious program. Modernism in this context implies a commitment to render the implementation of religion compatible with more general commitments in other areas.[16] There are two valuable approaches to studying the characteristics of modernity. The first is concerned more with the institution, and the other more with the individual. Whereas the first approach puts more stress on ways of organizing and doing, the second focuses primarily on ways of thinking and feeling.[17]

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[16] John F. Wilson, "Modernity" in Mircea Eliade, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987),18.

[17]Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 16; Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), 3-13; Samuel P.

The first, from the institutional approach, the study of the *jadidist* (modernists) movement would give emphasis to the more general meaning of a system of activities or a group of people engaged over time in a purposeful cooperative endeavor, rather than to the shape of its formal organization. Since, the latter never comes into being. The second analysis which may be of help in understanding the modern ideas of *jadidism* focuses on individual characteristics, which Inkeles defines as the socio-psychological approach. This approach treats modernization mainly as a process of change in ways of perceiving, expressing, and valuing. Modernization is thus defined as a mode of individual functioning, a set of dispositions to act in certain ways.[18] In other words, it is an "ethos" in the sense in which Weber speaks of "the spirit of Capitalism,"[19] or a kind of mentality.[20] This concept can be can be compared to the case of the relationship between religion and modernization in some countries.[21] Where religion laid down the foundation of modernization, or, at least, did not act as an impediment to its process. It is in this light that Gasprinskii interpretes Islam and tries to bring it about into real endeavors.

The *jadidist* movement wants to establish a new order of life, in which the implementation of Islamic teachings in social life becomes a very important duty. The movement derives its motivation from dissatisfaction with the current conditions of life, on the one hand, and from wishes and hopes of change, on the other. Such motivations encourage the process of change which happens to substantial parts of the society which are moving from a traditional to a modern

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Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe", *World Politics* 18, 3 (1966), 378-414.

[18]Inkeles and Smith, *Becoming Modern*, 16.

[19]Weber deals with the connection of the influence of certain religious ideas, the rational ethics of ascetic Protestanism on the development of the spirit of modern economic life. See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scriber's and Sons, 1958), 27.

[20]Robert N. Bellah, "Meaning and Modernization", *Religious Studies,* 4 (1968), 39.

[21] See Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (New York: The Free Press, 1957).

way of life. Deutsch calls this process of change "social mobilization." He defines it as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."[22]

Some reforms which have been carried out by the movement are believed to have brought about some improvements. Here, the new ideas which are developed are really very beneficial to the society. Gasprinskii adopts and develops new systems of education from the Western world, believing that this will enable him to meet the challenge of modern development. But it cannot be denied that in such an endeavor usually provokes an attitude of resistance to changing the status quo.

Based on the above description, this section examines the *jadidist* movement in Russian Islam with special attention to the role of Gasprinskii in the movement. Though the most important part of this sub-chapter describes Gasprinskii's ideas, nevertheless, the historical background of the *jadidist* movement and the responses to Gasprinskii's ideas are added to give a full potrait of the movement campaigned by Gasprinskii. Most of the data for this writing come from the secondary sources, and some are derived from Gasprinskii's works through the translation of Allworth, Fisher, Kuttner, and Lazzerini. On the basis of Gasprinskii's ideas this section proposes that the process of Islamic change in Russian Islam occurs more in the social and cultural fields.

The Historical Background of the Movement

Up to the eve of the First World War, the Muslims of Russia were concentrated in three main regions of the empire: the Ural-Kazan-Volga regions; Central Asia; and Trans-Caucasia. The largest concentration was in Central Asia which included nomads and semi-nomads, the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs. The Tatars and the Bashkirs lived in the Ural-Kazan-Volga region, and the rest–the Azari Turks, the Tatars, and the Persians in Trans-Caucasia. A majority of these Muslims, about

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[22] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development" *The American Political Science Review* LV, 3 (September, 1961), 493-514; S.N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Growth and Diversity* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1963), 2.

75 per cent of them, belonged to various Turkic groups. The Muslims of Russia were thus spread over the vast expanse of the Tsarist Empire.[23] The Muslims in these lands had defended their identity and lands from the outside invaders for many years. Bennigsen says that these challenges came, in cronological order, from Jewish Khazars, Buddhist Qara-Khitay, heathen, Buddhist and Nestorian Mongols of Chingiz Khan, Buddhist Kalmuks-Oirots, Christian-Orthodox Russians and finally the same Russians in Marxist guise. From the standpoint of the Caucasian or Central Asian Muslims, these challenges were variations on the basic threats posed by "infidels" who employed similar strategies against them: genocide, religious proselytism, biological or cultural assimilation.[24] The two great non-Muslim invasions from further east Asia, those of the Qara-Khitay in the twelfth century and of the Chingisside Mongols in the thirteenth century, were the most disastrous.[25] However, the last of the invaders, the Christian and the Marxist Russians, played a compatible role in cleansing the ethnic populations and suppressing the Muslim religious belief.[26] As a result, the character of Islam in Central Asia changed dramatically. It ceased to be the religion of the ruling elite and became instead the religion of the rural masses. Mongol rule also resulted the development of the Sufi *tariqas* in Central Asia. As Trimingham says that Sufi brotherhood became the representatives of religion for the people; the shrine of the holy *murshid* became the symbol of Islam. The shrine, the dervish house and the circle of *dhikr* reciters became the outer forms of living religion.[27]

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[23]Zafar Imam, "Origin and Development of Socialism Among the Muslims of Russia, 1890-1917" *International Studies,* XV, 2 (1976), 187.

[24]Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 56-57.

[25]The characteristics of the destruction of the conquered lands by the Mongols, seem to me, have similarities with the fall of Bagdad in 1258. In Central Asia, although Chengiz Khan was tolerant in religious matters and had no personal animosity against Islam, but the slaughter with which his name is linked was so overwhelming that the Mongol conqueror became the symbol of the deadliest danger that ever threatened Islam. Ibid 58.

[26]For detail information, see Ibid., 61.

[27]Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders of Islam* (Oxford, 1971), p. 167.

The massacre and deportation, suffered by the Muslim of Central Asia since the time of Qara-Khitay and the Chingisside Mongols, were perpetuated by the Russians' mass colonization of Muslim lands and conversion (often forced) to Christianity. After the conquest of Kazan, the Russian government encouraged Christian missionaries in their mission to convert Muslims to Christianity. The policy of proselytisation continued until the beginning of 17th century. The relatively liberal reign of the first three Tsars of the Romanov dynasty temporarily put an end to this policy which was resumed with a new vigour under Peter the Great and continued until the accession of Catherine II. Between 1738 and 1755, 418 out of 536 mosques in the Governorate General of Kazan were closed; in the province of Tobolsk 15 out of 113 and in the province of Astrachan 29 out of 40; and until 1759 Olga Tatars were not permitted to build mosques and *medresahs* (religious school).[28]

A number of Russian schools whose primary objective was to convert and educate Muslim children were founded by Russian missionaries. The Russian Orthodox Church was in the meantime, conducting missionary work among the native, non-Russian population under the protection of the state. The results, however, did not live up to expectations; the Tatars in particular rejected these conversion attempts. According to the fifth census taken in 1796, 103,050 male and 108,290 female Tatars lived in the province of Kazan, of these only 13,384 men and 13,922 women were baptized.[29] It could be assumed that much of the conversions were forced. With the support of the government, the Russian Orthodox Church forced Muslim population to convert to Christianity. This explains why, when the manifesto guaranteeing religious freedoms became effective on November 17, 1905, permitting the Turkic peoples to practise their religion and profess Islam, masses of Turks left the church. In the eparchy of Kazan alone 23,860 of the native population

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[28]Shams-Ud-Din, "Russian Policy Toward Islam and Muslims: An Overview" *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs,* V, 2 (1984), 322; Nadir Devlet, "Islam in Tataristan" *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs,* V, 2 (1984), 336.

[29]Josef Glazik, *Die Islamission der russisch-orthodox-en Kirche* (Munster, 1959), 112, quoted from Devlet, "Islam Tatarisan", 337.

turned their back on the church and returned to Islam; altogether there were 36,299 returns in all eparchies.[30]

The significant of the *Jadidist* movement in late nineteenth century cannot be separated from this background. The tragedy, that is to say an everlasting menace of Muslim Russia, which filled their history cannot be easily forgotten. The horrible treatments of Muslims by the "uninvited Infidel rule" led to the emergence of Muslim reaction. The resistance itself took many different forms, of which the use of armed resistance and rebellion against the rulers had lasted for many centuries. It seems that without the stubborn resistance of the Muslims and a heroic tradition of struggle to preserve their identity, probably Islam would have disappeared from their lands.

The struggle of the Muslims to preserve Islam and their identity in the period of the Tsarist Empire took another form by using non-violent resistance. In the end of the nineteenth century the struggle took the form of spiritual and cultural movement. With the failure of armed resistance and the imposition of "uninvited Infidel rule," the supporters of the movement were very confident that religious reformation and socio-cultural modernization were the means for reaching their goal. The last quarter of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century have been rightly stated by Bennigsen as the era of the "Tatar

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[30]Ibid; see also Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 28. The process of Christianization among the occupied people had the same pattern in other colonized Muslim countries. In Indonesia, especially in nineteenth century, many Dutchmen believed of eliminating the influence of Islam by rapid Christianization of the majority of Indonesians. This belief was partly anchored in the erroneous assumption that the "nominal Muslims" at the village level would render conversion to Christianity easier in Indonesia. But in fact, in spite of the governmental assistance, Christianity had been able to spread only very slowly, and even then only among Indonesians living in areas which had not previously been Islamized. Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation* (The Hague/Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1959), 19; Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (The Hague/Bandung, 1956), 204-205.

Renaissance."[31] The question arises: why did this movement emerge among the Tatars in the Ural-Kazan-Volga regions of the Russian Empire in that period? While the specific analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this discussion, it would be well to remember that, for religious and social reasons, this movement also assumed from its very beginning the form of struggle between the *Jadidists* and the *Qadimists.* The internal religious and social condition of the Muslims, indeed, accelerated the emergence of the movement.

On the religious aspect the *Jadidists* became dissatisfied with the condition of religious life at the time. They said that Islam had been the narrow dogmatism of theology, and therefore could not compete with the modern developments. Early in the nineteenth century a prominent Volga Tatar theologian, Abdul Nazir Kursavi (1775-1813), protested against the abstract system of Bukhara's theologians. He and then Shahabeddin Marjani (1815-1889) sought to replace the formal scholastic study of Islam by a less theoritical, and more practical.[32] On some religious practices they encouraged the return to the purity of the early form of Islam which, in its day, had been a torchbearer of world civilization.[33] Sharabi calls that the *Jadidism* a "neo-orthodox" movement,[34] where main issue is to return to "pure" Islam. The task of reviving the "pure" Islam has logical as well as practical primacy and requires substantive changes in the conservative approach to the new interpretation and analysis. The logical consequence of this revival is to show that the Muslim religion is perfectly compatible with modern science, and capable of surviving in a modern world dominated by reason and the spirit of criticism. The *Jadidist* movement goes a long way toward pointing out the direction an interpretation of Islam would do justice to the Islamic imperative in the modern context. The movement clearly advocates the position that Islam is not the name of a few privileged duties such as

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[31]Bennigsen, "Modernization and Conservatism in Soviet Islam" in Dennis J. Dunn, ed., *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 240.

[32]Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism,* 24.

[33] Alexadre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 35.

[34] Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectual and the West: The Formative Years,* 1875-1914 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1970), 25.

salat (praying), saum (fasting), *zakat* (almsgiving), and *hajj* (pilgrimage), but is an all-encompassing way of life.

Meanwhile, the social condition of the Russian Muslims was far from satisfactory. As in nearly every Muslim country, that experienced colonial domination, the socio-economic formations of the subjugated people usually got distorted and remain undeveloped. The national liberation movements of such people are also affected by such socio-economic formations. The urgent demands of colonial exploitation (industries, land resettlement, colonial government officials) generate their own new social classes. This is usually followed by the emergence of clashes of ideas and interests between newly emerging social classes among the subjugated people. The Muslims of the Tsarist Empire, as Zafar Imam says, were no exception to these social processes.[35]

In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the socio-economic situation of the Turkomens, the Kazakhs, and the Kirghiz, who together made up 30 per cent of the total population in Central Asia, was indeed depressing. The policy of resettlement of land vigoroursly persued by the Tsarist administration had completely disjointed the traditional nomadic or semi-nomadic socio-economic life of these people. By 1913, about 4.5 million hectares of the best agricultural land in Kirghizia was seized; the lands left in the possession of the nomads which were too poor for agriculture and too insufficient for herding. A large percentage of these people became landless labores, while only 1.3 per cent of the population lived in urban settlements in Kirghizia till as late as 1920.[36]

Given the above background, the renaissance that was pioneered by the Tatars was not restricted to the religious reform, but extended to the economic and cultural spheres. On religious reform, emerged some figures such as Abdul Nazir Kursavi (1775-1813), Shihabeddin Marjani (1815-1889), Razaeddin Fahhredin Oglu (1854-1939), and Musa Jarullah Biqi(1875-1949). Cultural and linguistic renaissance followed closely the religious reform. It was a successful, collective endeavor undertaken by Kayyum Nasyri (1824-1904) of the Volga Tatars, Ismail

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[35]Zafar Imam, "Origin and Development," 188.
[36]Ibid, 197.

Gasprinskii (1851-1914) of the Crimean Tatars, Hasan Malikov Zerdabi (1837-1907) of the Azeris, and Abay Kunanbaev (1845-1904) of the Kazakhs. The modernization of the Muslim educational system was pioneered by some famous figures such as Marjani, Gasprinskii, and Marjani's leading student, Hussein Feitskhani (1826-1866).[37]

The *Jadidist* movement was started by Marjani's attempt to reform Islam in Russia. But a new direction to the movement was given by Ismail Gasprinskii who could be said to be the fountain-head of the movement. What differentiated between the two was that Gasprinskii supplied the movement with a concrete program, and under his guidance the religious reform aspect was changed into a practical activism which aimed at development of the Muslims through modernized education, unification of the language and general cultural progress.[38] His idea was that the socio-political condition of the Muslims of Russia could be improved only by creating among the Young Muslims a sense of unity and nationalism based on the concept of Islamic brotherhood and nationalism and by promoting the usage of Ottoman Turkish as a lingua franca in all the schools and press controlled by the Muslims of Russia. His eargerness to promote the Ottoman Turkish was a response to the lack of linguistic unity among the Muslims, even among the Turkic groups; Zafar Imam points out that in certain regions, among the nomads of Kirghizia and Kazakhtan, there was no written language till 1900.[39]

Commenting on the condition of the Muslim life, Gasprinskii said that "it is an indisputable fact that contemporary Muslims are the most backward peoples." They have been left behind in virtually every area of life by Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews, and Hindus.[40] What was even worse was the fact that a number of areas of the Muslim world were losing their sovereignty in the face of European

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[37] Bennigsen, "Modernization", 240-242; Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism*, 24-25.

[38] Charles W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957), 130-131.

[39]Zafar Imam, "Origin and Development", 187.

[40] Alan W. Fisher, "Ismail Gaspirali, Model Leader for Asia" in Edward Allworth, ed. *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988), 16.

expansion and imperialism.[41] For this condition, Gasprinskii placed much of the blame on Islamic religious leaders who had stifled progressive ideas, placed thought in vice, and closed the doors to scientific research.[42] So, it was not Islam as a religion or as a culture that was fault, but its leading practicioners.

The *Jadidist* movement, under the influence of Gasprinskii, stressed more on the cultural and social aspects of Islam than the "doctrinal" issues. It was a revolutionary movement, although it never contemplated the use of force. Its arena of struggle was education and literature. Gasprinskii expanded his ideas through some publications such as: *Russkoe Musul'manstvo: Myli, Zamietkii Nobliudeniia Musul'manina* (Russian Islam: Thoughts, Notes and Observation of Muslim) published in 1881; his newspaper *Tarjuman* (Interpreter) from 1883-1914; *Russkoe Musul'manskoe Soglashenie* (Russian Muslim Agreement) published in 1895.Together with other periodicals he published *Alem-i Niswan* (The World of the Women, Bakhchisaray, 1906-1914); *Alem-i Sibyan* (The World of Children, Bakhchisaray, 1906-1914).[43] Another publication in which he became its editor-publisher and chief contributor was *al-Nahdah* (Renaissance).[44] Through his

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[41] At least up to the half of the twentieth century, many Muslim lands were occupied by Western colonialists. The Dutch colonized Indonesia; the British occupied India, Malaysia, and most of the Middle Eastern lands; French and Italy in African countries.

[42]Ibid.

[43] Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat,* 79, 90. *Tarjuman* was printed in a Turkic language based upon a simplified Ottoman Turkish. After the first few years of its existence, *Tarjuman* became a dual-language publication. The Turkic section was gradually expanded at the expense of the Russian section. But beginning in late 1905, except on rare occasions thereafter, articles were published in Turkic alone. See Edward J. Lazzerini, "Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View From Within" *Cahiers ou Monde Russe et Sovietique,* XVI, 3-4 (1975), 348.

[44]*al-Nahdah,* founded by Gasprinskii, was envisaged a type of itinerate journal, published periodically at different location within the Islamic world and whatever language was locally prevalent. To ensure continuity of form and content its editorship had to remain constant, so Gasprinskii proposed for himself a tour of the major regions of Islamic world. His plan to publish such an itinerate journal in some major Islamic regions failed to materialized, except *al-Nahdah* which was published in Cairo in 1908. See Thomas Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo -1908: A call to the Arab for the Rejuvenation of the Islamic World" *Cahiers ou Monde Russe et Sovietique,* 16, 3-4 (1975), 384-388.

publications, Gasprinskii wanted to disseminate his ideas not only to the Muslims in Russia but, as he did with *al-Nahdah* in Egypt, among the Muslims in the world as well. Some of Gasprinskii's ideas issued in *al-Nahdah* had been collected by Thomas Kuttner in an analytical work, "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World: Ismail Gaspriskii in Cairo -1908". Based on this work, Gasprinskii's core ideas are discussed in the following section.

Gasprinskii's Ideas and Programmes

Ismail Bey Gasprinskii[45] (1851-1914), the son of an improverished Crimean Tatar nobleman, was one of the most distinguished Muslim thinkers of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After graduating from Qur'anic school in Bakhchisaray and the Cadet Corps in Moscow, Gasprinskii lived for some time in Istambul and then in Paris. After his stay abroad, he returned to his homeland. In 1874 he became a teacher in Yalta where he taught Muslim adults the Russian language. In 1879 he was elected mayor of Bakhchisaray, and in this position he served four years.[46]

The challenges facing the Crimean Tatars in his day were the Russian political, economic, and educational superiority. Undestandably, Gasprinskii's responses to the different challenges were of a different order than those offered before or even today by many within the Islamic world who raise the same questions about danger and survival. What were Gasprinskii's prescriptions for

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[45] Ismail Bey's name appears in scholarship and on his own published work as either Gasprinskii or Gaspirali. "Gaspirali" is one Turkic variant of Ismail Bey's adopted family name. It derived from a small village (Gaspra), near Bakhchisaray in Crimea. Ismail Bey himself always employed a Russified variant -Gasprinskii- in his public discourse, as did many other Muslims inhabiting the empire. See Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (Gaspirali): The Discourse of Modernity and the Russians" in Edward Allworth. ed. *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival,* 367.

[46]Bennigsen, *The Islamic Threat,* 78. Gasprinskii's biography appeared in four issues of the Tatar-language journal *Shura,* published in Orenburg in November and December 1914. All these four issues had been translated by Alan W. Fisher. See "Documents: Ismail Bey Gasprinski, 1851-1914" in Edward Allworth, ed., *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival,* 72-99.

survival? He raised some questions on the matter of renewal and reform within Islam in his *Tarjuman* issued in 1895. He said:

> Thirteen years-ago there were innumerable forms of revolutionary and reform movements afoot in Russian Islam, many of them in opposition to one another. In essence, these movements raised five or six questions: (1) Muslims who are subjects of the Russian government have to decide whether they are loyal to the Tsar or to some Muslim government, or are loyal to their homeland;(2) What sort of education is proper and necessary for Muslims? ;(3) What are the best means for training Muslims to live in the modern world of trade and industry ? ... ;(4) Is it necessary that Muslims in Russia be trained in the modern methods of agriculture ?... ;(5) If we establish our own national schools, to permit our youth to acquire an education without going to the Russian schools, should our own schools be modeled on the Russian ones ? Should they take positions on these various issues?[47]

To answer these questions, he proposed some ideas and programmes which he promoted unceasingly for over a quarter of a century in his newspaper *Terjuman* (Interpreter) as well as in his various other writings. His ideas, although never articulated fully in a single manifesto, very clearly comprised the following points: (a) reform of the Muslim educational system in order to bring it into conformity with "modern" pedagogy; (b) emancipation of the Muslim women; (c) organization of cooperative and philanthropic societies;(d) creation of a common Turkic literary language. This idea was aimed at the creation of viable medium for strengthening of ties among Russia's Turco-Muslim people; and (e) cooperation with the Russian government and people.[48]

For Gasprinskii, education was the main weapon in the service of national revival. He founded a reform school which subsequently served as an example for other "new method" schools. "New Method," *usul-i-jadid,* became the slogan of progressive Tatar reformers, and they themselves began to be called "Jadidists," that is, "innovators." As it was questioned in the previous passages why such *Jadidist*

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[47] Fisher, "Documents: Ismail Bey", 80-81.
[48] Lazzerini, "Gadidism", 248; Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism", 388-389.

movement occured among the Tatars. It should be remembered that the pace of industrialization during the late nineteenth century was particularly rapid in the Tatar region such as Ural-Kazan-Volga and Crimea. These regions were the most developed and the Tatars were socially and culturally were advanced than other Muslims of the empire.[49] It is not surprising that the Tatar Muslims should have provided inspiration and leadership to the nationalist movements among the Russian Muslims.

The growth of the Tatar middle-class constituted a valuable asset for the process of modernization. Some sociologists have pointed out that literacy, being one of the characteristics of this class, is one of the keys of modernization.[50] This characteristic is closely related to the demand for education, which according to Robert Wood, becomes the decisive element of modern man.[51] In fact, Gasprinskii himself states that the reform of education is one of the most important programmes of his movement. He tried to reform Muslim education by introducing a new system of values which are in conformity with the demands of the future, and yet which do not neglect the principle of Islamic teachings.

Gasprinskii's educational reform includes two aspects, namely, an ideal and a technical aspect. The ideal aspect proposes to shape a man who has a good character, a good knowledge of religious as well as secular disciplines, and a willingness to work for the progress of his society. To this end he reorganizes the system of Muslim education and makes somes changes in its curriculum. The curriculum at the *maktab* (elementary school) level is to include the study of the

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[49]See Zafar Imam, "Origin and Development", 187-191.

[50] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 46.

[51] See Robert Wood, "The Future of Modernization" in Myron Weiner, ed. *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth* (New York: Basic Book, Inc., 1966), 44. Arnold Anderson and Edward Shils indicate that education plays an important role in creating skills and a spirit of creativity. But Anderson notes, by way of qualification, that education itself is not adequate, and that there are a variety of ways in which men may learn new skills and attitudes other than through formal education. Arnold Anderson, "The Modernization of Education", in Myron Weiner, ed. *Modernization,* 68-80; Edward Shils, "Modernization and Higher Education", in Myron Weiner, ed. *Modernization,* 81-97.

Qur'an, Islamic traditions, Muslim law, and a genuine ability to read in Arabic. But beyond these subjects Gasprinskii believed a student should study the grammar and literature of his native language, the history of Islam and Islamic societies as well as of other religions and other societies, geography, mathematics, and at least enough science to make an impact on the students's own life-style. He was convinced that no genuine renewal of Turkic-Tatar Islamic society was conceivable without educational renewal. As Fisher said, his society needed "an army of learned men" and an "enlightened public."[52]

The technical aspect of educational reform introduced by Gasprinskii was related more to the methods of learning, discipline and teachers' qualifications. The *usul-i-jadid* required reform in the actual physical environment for education, e.g. size of classes; the regularization of the beginning and the end of the school years, the regularization of school days, and a set curriculum of courses and levels. The school itself must be designed as a school, and the teachers must be prepared specifically in the subjects that they would teach. He was convinced that a sound and full *maktab* education was a prerequisite for a meaningful *madrasa* experience. Admission to the higher level would require solid grounding in the *maktab* "basics."[53]

In numerous articles, Gasprinskii forcefully presented his viewpoint that education provided the means whereby the Islamic revival was to be achieved; without it all hope for such a revival was in vain. He outlined his philosophy of education most broadly for his readers in a lengthy article entitled "Causes of Progress and Development." He postulated his theories on the basic premise that true education is a two-fold process comprising the unstructured years of child's early rearing and upbringing followed by the more structured period of formal pedagogy. Given the two institutions of family and society, Gasprinskii assigned a

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[52]Fisher, "Ismail Gaspirali", 22; Bennigsen and Lemercier Quelquejay, *Islam,* 39; Zenkovsky, *Pan-Islam,* 34.
[53]Fisher, "Ismail Gaspirali", 22.

critical role to a component of each, in the first instance the mother and in the second the school.[54]

Gasprinskii also reminded the Muslims of the importance of education for woman. He put forward various arguments to convince the Muslims of its validity. In an occasion Gasprinskii invoked historical justification for his contentions. He attributed the German victory over the French in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 to their enlightened feminist position. The reputed high level of education attained by German women coupled with their higher birth rates had provided Prussia with an unusually competent generation of young men beside whom their French counterparts were decidedly inferior.[55]

Education then is the keystone of the new society; it is the primary factor in a successful modernization of the East. Completed around 1905, the modernized system gave Russian Islam a leading position in the domain of Muslim education. Some of the Russian *madrasas* were considered the most progressive Muslim schools in the world. Particularly remarkable were *Zinjirli* in Bakhchisaray, *Mohammediyeh* in Kazan, *Huseyniyeh* in Orenburg, and *Rasuliyeh* in Troitsk.[56] While the Tatar *bourgeoisie*, which had long been the leading group in Tatar society, it later gave Gasprinskii its full support. The sharpening of relations with the Russian authorities, according to Zenkovsky, lent impetus to the growth of national consciousness in the Tatar *bourgeoisie;* and the Tatar merchants saw the advantages in the new school programs and contributed to the financing of new *maktabs* and *madrasas* as well as to the education of teachers and the printing of textbooks.[57]The "new method," meanwhile, spread very quickly, and it is reported that by 1914 some 5000 Tatar and other Muslim schools had adopted it.[58]

Relating to the position of women in Islamic society and their emancipation, Gasprinskii expressed his idea that women played an important role in the modernizing process. The dominan view that woman is to serve as the passive

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[54]Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism," 389-390
[55]Ibid, 390.
[56]See Bennigsen, "Modernization", 242.
[57]Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, 35.
[58]Ibid.

vessel of man's reproductive drive, active only in his physical birth and growth but not in any way in his spiritual development, was bitterly criticized by Gasprinskii. He argued that woman is the "touchstone of a progressive society."[59] In his two articles, "Causes of Progress and Development" and "Enlightened Islamic Society,"[60] he condemned Islamic society as a whole for the "crime" not only of passive neglect of its women, but of active oppression of them as well.[61] According to Gasprinskii, not only the traditional class oppresses women, but also the newly Westernized elite.[62] The latter are men who, through casual contact with European residents in the East, have adopted a veneer of Western sophistication. This superficially westernized man has been well described by Vambery as possessing only the outward appearance of Western style and behavior rather than genuine spirit of modern West.[63]

The emphasis which Gasprinskii placed on the need for educated women to play their proper role in society was in fact the key element in his advocation of the immediate emancipation of the Muslim woman. For him, once universal education was established, a new woman would emerge, freed from the bonds imposed on her by a male dominated society. The essence of an enlightened society lied in a changed attitude towards, and treatment of, its women.

Gasprinskii believed that the establishment of a new society which could support all activity aimed at the realization of his programmes of reform is necessary. But how was this reform to be affected? On this point, Gasprinskii did not provide a detailed blueprint, but rather suggested a broad framework on which the new society would be built. Central to his view of a re-built Islamic society is the concept of social responsibility. The inculcation of this sense in the consciousness of the individual member of society, especially among its upper classes, is a *sine qua*

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[59]Kutter, "Russian Jadidism," 390.

[60] These articles were written in *al-Nahdah,* published in Cairo in 1908, in serial numbers II, 1 a-c, and III, 3 a-c. See Ibid, 389, 421.

[61]Ibid, 391.

[62]Ibid, 393.

[63] Arminius Vambery, *The Life and Adventures of Arminius Vambery* (New York, n.d), 20.

non for Gasprinskii. It is for this reason he took donation from certain people for the child Welfare Society.[64]

If such donation is to be effective it is essential that it be properly channelled, and hus Gasprinskii advocated that private social responsibility be co-ordinated through programmes sponsored by structured community organizations. What was needed for social progress was the creation of multidutes of voluntary associations dedicated to the advancement of every facet of society.[65] The problems of mass poverty, hunger, ignorance, desease each had to be attacked by the planned efforts of a group of concerned individuals. He suggested that co-ordination be undertaken by a national club, established in every city, which would ensure the pursuit of common goals in a spirit of co-operation by the implementation of specific and definite programmes.[66]

Gasprinskii said that a modernized educational establishment and an emancipated womanhood were not contradictory to Islamic teaching. He even criticized the majority of Muslims who had neglected the spirit of Islam which called for progress and change.[67] Although he did not elaborate his religious ideology, he stated that Islam is a religion that should be able to offer Russian Muslims a solution to the current state of affairs. Islam is a religion that fosters science, knowledge, education and progress. Islam is not a religion opposed to any of the above.[68] For him, Islam is an "open" ideology which will always ready to accept whatever comes from other cultures as long as it is not contradictory with the principles of Islamic teachings. His ideas on this questions were most clearly expressed in Tarjuma<|n, 60 (1898), in which he said that to add new ideas is not to reject what is good and useful in Muslim national and religious heritage. Those Muslims who really wish to be able to serve their people must be willing to recognize what is good and useful in other sets of ideas and ideals. He reminded the Muslim leaders at his time that they may well continue to serve Islam by accepting the future instead of only focusing on

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[64]Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism", 394.
[65]Ibid, 394.
[66]Ibid, 395.
[67]Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism", 394.
[68]Fisher, "Documents: Ismail Bey", 90.

the past. The civilized nation, he said, are not necessarily Godless in their civilizing activity. But to come to such an idea is a great challenge. He himself realized that it will not be easy to persuade his *muftis* and other ulama<|' that Islam is not against change.[69]

Again, what Gasprinskii suggested to the Muslims is a set of attitudes, one of which was defined by Chandler Morse in terms of "adaptiveness". It is an ability to confront, overcome, and indeed prepare for new challenges, whether these originate from internal social dynamics, from external social contacts, from the impact of natural forces or from other sources.[70] Alex Inkeles lists some other characteristics which Gasprinskii recomends e.g. the readiness to acknowledge the process of social transformation occuring in certain place. Another one is a disposition to accept new ideas and try new methods. This entails an opennes to new experiences.[71] By disposition to accept new ideas is a readiness to new experiences. It may express itself in a variety of forms and contexts, as Gasprinskii himself manifested them in his willingness to cooperate with the Russian government and to accept some patterns of Western spirit of progress, and to adopt new system of modern education in his Muslim community. Such attitudes are defined by some sociologists as the characteristics of modernism.

There was no doubt in Gasprinskii's mind that if the East were to develop in the manner he envisaged, it would have to integrate itself harmoniously in Western civilizations. Gasprinskii clearly expounded this view in an important article which he wrote for the third edition of *al-Nahdah* and entitled "The Means to Civilization and Reform." First he defined the West as comprising Europe and America. The two principal features characterized their societies: modernization and enlightened statecraft. Because of the first, they become the teachers of the entire world in science and technology. The second was direct political result of the "lofty ideals" and "outstanding social principles" upon which their societies were based.

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[69]Ibid, 86.

[70]Chandler Morse, et. al., *Modernization by Design: Social Change in the Twentieth Century* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), 36.

[71]Inkeles and Smith, *Becoming Modern*,19-20.

Technologically and industrially advanced, politically mature, the West represented for him "an example to be emulated without exception."[72]

There was little doubt in his mind but that the East would in fact take its rightful place in Western civilization. He redefined and broadened the concept of "Western civilization," so as to make it less foreign for the East and more acceptable as an archetype. He declared that in reality, what was thought of as "Western civilization" was tantamount to "human civilization," rooted as it was in the great civilization of the past from which it had gradually but steadily developed. These civilizations included those of Babylon and Egypt, of the Greeks and the Romans, and finally that of Islam.[73]

What Gasprinskii said about Western civilization was held by the two leading intellectuals of the previous generation who had first hand knowledge of European civilization, Rifa'ah Badawi Rafi>' al-Tahtawi (1801-1872) and Khayr al-Din Pasha (d.1889). They both had developed a thesis which became central in reformist ideology: that Europe's civilization (and therefore its scientific knowledge) was based largely on what Europe had borrowed from Islam. Tahtawi said that European knowledge "only seems foreign (to Muslim); it is in origin Islamic." He maintained that, in any case, most of it had been "translated from Arabic."[74] Khayr al-Din had gone even further. He backed his thesis by two arguments: first, that "Muslim law does not prohibit reforms designed to strengthen economic and cultural life", and second, that since European civilization was based mostly on what Islam had contributed to it in the past, it was the duty (of Muslims) to take it back.

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[72]Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism," 396

[73]Ibid.

[74]Tahtawi explained all of this in his "*Manahij al-Albab al-Misriyyah fi Mabahij al-Adab al-Asriyyah* (The Paths of Egypt Minds in the Joys of Modern Arts). In his *Takhlis al-Ibriz ila Talkhis Bariz* (Customs and Manners of the Modern French), he described European knowledge as "the knowledge which had been lost" by the Muslims and which should be respossessed. Quoted from Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals,* 27, 44-45.

Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) resorted to the same formula that the Muslims only take back what they had originally given.[75]

To a certain extent, what Gasprinskii said on this point foreshadowed similar sentiments expressed by the Turkish reformers. Abdullah Gavdet wrote the phrase "Civilization means European civilization" in 1911,[76] and in the mid-twenties Mustafa Kemal Ataturk inaugurated the era of full-scale westernization in the Turkish Republic which was to radically alter Turkish society. But in some respects Gasprinskii's ideas and their formulation were quite different from those of the Turkish westernizers. For these latter, European civilization was in itself an absolute, whereas for Gasprinskii it was more a guide and model for emulation.

In his struggle for Muslim cultural unity, Gasprinskii placed three principles of unity at the basis of his thought and work: unity of language, of thought and action (*dilde, fikirde, ishte birlik*). He called for the union of the Turkic peoples of Russia under the spiritual aegis of Turkey, and for a new Muslim culture that contact with the West through the medium of Turkish.[77] The starting point of cultural unity was to be linguistic unification. To this end he introduced Ottoman Turkish as a common literary language. It was simplified, freed as far as possible from Arabic and Persian accretions, in favor of borrowing from Crimean Tatar.[78] The target of the linguistic unification was, first, the Turkic Muslims of the Russian Empire, and then, as he was convinced, it would associate Russian Turkic Muslims with Turks outside Russia. The dream of linguistic unity, as considered by some authors, provided a concrete base for the theories of Pan-Turkism.[79]

To enforce the spread of this language, Gasprinskii recommended introducing it as a common literary language in the Muslims schools and press of Russia. In his newspaper, *Tarjuman,* he used neither medieval Chagatai, which Russian Turks had used for centuries as their written language, nor the spoken

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[75]Muhammad Abduh, "Comments On A Mistake Made By Reasonable People," *al-Manar,* IX (1906), 597-598; Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals,* 45.

[76]Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford, 1968), 236, 267.

[77]Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam,* 38.

[78]Ibid, 38-39.

[79]Ibid, 39; Hostler, *Turkism,* 130.

Volga Tatar toungue first used in literary writing by Nasyry. He used, rather, the modernized literary language of Ottoman Turkey.[80] According to Fisher, it was only a simplified form of Ottoman Turkish used in Istambul at the time.[81] Gasprinskii was convinced that, in its simplified form, it would be undertood by Turkic readers anywhere and would facilitate the drawing together of the Turks throughout the world. What is important to note here is that Gasprinskii was interested in such a common literary language in order to facilitate reform.

Such a language was, in fact, understood easily by the Muslims in some regions but not in the other regions. The Crimean Tatars understood it due to their nearness to Turkey, the Tatars of the Crimea's Southern shores spoke a toungue very similar to it; and the Azerbaijans, belonging to the same linguistic group as the Ottoman Turks, could understand the language of Gsprinskii's *Tarjuma>n* with no great difficulty. But to the ordinary reader in the Volga region, the Kazakh steppe or Central Asia, Ottoman Turkish could not be understood without study.[82] The modernization of languages was to produce a literature which was openly committed, a literature fighting for religious reform, for the emancipation of women, for educational reform, eventually for equality of rights with the Russians, and ultimately for cultural and political autonomy.

This latter purpose, however, indicated that Gasprinskii was deeply conscious of the potential power of *Dar al-Islam.* He was convinced that the decline was only temporary and that the future of humanity belonged to Islam, espicially to Turkic Islam. It was this immense area extending from Bosphorus to the Chinese border that Gasprinskii tried to gather in and unify around his slogan "*Dilde, fikirde, ishte birlik.*" Formally, he was no political activist. But his social and cultural reform was a precise political attitude intended to awaken the Muslims at his time. Bennigsen says that Gasprinskii was the first to expound Pan-Turkism among Russian Muslims, although he rejected its more violent, anti-Western manifestations. He also refused to accept the radicalism of al-Afghani (who

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[80]Zonkovsky, *Pan-Turkism,* 32.
[81]Fisher, "Ismail Gaspirali", 19.
[82]Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism,* 32-33.

preached rebellion of the Muslim world against the encroaching West) on the basis that an assault on a powerful adversary, Russia, was ill-conceived and bound to fail.[83]

Gasprinskii refrined from any clearly national-political agitation. In urging Russian Turks to unite on the basis of culture and religion, he apparently had in mind the strengthening of the entire Muslim world. He understood, however, that the regime of imperial Russia in the nineteenth century was not inclined to tolerate any open political activity directed at weakening this supranational state. In serving the cause of Muslim cultural unity, Gasprinskii was very careful in his attitude toward the Russian state.

He believed that open struggle against Russia would, in this day, be impossible and ill-fated, and that peaceful co-existence, even a fruitful co-operation between Russia and the Muslim world, could prove lasting and to the greater advantage of Islam. He saw no real danger in co-operation and growing closeness between Muslims and Russians or other Westerners. Ismail Bey's attitudes toward the West were only partly based on his first-hand experience. He had lived for a few months in Paris early in his career and apparently could read Frenh. But his views, for the most part, about Western-Islamic relations were the result of his experiences in Russia, his study of Russian culture and institutions, and his good knowledge of the Russian language.[84]

What Gasprinskii was offering to the Russian Empire was nothing less than partnership on equal terms. He said that it would be desirable if Russians and Muslims came to know one another better and directly, without either preconceived ideas or prejudice. Thus, they might see that except for religion, everything else draws them together and binds them fast. Religion, he said, should not empede the good in secular life and activity; and it does not. The Qur'an has not been an obstacle to an alliance between the Turks, the English, and the French. He said that many people quite often see excellent relation between Christians and Muslims in privat

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[83]Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat,* 78.
[84]Fisher, "Ismail Gaspirali," 16.

life and actions.[85] In exchange for total religious and cultural freedom and absolute equality for Russian Muslims, Gasprinskii offered Russia the full support of the Muslim world in the fight against British, German and French colonialization.[86]

Thus, a real Russian-Muslim-Turkic alliance was to be established for the mutual benefit of both partners. He emphasized not only agreement between and understanding of one another by Russians and Muslims, but an actual drawing closer together. Muslims and Russians can plow, sow, raise cattle, trade, and make their livings together or side by side.[87] This was not the first time that he had written to his audience; indeed, earlier before, he explained it with words of praise, friendship, empathy, and hope. He wishes the Russians and the Muslims could achieve the rapprochement from which both would benefit.

At the practical level, Gasprinskii had to pay extraordinary attention to the Russian Empire's ethnic prejudices. How to minimize Russian resistance to his reform movement was a significant question. His goals required not merely Russian neutrality but official acceptance in order to proceed as broadly and rapidly as possible with his movement. Attracting the Russians to Gasprinskii's cause was really to be his great task.

Responses to the Jadidist Movement

The Jadidist movement, inspired by Gasprinskii, led to positive and negative reactions from Russian government and from Russian Muslims. The movement was met with great enthusiasm in the Volga-Ural and some other regions. This positive response was, especially, identified by the emergence of new schools in those regions under the model of *usul-i-jadid.* However, not all responses to the movement were positive. The Russian government and certain groups of Muslims, each of them, having its own reason for opposing the Jadidist movement.

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[85]Ismail Gasprinskii, "Russko-Vostochnoe soglashenie: Mysli, Zamietkii Pozhelaniia (Russo-Oriental Relations: Thoughts, Notes, and Desires)" trans. by Edward J. Lazzerini in Edward Allworth, ed. *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival,* 206.

[86]Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat,* 79.

[87]Gasprinskii, "Russko-Vostochnoe," 206.

There is considerable disagreement about the number of *usul-i-jadid* schools established by the time of the Russian Revolution in March 1917. But it seems clear that the number exceeded five thousand. It is reported that Gasprinskii's educational system was followed outside Russia, in Turkey, in Persia and even in India.[88] Gasprinskii traveled widely in the Muslim areas of the empire, doing his best to persuade the local dignitaries of the importance of these new-method schools. In some regions, he was more successful than in others. In kazan *guberniia,* where interest in educational reform and social renewal predated Gasprinskii's career, his new method corresponded exactly with the need of the powerful Tatar bourgeoisie, and the city of Kazan alone there were more than a dozen *usul-i-jadid maktabs* by 1916. One set of statistics published in the 1920s in Kazan argued for the proposition that these reformed schools were at least as successful as their Russian counterparts, producing a claimed Tatar literacy rate on the eve of the March 1917 revolution of 20 percent compared to 18 percent for the Russians, and between 5 and 9 percent for the other non-Russian minorities in the *guberniia,* the Chuvash, Mordovians, Votiaks, and Cheremisses.[89]

Gasprinskii visited Central Asia and under his influence *usul-i-jadid* schools were opened in Andijan in 1897, in Samarkand and Tokmak in 1898. These early Central Asian schools were exclusively for the local Tatar population. It was only in 1901 that the first *usul-i-jadid maktab* was opened in Taskent, and in Samarkand, it was in 1903.[90] There were, by 1912, about fifty seven*usul-i-jadid* schools operating in the Turkistan region. Gradually a small native intelligentsia arose from the ranks of the petty and middle traders and school teachers.[91] Gasprinskii made a trip to

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[88]Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam,* 39.

[89]David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908* (London: Frank Case, 1977), 12-14.

[90]Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 203-205; Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Stirring of National Feeling" in Edward Allworth, ed. *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 177-178, 194-195, 200.

[91]Zafar Imam, "Origin and Development," 197.

India where he persuaded the local Muslim schools in Bombay to adopt his *usu-i-jadid.* Some of these schools took up Gasprinskii's suggestion and on March 2, 1910, the first "new method" school was established in India.[92]

Strong backing for Gasprinskii's educational ideas emerged throughout the Russian Islamic political movements so that the Third Muslim Congress in August 1906 at Nizhmi Novgorod adopted three resolutions, one of which was promote school reform in Islamic areas, to conduct education in the *maktabs* in the tongue of the pupils and to conduct classes in the madrasas in the language espoused by Gasprinskii. In May 1917 the Pan-Russian Muslim Congress held in Moscow adopted the resolution offered by Zeki Kadyrov on school reform that conformed in all important ways to the ideas of Gasprinskii.[93]

A number of important Central Asian, Tatar, Azeri, and Turkish intellectuals credited Gasprinskii with providing models and leadership that influenced them heavily. Modernists like Yusuf Akchuraoghlu, Akhundzada, Huseyinzade, Ahmed Maksudi, and Fatih Kerimi on the one hand, and editors of journals and newspapers such as *Vaqt, Yulduz,* and *Ay Qap,* all recognized the path breaking impact of Gasprinskii and his *Tarjuman.*[94] It is a remarkable fact, as Vambery said, that the spirit of the *jadidist* reform spread from South Russia towards the Upper Volga teritory, into the steppe region, and as far as East Turkistan. By 1901, the *Tarjuma>n* had a circulation of 6,000 copies in the Crimea, the Caucasus, Siberia, Turkistan and China.[95] Gasprinskii's language reform and his ideas for promoting the cultural or even political unity of the Turkic Muslim world would not overcome the desires of each Turkic group to focus on local parochial political goals. But

[92]Fisher, "Documents: Ismail Bey," 92.

[93]Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 48-49; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam,* 78-79; Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism,* 41.

[94]Manuel Sarkisyans, "Russian Conquest in Central Asia: Transformation and Acculturation" in Wayne Vuvinich, ed. *Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples* (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 255.

[95]Arminius Vambery, *Western Culture in Eastern Lands: A Comparison of the Methods Adopted By England and Russia in the Middle East* (London: John Murray, 1906), 272.

Gasprinskii's evaluation of the weaknesses of Islamic society, his journalistic achivements, and his directions in educational reform produced immediate, and long-lasting results.

Not surprisingly, both Russians and certain groups of Muslims gave negative responses to Gasprinskii's movement. The Russian government too feared the outcome of successful Muslim educational reform. N.A. Ilminsky, for example, said that a Muslim fanatically hostile to infidels was less dangerous for the Russian state than a Muslim educated in European style.[96] K.P. von Kaufman, governor general of Turkistan after the Russian conquest, while viewing Islam as a source of mortal danger to the Russian Empire, believed that it could be best countered by a policy of indifference. He therefore pursued a policy of least interference in Muslim religious affairs. He said that the best way to undermine the influence of Muslim education was to create Russian schools to which Central Asian children would be admitted. This had the double advantage of drawing them away from Muslim schools, either traditional or modern, and of bringing Muslim and Russian children together. He believed that the latter would assimilate the former when placed side by side.[97]

Thus, Ilminsky, a professor in the Kazan Orthodox Theological Seminary, agreed with Kaufman on the danger posed by Islam. He believed that the Russian government should attempt to combat the exclusive impact of the Muslim schools and Islamic culture on the Tatars. Since the purely Russian school was unpopuler among the Tatar population because of the latter's ignorance of the Russian language, Ilminsky began to develop a new type of educational institution for non-Russian natives. He elaborated a new curriculum for a "Russian Tatar" school which would be partially conducted in the native language. In the lower classes Tatar students would study their own language and "element of Russian civilization in

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[96]Alexandre Bennigsen, "The Muslim of European Russia" in Wayne Vucinich, ed., *Russia and Asia,* 152.

[97]Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 187, 201.

translation." In the upper classes Russian language would be introduced. He even invented a special Tatar alphabet, based not on Arabic but on Russian letters.[98]

The practicability of Ilminsky's Russian-native schools in facilitating the spread of Russian language and culture among the non-Russian populations of the empire was later proved by the Soviet government's adoption of the very principles of his system. The Soviets introduced in their schools for non-Russians both the basic subjects of Ilminsky's curriculum and his alphabet. Russians established schools to compete with the very populer *usul-i-jadid* schools of Gasprinskii. These Russian-native (*russko-tuzemnaia*) schools were for Muslims only, however, to acquiant the children with Russian culture through the medium of their own language and with elements of the Russian language. The first was opened in 1884 under the head-mastership of a Russian orientalist, V.P. Nalivkin. In 1911 there were almost ninety of them in Turkistan, and by 1913 there were more than 150 in the Kazak plains.[99]

To the Russians, Gasprinskii was very dangerous. He strove, as one critic charged, "to use all the advantages of Russian culture to defend his nationality, therefore, he could not be trusted;" some believed that, despite his partial assimilation, he continually envinced an anti-Russian bias. As a Russianized Muslim, he was a partial insider who knew how to turn the dominant discourse against itself.[100] Such harsh view and negative stereotypes may have been a typical of most educated Russians, yet such subtle prejudices did act to block Gasprinskii's plans. As it was seen later, The Russians accused the *Jadidists* as being interested in nationalism rather than the class war. For this reason a complete rupture became inevitable, and by 1930 all the Jadid reformers had disappeared, many of them having been executed as counter-revolutionaries.[101] The Russians did not welcome a revitalized Muslim minority since it would lead to the political independence.

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[98]Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism,* 28-29.

[99]Ibid, 201-203.

[100]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey," 157.

[101]Geoffrey Wheeler, "National and Religious Consciousness in Soviet Islam" in Max Hayward and William C. Fletcher, ed. *Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Powe*r (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), 191.

Therefore, whatever Gasprinskii's modernist program was, it was perceived as inherently subversive to the Russian government.

Meanwhile, Gasprinskii's ideas of reform met with strong reaction from certain groups of Muslims, the so-called *Qadimists* (the old method). Whereas Russian opponents invariably focused their fear on the politically disruptive implications of Gasprinskii's views, the *Qadimists* tended to see his views as an assault on sacred teachings. These opponents argued that Islam did not need to be reformulated. A reinterpretation of Islam was not only unnecessary but also forbidden since it could lead to invoking anything sacred for secular use. For Gasprinskii, seeking to regenerate the Islamic way meant the reaffirmation of Islamic uniqueness and authenticity, an interpretation of scriptural teaching and its strict application to human needs, without recourse to borrowing from non-Islamic traditions. His movement, then, was "radical" in its designs to rearrange social forces, but it was always firmly within an Islamic framework.

Among Gasprinskii's opponents, some Muslims in Central Asia, especially in Bukhara, were the strongest one. They argued his ideas were heresies, the inevitable result of his dealing with Western culture. The *Qadimists* accused the *Jadidists* of "spreading among Muslims books from abroad, especially by French atheists," and seeking to replace the "old Muslim ways with European ones." In an appeal to Muslims to face the challenge of modernism campaigned by Gasprinskii, another opponent issued his more dogmatic reaction to Gasprinskii. He said "whoever believes in God and Muhammad must be an enemy of the modernists. For them the shari<|'a demands the death penalty."[102] These examples show how the *Qadimists* viewed Gasprinskii's *jadidism.* Their rejection of *jadidism* was coined in term of religious differences. However, the rigid religious doctrine disguised the social dynamics at work. The dominant power elite took shelter behind religious symbolism in order to maintain its privileged socio-economic position.

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[102]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey," 154-156.

R.R. Sharma pointed out that, socio-culturally, the Central Asian society professed the sanctified Islamic tradition, and suffered from the monolithic cultural domination of its traditional intelligentsia, a kind of priestly elite of the society. The native society recruited its elite groups on an exclusively caste-like blood basis, and this consequently led to the process of social inbreeding, thus closing the door on socio-cultural mobility. Since the Muslim cultural tradition itself conferred venerable status on its @ulama<|', in the course of time this enabled the native priestly elite to gain monopolistic control over strategic institutional structures of socio-cultural and educational roles.[103]

In the late nineteenth century, the most numerous and socially and politically dominated group was that of the *Qadimists,* who exercised control over the native economic, socio-cultural, and educational institutions. They vigorously blocked the penetration of all modernizing influences.[104] The most potent tool which enabled them to impose their cultural values was the native education system financed and regulated by religious endowments. An educational system in its social context is, as Karl Mannheim asserted, not merely "a means of realizing abstract ideals of culture," but also a part of the "process of influencing men and women" at multiple levels of social action.[105] The *Qadimists* endeavored to construct a human type that would be ideologically compliant and which would culturally submit to the established institutional pattern. To this end, the role of curriculum in their educational tradition was very important. Therefore, all modest efforts of the *Jadidists* to introduce an element of modernization in the curriculum were strongly opposed. Indeed, the *Qadimists,* who had a long tradition of militant resistance to Russian rule, worked against all other social groups and, in particular, tried to isolate the indigenous population from all European influences. Vambery argued that they

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[103]R.R. Sharma, "Intelligentsia and the Politics of Underdevelopment and Development: A Case Study of Soviet Central Asia, 1917-1940" *International Studies,* XV, 2 (1976), 207

[104]Ibid.

[105]Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (London, 1940), 271.

succeeded in keeping the masses in ignorance of all non-religious knowledge, and in discrediting everything that comes from Europe.[106]

The *Qadimists* desired to perpetuate their hold over the native institutional centers of economic and cultural power. They believed that a free inflow of the so-called European influences was bound to open the window of other ideas that would militate against the established hegemonic structure of ideology. In this context, the resistance was mainly directed against the fear of cultural reform, and it was, therefore, not only directed against the *jadidist* movement, but also against the influence of the Russian culture.

The *Qadimists*' reaction to the *jadidist* movement undoubtedly the direct outcome of the psychological desire to preserve their "religious ideology." But, to a certain degree, it was actually a reflection of their political attitude towards the Russian occupation. It is reasonable to say that the political position of the Muslims under the Russian rule was very weak. Although they had a long tradition of militant resistance to Russian rule, they thought that to oppose the Russian military at the time was impossible. This condition led to the decision to concentrate on a non-cooperative attitude towards the Russian, both politically and culturally. As a justification, they invoked religious reasons. Thus, the non-cooperative attitude was partly the result of an anti-colonialism strategy.

Gasprinskii, on the other hand, believed that independence from the Russian would evolve through adopting some modern ideas and certain aspects of culture, even though some of them might be derived from the Russians. Convinced that such an attitude was right, he wanted to build a new culture appropriate to the demands of modernization. But his struggle to activate the forces of socio-cultural change was blocked not only by the *Qadimists,* but also by his own conceptual formulation, which did not endeavor to question the institutional foundation of his movement.

The subjugated condition of Russian Muslims in the relgious, social, and political spheres in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries provoked certain responses among Russian Muslim leaders. With their commitment to their

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[106]Vambery, *Western Culture,* 278.

religion, these leaders tried to find a solution to their problems. Giving a diagnosis of the situations, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii believed that the real problem was due to the fact that the Muslims implemented Islam only in certain aspects but not in others. He believed that if the Muslims implemented it in all aspects of daily life, and paid attention to the improvement of social and educational fields, they would recover from their backwardness. Therefore, the emergence of the *Jadidist* movement was an endeavor to respond to such a condition.

Gasprinskii laid down the practical principles of the movement and directed it as a socio-cultural movement. Politically, he avoided a reactionary position, while seeking to protect his religious and social initiatives from government interference. His *jadid* ideas, concerned with "worldly affairs," held a position of equal importance with the religious practices. For Gasprinskii, *Jadidism* was essentially concerned with this world, therefore the process of change had to be a main charactertic of this world. His readiness to adapt to new environment, to accept new ideas, and his openness to new experiences all led to the realization of his ideas on the reform of the Muslim educational system and the creation of a common Turkic language.

The distinctive achievements of Gasprinskii, which distinguish him from all other *jadidists* in Russian Islam, consisted precisely in his socio-cultural endeavors. He introduced new ideas and system which were adopted from the West to build his social and educational institutions. In the field of education, Gasprinskii introduced a new system which combined the old element, Islam, as a basis of modernization, with the new elements derived from the system of modern education. Such a combination was believed to be in conformity with the demands of the future, and yet not in opposition to the principles of Islam.

Gasprinskii's struggle for reformation, however, did not run well. The Russians opposed his movement for political reason. Meanwhile the socio-religious and cultural outlook of Gasprinskii provoked the *Qadimists'* strong reaction against him. The *Qadimists* owed their position and power to the very system which was being threatened by Gasprinskii's movement. Therefore, the *Qadimists* refused every change advocated by Gasprinskii, for they thought that the change was considered to be an assault on the religion itself. On the other hand, Gasprinskii argued that

changes were very necessary to bring the Muslims to a new atmosphere of socio-religious life.

3. The Reformation of Muslim Education: Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah

One of the problems that had been faced by Muslim in India in the late nineteenth-century, and in Indonesia in the early twentieth-century was inadequacy of Islamic education to fulfil the demands of developments of the world. The existence of Muslim educational institutions in both countries had been relatively undeveloped. These institutions only concentrated on a limited Islamic knowledge that was mostly related to the religious practice and avoided including modern sciences that were needed in accordance with the demands of modern development. In India, for example, the Muslims in general were not prepared to undertake the study of modern sciences and literature because these were regarded by them as altogether incompatible with their religion. On the other side, the old eastern sciences that were studied by the Muslims were utterly useless and of no practicalimportance.[107] In addition, there were people who wanted progress in trade, agriculture, industry and handicrafts, but Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a prominent Indian thinker, pointed out that all these things depended on education of modern nature.[108] In Indonesia, the Muslim educational institutions which centered in the Pondok Pesantren (the traditional instition of Islamic education), in fact, were isolated from the developments of sciences and modern society. Those who were in the circle of the Pondok Pesantren were not able to solve the problems which arose due to modern developments. The role of physicians, lawyers, engineers, educators, economists, which were needed by community, could not be produced by a traditional institution of Islamic education, but by a modern one. At this point, the Pondok Pesantren did not adequately serve the national plans for modernization.

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[107]M.S. Jain, *The Aligarh Movement: Its Origin and Development 1858-1906* (Agra: Sri Ram Mehra & C0., 1965), 30.
[108]Ibid., 28

Meanwhile, the colonial educational system could not fulfil the wish of the Muslims. In India, the system of education inaugurated by the British was not accepted by the Muslims as it was considered irreligious and an attempt to wean them away from the creed which their fore-fathers had professed.[109] Sayyid Ahmad Khan found that the Muslims had stromh feelings of dislike for the Western system of education and he was convinced that their antagonism to the government educational system was not a "matter of chance." The Muslsms rejected it for a number of reasons which may be traced to four causes: their political trtaditions, religious beliefs, social custom and poverty.[110] Among these reasons, it was because, as Sayyid Ahmad Khan pointed out, the Muslims were bound to know all the tenets of their religion, to discuss them and to regulate their lives accordingly. Based on these reason, therefore, he considered that a purely secular education without religious instructions would be like a body without soul.[111] Besides that, he could never agree that the education of the Muslims should be supervised and controlled by a foreign power. He alleged that the people could not expect any development of national character and integrity through government schools and colleges.[112] He also remarked that any nation wishing to promote national education could not expect to achieve its aims until it took it in its own hands.[113]

In Indonesia, the development of the colonial secular education, which was very discriminative and stressed on the secular science by avoiding religious values in its school curriculum, threatened the culture and spiritual life of Muslim youth. The Dutch educational policy, in fact, proposed to fulfil the colonial government's need for efficient workers to help the Dutch in business and administrative offices.

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[109]Barkat Ali, "The Origin of Moslem Renaissance in India," *The Hindustan Review,* July (1907), 39.

[110]Jain, *The Aligarh Movement,* 29.

[111]Ibid.

[112] Shan Muhammad, *Sir Syed Ahmad Khan: A Political Biography* (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969), 63.

[113]Sir Syed's lecture at Gurdaspur, Punjab, January 27, 1884. Ibid.

These civil servants were usually from the *priyayi* (aristocracy) families.[114] Therefore, when the opposition to the Dutch education emerged, this group did not react but the public began to doubt the benefit of the Dutch education for Indonesia people. It seemed that the collaboration with certain social groups of society was considered very important by the Colonial Government. In the field of education, the *priyayi* class attained several advantages from the Dutch educational policy in Indonesia, and so did the Hindus from the British government in India. The Hindus had not developed the same attachment to Sankrit as the Muslim had welcomed the opportunity to Persian and Arabic. They felt that the government education would give them access to government jobs, and, at this point, they left the Muslims far behind educationally and economically. Consequently, the Hindus had become the favourites of the British government because of their willingness to adopt it, but the Muslims were without any support owing to the hostile propaganda against the rulers emanating from the conservative Muslim circles.[115]

Moreover, the issue of the relation between colonialism and Christianization in the colonialized countries, supported the reaction to the colonial government education. In 1835, for example, when the Muslims of India came to know that the British government intended to start English teaching in all the schools, they submitted an application which stated that the evident object of the scheme was to convert them and to induce the people to become Christians.[116] Although the government thereupon announced a policy of strict religious neutrality, the propaganda of the Christian missionaries had already horrified the Muslims. They even interpreted the Government's sincere assurances of religious neutrality as a cunning device to deprive them of their faith.[117]

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[114]Edwin R Embree, Margaret Sargent Simon, and W Bryant Mumford, *Island India Goes to School* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, n.d.), 97; see also Soebardi, "Islam di Indonesia," *Prisma,* extra edition (1977), 27-29.
[115]Muhammad, *Sir Syed Ahamd Khan,* 55.
[116]Lecture of Syed Mahmud delivered in the Muhammadan Educational Conference on the December 28, 1893 at Aligarh. Ibid., 54.
[117]Ibid.

Meanwhile, the reaction of the Muhammadiyah to the Dutch educational policy was caused, not only by the fact that the Dutch did not honestly want to educate the Indonesian people but only to train the necessary native officials for their own interests, but also by the issue of Christianization. This point was an important issue because in the nineteenth century, in particular, many Dutchmen had great hopes of eliminating the influence of Islam by rapid Christianization of the majority of Indonesians. These hopes were partly based on their assumption that the syncretic nature of Indonesian Islam at the village level would render conversion to Christianity easier in Indonesia than else where in Muslim lands.[118]

Therefore, the Dutch colonial government rended to hand over the education in Indonesia to the missionary works. As it was seen later, this policy was begun in 1905 and was completed in the period of Idenburg, in 1909.[119] Based on this policy, the facilities that were given to the private schools, were more beneficial to the Christian mission. In this case, missionary works obtained greater chances to spread their religion through education. The above-mentioned conditions of the Muslim education encouraged Sayyed Ahmad Khan in India, and Kiyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah, in Indonesia, to strive toward establishing an educational institution for their future generation.

The reformation of Muslim education that was carried out by the Muhammadiyah and the Aligarh movement was an effort to solve the condition of the Muslim education which was considered undeveloped. These movements wished, as Sayyid Ahmad Khan said, to provide a system of education and learning for the Muslims that should be in accordance with the needs of the time. If people were not educated as the time demanded they became poor, idle and incompetent, and finally were demoted in the scale of progress.[120] These movements endeavored

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[118]In spite of much governmental assistance, Christianity had been able to spread only very slowly, and even then only among Indonesians living in areas which had not previously been Islamized. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition* (Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1956), 204-205.

[119]Soegarda Poerbakawatja, *Pendidikan dalam Alam Indonesia Merdeka* (Jakarta: Gunung Mulia, 1970), 29.

[120]Jain, *The Aligarh Movement,* 36.

to reform Islamic education by introducing new values and a system which were in conformity with the demands of the future without neglecting the principles of Islamic teachings. The reformation included two important aspects, namely, ideal and technical aspects. The Muhammadiyah formulated this ideal aspect in its educational aim in order to shape a Muslim who had a good character, a capability of religious as well as secular sciences, and a willingness to work for the progress of his society.

Having special objectives, the purposes of the Aligarh College were to impart liberal education to the Muslims; to dispel those illusory traditions of the past which hindered Muslims' progress; to remove some prejudices which have hitherto exercised a baneful influence on Muslim race; to reconcile Oriental learning with Western literature and science; to inspire the dreamy minds of the people of the East the practical energy which belong to those of the West; to make the Muslims of India worthy and useful subjects of the British Crown; to inspire in them that loyalty which springs not from servile submission to a foreign rule, but from genuine appreciation of the blessing of good government; these were the objectives which the founders of the College articulated in their policies.[121]

The purpose of the Muhammadiyah system of education is to form an ideal Muslim who ought to have an equilibrium between faith and knowledge, between religious science and secular science. This purpose is based on Islam which teaches not only religious matter (in a limited sense) to its followers but also all aspects related with the life in this world. From this view *'ilm* (science) should not be understood as a rigid division into religious and secular sciences, as generally people did, but rather, as Sayyed Hossein Nasr said, to understand Islamic sciences in their essence, requires an understanding of some of the principles of Islam itself.[122] These principles are based on the universality of Islamic teachings, which emphasize the equilibrium between the life of the world and of Hereafter. Based on

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[121]See Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, ed., *Addresses and Speeches Relating to the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh from its Foundation in 1875-1898* (Aligarh, December 1898), 31-32.

[122]Sayyed Hossein Nasr, *Science and Civilization in Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1968), 22.

this understanding, a truly Islamic system of education should, therefore, teach its followers not only the beliefs and religious practices of Islam, but also their relevance and application to the worldly life, especially, to the demands of modern development.

To this end, besides formulating the ideal of their educational aims, the Muhamadiyah and the Aligarh movements also brought about technical reformation of education by introducing some changes in the methods of learning, organization of education, and rationalization of subject and curriculum.

Many aspects of technical reformation of education are taken from the modern educational system. Replying to all the letters which were sent by the community asking in what ways was Aligarh College to be organized, Sayyid Ahmad said that it was to be modeled after Oxford and Cambridge Universities and the students would have to live in hostels. *Namaz* (pray) was compulsory for both Shi'I and Sunni students. The presence of every student at *namaz* was essential and regular attendance was to be maintained.[123] School life revolved around the activities of the residential students. The headmaster was the Provost and supervised various hostels through Proctors and sub-Proctors. Discipline was strict but paternal. Cases of indiscipline were, therefore, rare and punishments were mostly psychological and corrective. Every hostel was encouraged to chalk out its own program of games, campfires, social occasions and picnics. Dramas were staged once a year and generally depicted the political and social problems of the community. Religious instruction was an integral part of the program. Apart from the regular classes, there were seminars and lectures. Every hostel had a mosque and attendance at the prayers was compulsory.[124]

One of the remarkable features of the College which made it different from other educational institutions in India was that most of the students were to live within the precincts of the college-away from the family atmosphere. Through this way it was hoped that the construction of the character and religious spirit of the

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[123]Muhammad, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad,* 68.
[124]*A History of the Freedom Movement,* vol. III, 1906-1936, part II (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1963), 418-419.

students would be more effective and successful. Although the Muhammadiyah did not adopt the approach of Aligarh in formulating the religious life of the students, the former provided some kinds of practical and social duties for the students in its extra-curriculum. Religious activities were performed in class seminars as well as on campus such as, *Dar al-Arqam* (religious training), which was held every Ramadhan, and outside campus in the form of social participation in the community which was usually held coinciding with remembrance of the special events in the Muslim calendar such as 'Id al-Fitri, Hajj and some other important days. It was hoped that by these religious and social activities, students would implement Islam in practice.

The method of learning that was used by the Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah schools was the class system rather than the book system as it was used in the Pondok Pesantren in Indonesia and the Deoband School in India. The lessons were given in the classroom. The teacher gave the lesson to a group of pupils of nearly the same age and knowledge. He also had to monitor the progress of the students by giving them formal examinations regularly, and individual marks. Thus, the student was able to move from grade to grade until he completed his education, whereupon he was awarded a certificate. The school even provided scholarships for the students who had a good achievement during their stay in school or when their examination was completed.[125]

Both the Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah educational institutions were organized as independent institutions and not as part of the household of the leading teacher, nor as a function of the local mosque. Sayyid Ahmad, besides starting the publication of *Tahdib al-Akhlaq* also formed the *Committee Khwastqar Taraqi-e-Musalaman-e Hindustan* (The Committee for the Better Diffusion and Advancement of Learning Amongst the Muslim of India), at Benares long before the Aligarh College was established. The Committee itself was meant to inverstigae the causes whichprevented the Muslim community from taking advantage of the

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[125]For more detail information of the Aliogarh scholarships, see Shan Muhammad, ed., *The Aligarh Movements: Basic Documents, 1864-1898* (Meerut, New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakasan, 1978), 450-455.

educational system established by the government, and to suggest mean by which modern education could be spread among them.[126] The Committee having studied the causes, decided that it would not only consider the means suited to remove their difficulties at that time, but would also consider the ways which might be of real use to the Muslims in the future as well. It was, therefore, resolved to establish as educational institution for the future generations. It was also agreed upon that the old Muslim books and their tone did not suit the age, as they failed to encourage independent thinking and contained many inaccuracies and therefore neededto be replaced by new books.

Their spirit was incompatible with the new age and the Committee was convinced that through them the Muslim community could never attain the knowledge of new subjects, and without the knowledge it was bound to remain backward. With these ideas they formed another committee known as *Majlis-e-Khazan-ul-Bazaat-ul-Tasees-ul-Uloom-ul-Muslimeen* (The Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College Fund Committee). The Committee was to collect funds for the establishment of a Muslim college.[127] Thus, it is clear that the organization of the Aligarh College had been charted prior to its actual establishment. It was from this committee that the policy of education was determined. Different from the Aligarh, the Muhammadiyah established its Department of Education to manage its school. This Department was responsible for the establishment and the application of educational policy of Muhammadiyah, academically and administratively, in every singlr of its schools. Both the Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah believed that Muslim education could progress only when Muslims themselves managed their educational institutions efficiently.

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[126]The result of the investigation of the Committee as mentioned in "Translation of the Report of the Members of the Select Committee" Muhammad, ed., *The Aligarh Movement,* 337-380.

[127]Muhammad, *Sir Syed Ahmad,* 65; for details of the rules and regulations of the Committee see "Rules for the Guidance and Management of the College Fund Committee (1872 AD/1289 H)" Muhammad, ed., *The Aligarh Movement,* 381-386.

The idea of reformation of Muslim education included the rationalization of the curriculum. To achieve the purpose of its education, the Muhammadiyah decided to include religious as well as secular subjects such as mathematics, natural sciencies and humanities into its schools, the ration of which is depended on the type of school. However, one of the important innovations of the educational system was undoubtedly the opportunity it provided for girls to obtain an education, even permitting them to study alongside male students in the class. The reformation of the Muhammadiyah education was also a response to the dualist educational system in Indonesia. With regard to the Pondok Pesantren, the Muhammadiyah changed its model and reformed its organization, curriculum, and technique of learning. This new model school was called madrasah, in which both religious and secular subjects were taught. Following the pattern of the schools established by the Government, the Muhammadiyah set up such a school model and added the religious subject in its curriculum. In consequence, the number of the subjects that were taught at the Muhammadiyah school were more than those in the government school. It was believed that by including such a curriculum in its school it would be able to produce a graduate in accordance to the plans of the organization. A well-organized school as well as a very positive response from the governmend and communities, accelerated the development of the Muhammadiyah schools. In 1985, it was reported that this organization had managed 14.385 schools from Kindergarten to Senior High School, and 72 Universities and Colleges throughout Indonesia.[128]

In the case of curriculum of Aligarh, Sayyid Ahmad said that it should be flexible enough to appeal to a broad variety of purposes. The point was to reach as many people as possible with what kind of education they might be willing to pursue.[129] He further proposed that the curriculum of Aligarh, as he conceived it in

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[128]"Laporan Ketua Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah pada Resepsi Pembukaan Muktamar ke 41 di Stadion Sriwedari tanggal 7 Desember 1985," in *Siapa Yang Tak Tahu Muhammadiyah* (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan RI, 1986), 14; Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Majlis Diktilitbang, *Warta PTM,* 3, IV (September, 1989),1. The total number of Colleges and Universities now around 166 + 12 PTA.
[129]David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 128.

1872, would consist of general education from ages thirteen to eighteen, followed by specialized study, supposedly analogous to the type at Oxford and Cambridge. At the preparatory level there would be four subject areas-religion, literature, mathematics, natural science. Natural science would deal with elementary physics, mathematics, with algebra and geometry. Literature was defined as including language, composition, history, geography, logic, politics, and various topics in philosophy. The course in religion would cover the life and sayings of the Prophet, commentaries on the Qur'an, jurisprudence, and general principles.[130] These subjects could be pursued in either English or Urdu. Students hoping for high government posts would study English. At the same time the English Department could train people capable of transmitting modern learning to the wider Indian public. Aside from English, these students would have to learn Latin and either Arabic, Persian, or Urdu.[131] The college was to be such an institution as would suit not only the present but also the future needs of the Muslim community. The Committee for Better Advancement of Learning was expected to inaugurate an educational system for the future generation. Although such a system could not possibly be brought into working order all at once, the whole fabric was to be considered and only such portions would be started as were visible.

Based on above description of the curriculum, in 1875, the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College was started as a school. In 1878, college classes were started, so that the students who had passed the entrance examination from the college could continue their studies. In 1881, for the same reason B.A. classes were also started. The same year a special class, known as the Civil Service Preparatory Class, was also started in order to enable young Muslim boys to prepare themselves specially for the Competitive Indian Civil Service Examinations. In 1887, a class was opened for preparing student for the engineering college at Rookee. In due course, M.A. and LL.B. classes were also opened.[132]

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[130]Muhammad, *The Aligarh Movement,* 370-371.
[131]Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation,* 125.
[132]Jain, *The Aligarh Movement,* 41-42; see also "Report of the Progress of Education in the M.A.O. College 1877," Muhammad, ed., *The Aligarh Movement,* 482.

Although the Aligarh College was founded primarily for Muslim, it openly welcomed Hindu students both as day scholars from the town and as boarders in separate Hindu bungalows. In the first year the student body was totally Muslims, but thereafter there was always a significant number of Hindu.[133] The openness to invite non-Muslim students to study at Aligarh was one of the policies aimed at creating the principles of fellow feeling between Muslims and Hidus. In this case Sayyid Ahmad Khan explained that the school was non-sectarian both in the student body and for the members of several administrative committee except that the Hindu's sensivity for the caste system was respected, and religious education was imparted separately to Hindu and Muslim students.[134] Relating to the religious instruction that was given to the students who came from different religious aspirations, he said:

> *I am glad to report that Sunni and Shi'I lads are instructed in the principle of their religions by Sunni and Shi'I professors respectively. If similar arrangements be made by Hindu gentlement for the instruction of the lads of their race in the principles of* Dharma Shastras *and other religious books, I am sure the Committee would gladly give an opportunity for their doing so. It is thehearty desire of the founders of this college that every pupil, to whatever sect he may belong, should preserve the views and tenets of his own faith and then be benefited by the study of arts and sciences, rules of good behaviour ang morality.[135]*

Besides such consideration, the emphasis of the importance of the English language at the Aligarh college perhaps gave another reason why the non-Muslim students joined to this college. Several pragmatic reasons of the use of English were offered by Sayyid Ahmad. He noted that Indian could not hope to gain government jobs without knowledge of English; participation in modern trade and international

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[133]Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First,* 170.

[134]Hafeez Malik, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernism in India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 189.

[135]Muhammad, ed., *The Aligarh Movement,* 488.

commerce was not possible without it, international politics and the relative development of other countries remained unknown; and finally, the Indians could not be effective in the political processes of India even if the British Government offered them a generous share.[136]

On the orther side, the Muhammadiyah schools have received a positive response from both the community and government. As in Aligarh, the students who enrolled at the Muhammadiyah schools came fromvarious religious aspirations and social groups. Nakamura concluded through his research in Kotagede, Yogyakarta, that there were many individuals from a much wider spectrum of religious orientations and social status groups who sent their children to the Muhammadiyah schools.[137] The government gave them subsidies because the Muhammadiyah schools had really fulfilled the requirements outlined by the Department of Education.[138]

Judging by the responses from the community as well as from the governments, although there were still reactions from some groups of people, the Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah schools were well accepted. The reactions gradually reduced and changed to be a positive response as people realized the need for such a kind of education. The Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah had fulfilled their need by offering a model of education that was in conformity with the demands of modern developments.

The reformation of Muslim education that is carried out by the Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah is actually a precise response to the socio-religious conditions of Muslim in India and Indonesia. Although there are some differences between these both movements, their essential spirit is similar. The Aligarh concentrates on higher education at one educational institution, therefore, there is no need to spread such institution in other part of India. The Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, at the beginning, established lower and secondary levels of schools and spread ita schools

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[136]Malik, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad,* 189.

[137]Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises Over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in Central Javanese Town* (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1983), 89.

[138]Poerbakawatja, *Pendidikan,* 24-30, 215.

among the Indonesian societies in all part of Indonesia. In its later period, it also concentrated on higher education.

The educational institutions that are established by the Aligarh and the Muhammadiyah adopt new elements of Western educational system, and, on the other hand, preserve Islam as a basis of their education. Therefore, in some aspects, they are very different from the traditional Muslim education, and especially the Muhammadiyah, from the Colonial Government schools. The difference, for the Muhammadiyah, is not only in technical aspects but, actually, in the aim of education itself.

CLOSING NOTES

The condition of the Muslim world is actually keeping on going process until arriving at an ideal stage. The process itself has lasted since the early nineteenth century through modernization. But the result is not the same among the Muslim countries. Some are trying to reconcile between Islam and worldly affairs, the others are still on the stage of transition from pre-Islamic tradition to Islam. The latter is, especially, concerned with the regious rituals. Therefore, the modernization process in the Muslim world covers two themes: purification and reformation. The first is concerned with the religious aspects of Islam, and the second is concerned with the social, politic, economy, and culture. Both are believed to have a theological basis of *tajdid* in Islam.

Tha application of *tajdid* in the history of Islam has differences in terms of the themes of thought and movement. Although, in certain issues, each of them has relationship. In this case the role of modernist Muslims in certain country, such as Abduh, is very important. His reformist thought not only influences many modernist figures, but also triggers some modernist movements in the Muslim countries. Some Muslim modernists in Indonesia besides trace their root from Mekka, they also claim to have learned from Abduh's thoughts. As generally have been known that the modernist Muslims in Egypt are elitist who concentrate on thought. While in some other Muslim countries are more populist, whose modernist thoughts are expressed in various socio-religious movements.

Major issues of modernization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries some of which are continuous problems faced by the Muslims. Those are especially concerned with the issues of religious rituals. The efforts to be done become the main mission of purification movements. Meanwhile, the changes are also conducted concerning the aspects of social, economy, and culture. Reformation of education becomes the most important issue, nearly all of the Muslim world. Two important things relating to this reformation are: management and purpose of Muslim education. The first is concerned with the technical process of teaching and learning, including its methodology. The second is related to the end of education.

For the purpose of a new system of education the reformulation of curriculum is needed to complete the demand of developmnet. Different from the curriculum that was taught before, the new one combines the religious and secular knowledge as well.

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